Matthew Giovinazzo

The court sentenced Shane Campbell following his guilty plea to three firearms offences arising from a gunfight in a Toronto residential neighbourhood.

The decision details the circumstances of the offences, Campbell’s personal background, and the aggravating and mitigating factors considered.

The court imposed a global sentence of eight-and-one-half years, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, but also recognizing Campbell’s remorse, family support, and the impact of systemic racism and harsh pre-trial custody conditions.

The accused, charged with armed robbery and related offences, brought an application to stay the proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The anticipated delay to the end of trial was 34 months, exceeding the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Crown successfully rebutted the presumption of unreasonableness by demonstrating that the delay was caused by the exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic and periods of defence delay.

The court also found that the Crown acted reasonably in refusing to sever the accused's trials.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from charge to the anticipated end of trial was 22.5 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown argued that exceptional circumstances, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the time required to vet a search warrant involving a confidential informant, justified the delay.

The court rejected these arguments, finding that the primary cause of the delay was the police's unacceptable and apathetic approach to providing disclosure.

After deducting 89 days for continuing trial dates and 9 days for officer illness, the net delay remained over 19 months.

The application was granted and a stay of proceedings was ordered.

The accused, Nikolas Morello, was charged with assault against his intimate partner, Megan Charette.

The case involved conflicting testimonies, issues of credibility, and video evidence.

The court found Ms. Charette's testimony to be inconsistent and manipulative, raising serious doubts about her credibility.

While the video showed some physical contact, the court could not ascertain the accused's intent with the required certainty.

The defence of property argument was also briefly addressed, with the court emphasizing caution in applying it in intimate partner violence contexts.

The accused was found not guilty due to reasonable doubt.

The accused, Raphael Fortune, was charged with fraud over $5,000 and possession of proceeds of crime in relation to an alleged diamond investment scheme.

The complainant, Mike Rantissi, invested a significant sum with Fortune based on representations of no risk and high profits, but never received diamonds or his money back.

The court found that Fortune intentionally deceived Rantissi, diverting the funds for personal expenses rather than purchasing diamonds as promised.

The accused was found guilty of both counts.

The appellant, a rap artist, appealed his conviction and sentence for uttering a threat to cause bodily harm.

The charge arose from a YouTube music video containing lyrics and images directed at the complainant, a music promoter.

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial, raised 14 grounds of appeal, including issues related to the complainant's credibility, disclosure of a Facebook message, cross-examination on his criminal record, and the trial judge's handling of various procedural matters.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, handling of disclosure, or sentencing.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that overturned the accused's convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration.

The appeal judge had found that the Crown failed to prove a breath demand was made, which precluded reliance on the evidentiary shortcuts in former ss. 258(1)(c) and (g) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, confirming that while the lawfulness of a demand need not be proven to use the shortcuts, the fact that a demand was made is a condition precedent.

The Court also agreed that the defence's failure to object to the certificate's admissibility when tendered did not prevent them from arguing in closing that the Crown failed to prove an essential element of the offence.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after it invited the trial judge to acquit the accused to avoid non-compliance with a disclosure order.

The trial judge had ruled that the Drug Recognition Expert's rolling log was relevant and subject to disclosure under Stinchcombe, but that section 320.36(2) of the Criminal Code prohibited its disclosure, rendering the section unconstitutional.

On appeal, the Superior Court upheld the finding that rolling logs are relevant and must be disclosed.

However, the court found that the trial judge erred in interpreting the Criminal Code; the amended provisions do not prohibit the disclosure of rolling logs in criminal proceedings.

As the rolling logs were still required to be disclosed, the appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought disclosure of a drug recognition expert's (DRE) rolling log, which documents all drug recognition evaluations conducted by the DRE.

The Crown opposed disclosure, arguing that rolling logs are clearly irrelevant and that disclosure is prohibited by section 320.36 of the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the rolling log was clearly irrelevant because the DRE's opinion was corroborated by toxicological analysis.

The court also held that section 320.36 does not prohibit disclosure of rolling logs, but found disclosure unnecessary in this case due to the corroboration.

The appellant appealed his convictions for driving with excess blood alcohol and stunt driving.

He argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, erroneously relied on the repealed presumption of identity under the Criminal Code, and erred in dismissing his section 10(b) Charter application regarding the right to counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no uneven scrutiny, holding that the presumption of identity continues to apply to transitional cases where the offence predated the legislative amendments, and concluding that the police fulfilled their informational and implementational duties under section 10(b) without steering the appellant toward duty counsel.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug.

The Crown and defence conceded the actus reus—that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle and was impaired.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved the mens rea of the offence.

The defendant claimed he mistakenly consumed alprazolam (Xanax) believing it was citalopram, a medication he had been prescribed for anxiety, and therefore lacked the intent to consume an intoxicant.

The court found that the defendant's urine sample contained alprazolam and carboxy THC (a cannabis metabolite), which aligned with the drug recognition expert's assessment.

The court applied the presumption under s. 320.31(6) and found no evidence to the contrary.

The court rejected the defendant's involuntary intoxication defence, finding that he was aware of his impairment before and during driving, and chose to continue operating his vehicle despite knowing it was dangerous.

The defendant was convicted.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving causing death after making an illegal U-turn that resulted in a fatal collision with a motorcycle.

The court found that the defendant's driving was objectively dangerous, thus establishing the actus reus of the offence.

However, the court acquitted the defendant, concluding that while the driving constituted a departure from the standard of care, it did not amount to a "marked departure" required for criminal fault, but rather a single, momentary error in judgment.

The decision emphasized the distinction between civil negligence and criminal conduct, relying on Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence.

The defendant sought disclosure of a drug recognition expert's rolling log in an impaired driving by drug case.

The Crown resisted disclosure, arguing that recent amendments to the Criminal Code (Bill C-46) and new statutory provisions prohibiting disclosure of drug evaluation results rendered the earlier decision in R. v. Stipo inapplicable.

The court held that the rolling log remains relevant first-party disclosure and that the statutory prohibition on disclosure does not prevent disclosure to an accused to protect their constitutional right to make full answer and defence.

The application for disclosure of a vetted/anonymized version of the DRE rolling log was granted.

The defendant was charged with threatening death contrary to s. 264.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that a passage in an article published in Your Ward News, which the defendant edited, constituted a threat to kill Warren and Lisa Kinsella.

The passage referenced the possibility that "some hothead" devoted to the defendant might "bludgeon the Kinsella's to death." The court applied the objective test established in R. v. McRae, examining both the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and contextual factors.

Although the court found that a threat interpretation was possible given the hostile history between the parties and the defendant's careful use of language, it concluded that the most likely interpretation was the plain meaning of the words.

The court acquitted the defendant, finding that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the only reasonable interpretation was a threat to kill.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol.

The sole issue was whether the arresting officer's delayed demand to provide suitable samples into an Approved Instrument breached the defendant's section 8 Charter rights.

The officer delayed making the demand for approximately 12-13 minutes after arrest while completing administrative tasks and attending to other matters.

The court found that the demand was not made "as soon as practicable" as required by statute, constituting a breach of the defendant's section 8 rights.

However, applying the Grant factors under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court determined that the breach was minor and technical in nature, the officer's conduct was otherwise professional and exemplary, there was no deleterious impact, and the evidence was highly reliable.

The court admitted the breath samples into evidence and declined to exclude them or prohibit the Crown from relying on the presumption of identity.

The accused, Osama Filli, was charged with second-degree murder for the stabbing death of Nahom Berhane.

The trial proceeded without a jury.

The central issues were self-defence and the intent for murder.

The court found that while Filli subjectively believed he was in danger and acted for self-defence, his belief was not objectively reasonable, and his response (stabbing an unarmed man with a knife when retreat was possible) was grossly disproportionate.

Therefore, self-defence was disproven.

Regarding intent, the court found that Filli intended to cause bodily harm but was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to cause bodily harm of such a grave and serious nature that he knew it was likely to result in death.

Consequently, Filli was found not guilty of second-degree murder but guilty of manslaughter.

The defendant was charged with operation impaired and operation over 80 following a motor vehicle collision on March 22, 2014.

The Crown presented evidence from paramedics, police officers, a breath technician, and a forensic toxicologist.

The defendant did not call any evidence.

The court found the defendant guilty of impaired care or control and impaired over 80, applying the legal test established in R. v. Boudreault regarding the elements of care or control under the Criminal Code.

The defendant was found in the driver's seat of the vehicle after it struck a church, with a blood alcohol concentration significantly exceeding the legal limit.

Sentencing decision following a guilty plea to break and enter.

The Crown sought 12 to 15 months' custody, while the defence sought an 18-month conditional sentence order followed by probation, relying on Gladue principles, the offender's Aboriginal background, substance abuse history, and demonstrated rehabilitation while on bail.

The court held that specific deterrence and rehabilitation would be better achieved through continued counselling, housing stability, employment training, and community supervision than through incarceration.

An 18-month conditional sentence order was imposed, followed by 18 months' probation, together with a s. 109 weapons prohibition and a DNA order.