Trevin Mark David

The offender, M.S., was found guilty by a jury of sexual assault against his stepdaughter, SLF.

This was a re-sentencing after a successful appeal of an earlier conviction.

The court addressed two main issues: whether the Crown proved both alleged acts of sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt (the "apartment incident" and the "house incident"), and whether the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, justified a departure from the four-year sentence imposed at the first trial.

The court found both incidents proven, discrediting a defence witness's testimony.

It also determined that Friesen rendered the original sentence unfit, as it emphasized higher sentences for sexual offences against children, particularly adolescents, and the primacy of denunciation and deterrence.

The court imposed a sentence of seven years' imprisonment, along with various ancillary orders.

Armen Avansi pleaded guilty to child abduction and disobeying a court order after taking his nearly three-year-old son to Armenia for over two years, violating a parenting order.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the child's young age, the prolonged ordeal, the breach of a court order, and the significant emotional and financial impact on the victim and her family.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea and no prior criminal record.

The court imposed a sentence of two years less a day of real incarceration, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation for child abduction cases, and ordered restitution for specific expenses.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from charge to the anticipated end of trial was 22.5 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown argued that exceptional circumstances, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the time required to vet a search warrant involving a confidential informant, justified the delay.

The court rejected these arguments, finding that the primary cause of the delay was the police's unacceptable and apathetic approach to providing disclosure.

After deducting 89 days for continuing trial dates and 9 days for officer illness, the net delay remained over 19 months.

The application was granted and a stay of proceedings was ordered.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm after his vehicle drifted into oncoming traffic, resulting in a fatal collision.

The Crown argued the accused was awake but inattentive for 14 seconds.

The defence argued there was a reasonable possibility the accused fell asleep at the wheel without prior warning.

The court found that the driving was objectively dangerous, but there was a reasonable possibility the accused fell asleep and had no reason to foresee the risk of falling asleep.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an incident in a hot tub at a cottage.

The Crown alleged that the complainant did not consent to the sexual activity, while the accused testified that the complainant affirmatively consented to both vaginal and attempted anal intercourse.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess credibility and found the accused's evidence to be straightforward and believable, raising a reasonable doubt.

Conversely, the court found material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and conflicts with other witnesses' testimonies.

The accused was found not guilty.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, sought to confirm his right to a trial by judge and jury.

The Crown argued that the accused must be tried by judge alone because the Crown had not expressly consented to the accused's re-election to a jury trial at the assignment court.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the Crown's conduct at the assignment court, where the Crown Attorney actively participated in scheduling a jury trial without objection, constituted a clear and unequivocal waiver of the procedural requirement for express consent.

The court confirmed the accused's right to a trial by judge and jury.

The applicants, charged with firearms offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The total delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

However, the court found several periods of delay were attributable to the defence, including time taken to retain counsel, scheduling conflicts for a joint preliminary hearing, and a late request for disclosure that delayed committal.

After deducting the defence delay, the remaining delay for both applicants fell below the 30-month ceiling.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused was charged with failing to stop after an accident resulting in bodily harm under s. 320.16(2) of the Criminal Code.

After his vehicle collided with a bicycle, the cyclist punched the accused in the face, prompting the accused to drive away out of fear.

The court found the accused had a reasonable excuse for failing to stop at the scene.

The Crown argued that the accused had a continuing obligation to report the accident once it was safe to do so.

The court rejected this argument, holding that s. 320.16 does not create a continuing offence, and a reasonable excuse at the time of the failure to stop is a complete defence.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with failing to stop and provide name and address after a motor vehicle collision that resulted in bodily harm, contrary to section 320.16(2) of the Criminal Code.

The accused had collided with a cyclist on a Toronto street.

After the collision, the cyclist punched the accused through the car window, injuring him.

The accused drove away without stopping or providing his name and address.

The central issue was whether the accused had a reasonable excuse for failing to stop and provide information, and if so, whether that excuse was a complete defence or whether the accused remained obligated to report the accident to police at a later time.

The Crown applied to have the respondent designated a Dangerous Offender following his convictions for overcoming resistance by choking, uttering a threat to cause bodily harm, forcible confinement, and sexual assault causing bodily harm.

The court found that the predicate offences were serious personal injury offences and that the respondent constituted a threat to the public due to a pattern of repetitive, persistent, and aggressive behaviour, as well as a failure to control his sexual impulses.

Concluding that a determinate sentence followed by a long-term supervision order would not adequately protect the public, the court designated the respondent a Dangerous Offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving, assault with a weapon, fail to remain, assault, and uttering threats following an altercation that began outside a nightclub, continued on the road, and culminated in a McDonald's parking lot.

The court found the accused guilty of dangerous driving and assault with a weapon for deliberately driving his SUV at and striking a pedestrian in the parking lot, as well as failing to remain at the scene.

The accused was acquitted of the assault and uttering threats charges due to reasonable doubt arising from conflicting testimony and the fast-paced nature of the physical altercation.

The accused, charged with attempted murder and other serious offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to trial delay.

The total delay was approximately 35 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court calculated the net delay for each accused by deducting defence delay, including periods of counsel unavailability and a change of counsel.

The court found that the delay caused by a trial adjournment requested by the defence due to late disclosure of a cell phone extraction report was not attributable to the defence.

The net delay for both accused remained above the 30-month ceiling, and the court granted the stay of proceedings.

The offender was convicted by a jury of importing 4.6 kilograms of opium into Canada, concealed inside an air compressor shipped from Iran.

The Crown sought a five-year sentence, while the defence sought three to three and a half years, citing the offender's status as a first-time offender and the recent cancer diagnosis of his wife as a collateral consequence.

The court found insufficient evidence to reduce the sentence based on collateral consequences and sentenced the offender to four years and six months imprisonment, along with a ten-year weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The Crown sought to adduce a statement made by the accused to police after he turned himself in.

The accused had refused to be video or audio recorded but agreed to answer questions, which the officer noted down.

The defence opposed the admission of the statement, arguing it was involuntary due to the police's failure to video record the interview as required by appellate jurisprudence.

The court found that the police did not deliberately avoid recording the statement, but rather respected the accused's refusal to be recorded while answering questions.

The court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary and admissible.

The accused was charged with two offences: transferring a restricted handgun without authorization contrary to s. 99(1) of the Criminal Code, and failing to report the loss or theft of the handgun contrary to s. 105(1) of the Criminal Code.

A restricted Glock 17 handgun registered to the accused was found in the possession of another individual during a search warrant execution.

The accused testified that the gun was stolen from his locked safe without his knowledge.

The Crown argued the accused unlawfully transferred the gun.

The court found that the accused's evidence, while not believed, raised a reasonable possibility that the gun was stolen rather than transferred, and accordingly dismissed both counts.

The defendant was charged with possession of cocaine following an arrest by York Regional Police officers who were conducting surveillance on a suspected drug dealer.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the arrest and subsequent search of his vehicle.

The court found that the officers lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the defendant.

The evidence relied upon by the arresting officer was based primarily on an unreliable observation by another officer who claimed to have witnessed a "hand-to-hand" drug transaction.

The court found the arrest and searches to be unlawful Charter breaches and excluded all evidence obtained subsequent to the breach under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was acquitted.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking following a vehicle search.

The Crown alleged the accused possessed 497.32 grams of cocaine found in a concealed compartment in the rear seat of his BMW.

The accused challenged the arrest and search on Charter grounds, arguing arbitrary detention and unreasonable search and seizure.

The court found a breach of section 9 of the Charter due to the officer's failure to confirm complete bail conditions before arrest, but declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2).

The accused was convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking but acquitted of failure to comply with bail conditions due to reasonable doubt regarding whether the second cell phone was operational.

The accused applied under section 523(2)(b) of the Criminal Code to vacate a detention order following the conclusion of a preliminary hearing on charges of attempted murder, aggravated assault, and kidnapping arising from a violent group beating.

The Crown's case relied on identification evidence including a post-arrest statement, officer identification from surveillance video, and dock identification.

The court found that the preliminary hearing evidence revealed significant admissibility challenges to the Crown's key identification evidence, particularly regarding the voluntariness of the statement and the reliability of the officer's identification.

Although the objective gravity of the offence remained extreme, the apparent strength of the Crown's case was substantially diminished.

The court granted the application and ordered the accused's release on strict conditions, finding a material change in circumstances sufficient to reconsider the necessity of detention on the tertiary ground.

The accused applied under s. 487.3(4) of the Criminal Code to terminate a sealing order over materials related to an earlier search warrant that had been authorized but never executed.

The accused argued the earlier Information to Obtain was necessary to assess the credibility and reliability of confidential informant information and to prepare a Garofoli challenge to a later executed warrant that led to firearm charges.

The court held that Stinchcombe disclosure obligations in a Garofoli context are limited to materials placed before the authorizing justice for the warrant under challenge.

Because the earlier warrant materials were not before the issuing justice for the executed warrant and the accused failed to establish likely relevance, disclosure was not warranted.

The court further held that unsealing procedures cannot be used as a collateral method to obtain disclosure beyond the Garofoli framework.

The application to terminate the sealing order was dismissed.

The accused jointly applied under s. 24(1) of the Charter for a stay of proceedings on the basis that their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) had been violated.

The overall delay between arrest and scheduled trial was approximately 999 days (nearly 33 months).

Applying the analytical framework from R. v. Morin, the court assessed waiver, reasons for delay, and prejudice.

After deducting defence and neutral delay, the court found approximately 550.5 days (about 18.08 months) of Crown and institutional delay, which was only slightly above the guideline range.

Given the seriousness of the charges and the finding that most prejudice arose from the existence of the charges rather than delay itself, the court concluded the accused had not established a Charter breach.