Craig A. Brannagan

Ricardo Charleston pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and failure to comply with probation.

This decision concerns his sentencing.

The court reviewed the circumstances of the offence, the offender's background (including sexual abuse, family dynamics, education, employment, and extensive criminal record related to addiction and mental health), and the severe impact on the victim.

The Crown sought a 10-year sentence, while the defence sought 5 years, arguing for time served due to pre-sentence custody and rehabilitation efforts.

The judge imposed a global sentence of 7 years (84 months), crediting 70 months for pre-sentence custody and mitigating factors, resulting in a further 14 months to serve.

A concurrent 3-month sentence was imposed for the probation breach.

The applicant, charged with second degree murder, applied for a stay of proceedings or an increase in juror remuneration, arguing that the current payment framework under the Administration of Justice Act breaches his ss. 11(d) and 11(f) Charter rights by excluding lower-income individuals and creating an unrepresentative jury.

The court dismissed the application, finding that jury representativeness depends on the random selection of the jury roll, not diversity, and that the applicant failed to provide evidence that financial hardship disproportionately affects lower-paid workers or that increased remuneration would resolve the issue.

K.S., a young person, was sentenced after being found guilty of common assault, aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and assisting Jacob A. to escape.

She was acquitted of second-degree murder.

The court considered whether the gateway to custody was open and if further custody was warranted, given her 242 days in secure detention.

Based on psychological and presentence reports indicating low risk of reoffending and positive trajectory, the court imposed a 3-year probation order with specific conditions, a 2-year weapons prohibition, and a DNA order, declining further incarceration.

A young person, K.S., was charged with multiple offences including common assault, aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, assisting Jacob A. to escape, and second-degree murder, all stemming from a violent incident at a party.

The court found K.S. guilty of common assault on two individuals (A.D. and F.K.), aggravated assault and assault with a weapon on M.O., and assisting Jacob A. to escape.

However, K.S. was acquitted of second-degree murder due to reasonable doubt regarding her direct participation and intent in the fatal stabbing of F.N. The judgment details K.S.'s role as an accomplice to Jacob's rampage, balancing the Crown's theory of aiding and abetting against the defence's argument of protective behaviour.

A young person charged with second degree murder, accessory after the fact, aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and three counts of assault simpliciter arising from stabbings at a party in Toronto on October 31, 2019, was the subject of a Crown application to permit two key eyewitnesses to testify via videoconference under section 714.1 of the Criminal Code.

The defence opposed the application for two witnesses.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that the witnesses' mere preference to testify remotely due to COVID-19 health concerns, without evidence of personal vulnerability or exceptional circumstances, was insufficient to justify departure from the default standard of in-person testimony in a serious criminal matter where credibility was central to the case.

The accused, Marvin Small, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, challenging his continued detention by a Justice of the Peace.

He argued for a material change in circumstances based on the proposed addition of electronic monitoring, a new surety (KN), an increased monetary pledge from his girlfriend (TT), and trial delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found that neither TT nor KN were suitable sureties, rendering electronic monitoring ineffective.

The increased monetary pledge did not address the core concern of surety supervision.

Furthermore, the COVID-19 related delays were largely duplicative of arguments made at the initial bail hearing.

Consequently, the court found no material change in circumstances, dismissed the application, and maintained the accused's detention.

The Crown applied to have the respondent designated a Dangerous Offender following his convictions for overcoming resistance by choking, uttering a threat to cause bodily harm, forcible confinement, and sexual assault causing bodily harm.

The court found that the predicate offences were serious personal injury offences and that the respondent constituted a threat to the public due to a pattern of repetitive, persistent, and aggressive behaviour, as well as a failure to control his sexual impulses.

Concluding that a determinate sentence followed by a long-term supervision order would not adequately protect the public, the court designated the respondent a Dangerous Offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable period of time contrary to section 11(b).

The accused was charged with impaired driving on May 8, 2019, and was scheduled for trial on October 3-4, 2019, resulting in approximately 17 months of delay.

Applying the Jordan framework, the court found that although the delay was concerning and disappointing, it did not constitute constitutionally intolerable delay.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

Randi Wasylyk was charged with unlawful possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and accessory after the fact to discharging a firearm.

The charges stemmed from an incident where Daniel Green discharged a firearm and then placed the weapon in Wasylyk's satchel shortly before their arrest.

The court conducted a blended voir dire and trial.

The central issues were whether Wasylyk knew about the firearm or was wilfully blind to its presence, and whether she intended to possess it to assist Green in evading police.

The court found the defence's evidence plausible and consistent, raising a reasonable doubt regarding Wasylyk's knowledge and intent to possess the firearm.

Consequently, Wasylyk was found not guilty on all counts.

B.Z. was found guilty by a jury of sexual assault and unlawful confinement.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the violent nature of the assault, non-consensual vaginal penetration, and the victim's emotional trauma, and mitigating factors, such as the offender's lack of prior criminal record and educational background.

The court rejected the defense's submission for a lower sentence and the request to stay the forcible confinement conviction based on the Kienapple principle, finding the acts distinct.

A sentence of 42 months concurrent for both convictions was imposed, along with mandatory ancillary orders, but restitution was denied due to insufficient evidence of the precise amount.

Randi Wasylyk, charged with firearm offences, applied to exclude a firearm from evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found no breaches of ss. 8 and 9, as the arrest and search incident to arrest were lawful based on reasonable grounds.

However, the court found breaches of ss. 10(a) and 10(b) due to delayed notification of arrest reasons and unreasonable delay in facilitating access to counsel.

Applying the Grant factors, the court determined that despite the seriousness of the Charter breaches, the reliable nature of the firearm evidence and society's strong interest in prosecuting firearm offences meant its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed, and the firearm was deemed admissible.

The defendant was convicted of assault with a weapon and threatening death following a knife attack in a restaurant, and assault on a police officer.

The trial judge had previously stayed all charges except assault with a weapon due to police brutality during arrest.

At sentencing, the Crown sought 90 days jail while the defence sought an absolute discharge.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 12 months probation, finding that a nine-month conditional sentence was appropriate when accounting for the Charter breach involving excessive police force, pre-trial detention, and lengthy bail conditions.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm, assault with a weapon, and uttering death threats following an altercation at a restaurant where he stabbed the complainant in the face.

Upon arrest, police officers used excessive force, including unjustified pepper spray and baton strikes to the accused's face while he was handcuffed.

The court found the accused guilty of the assault charges, rejecting his self-defence claim.

However, due to the severe police brutality violating sections 7 and 12 of the Charter, the court stayed the remaining charges (assault police, weapons, drugs, and threats) as a remedy under section 24(1), leaving the main assault convictions to be addressed in sentencing.

Sentencing decision following convictions for multiple historical sexual offences against a child relative committed over three distinct incidents.

The court treated denunciation, general deterrence, and separation from society as the paramount sentencing objectives, while considering the offender's Gladue factors and Aboriginal background.

The offences involved repeated sexual touching, invitation to sexual touching, oral sex, digital anal penetration, and anal rape of a child between six and ten years old, coupled with a breach of trust by an adult family member.

The court held that the gravity of the offences warranted a penitentiary sentence notwithstanding the offender's personal and community supports, and imposed a global sentence of eight years plus ancillary orders.

Judge-alone criminal trial concerning thirteen historical sexual offence counts alleged against two child complainants in a family setting.

The court reviewed the essential elements of sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault under ss. 151, 152, and 271 of the Criminal Code, and applied the reasonable doubt standard count by count.

The judge found the accused's denials untruthful and found the second complainant credible and reliable, but concluded the first complainant's evidence could not safely be relied upon.

The accused was acquitted on all counts relating to the first complainant and convicted on all counts relating to the second complainant.

The accused, a Niagara Regional Police officer, was charged with assaulting his wife, also a police officer, on November 25, 2013.

The complainant alleged the accused was the aggressor who chased her through the house and assaulted her.

The accused claimed the complainant was the aggressor.

The trial examined credibility and the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Despite finding the accused's evidence unreliable due to his manipulative and jealous behavior, and despite concerns about inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, the court found reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.

The applicant filed a police misconduct complaint arising from a stop and search during the G20 summit.

The OIPRD investigated and directed the Chief of Police to hold a disciplinary hearing.

Because more than six months had passed, the Chief applied to the Police Services Board for an extension of time.

The Board denied the extension without notifying the applicant, allowing him to make submissions, or providing reasons for its decision.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court quashed the Board's decision, holding that the Board breached its duty of procedural fairness by failing to provide the applicant with notice, an opportunity to be heard, and reasons for its decision.