Franklin Adam Lyons

This criminal trial concerned an assault charge against Tobias Bishop, accused of punching his brother, Shai Bishop.

The Crown presented direct evidence from the complainant and corroborating police testimony, detailing the incident, the complainant's injuries, and the disarray of the shared residence.

The defence challenged the complainant's credibility and reliability, suggesting he was motivated to remove the accused from the home and that the accused was asleep during the alleged incident.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and reliable, supported by independent police observations, and rejected the accused's general denial as inconsistent with the overall evidence.

The accused was found guilty as charged.

The applicant brought a mid-trial application seeking to prohibit the complainant from participating in a s. 278.93/4 hearing and to prevent disclosure of application materials to the complainant, relying on the recent decision in R. v. Reddick which found those provisions unconstitutional.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the principles of stare decisis did not apply because Reddick was decided in the context of a pre-trial application, whereas this was a mid-trial application.

Furthermore, the court held that even if stare decisis applied, the decision in Reddick was plainly wrong as it failed to fully consider the constitutional issues in the context of a mid-trial application and misinterpreted the legislation.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and other offences, brought a motion seeking to prohibit the complainant from participating in a s. 276/278 admissibility hearing regarding WhatsApp messages.

The applicant relied on a recent Superior Court decision (R. v. Reddick) that found the participation provisions unconstitutional, arguing that under the principles of stare decisis, the court should follow Reddick without a formal constitutional challenge.

The Crown argued that a Notice of Constitutional Question was required under s. 109 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court held that relying on a previous declaration of unconstitutionality still puts the constitutional validity of the legislation in question, thereby triggering the mandatory notice requirement under s. 109.

However, the court ruled that notice did not need to be served on the complainant.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and other offences against his wife, sought a ruling on whether an application to adduce evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity (WhatsApp messages) under ss. 276 and 278.92 of the Criminal Code could be brought mid-trial rather than pre-trial.

The court reviewed the legislative history, the purpose of the rape shield provisions, and the accused's Charter rights to make full answer and defence and against self-incrimination.

The court concluded that requiring a pre-trial application would force premature disclosure of impeachment material, potentially tainting the complainant's evidence and violating the accused's fair trial rights.

The court ruled that the application could be brought mid-trial.

The applicant, Abdirisaq Muse, sought a mistrial after being found guilty by a jury, arguing that the jury was improperly constituted due to the retrospective application of Bill C-75, which abolished peremptory challenges.

This application followed the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Chouhan, which held that the amendments regarding peremptory challenges were to be applied prospectively, contrary to the trial judge's initial ruling.

The Crown argued that the court was functus officio post-verdict and that the narrow exceptions to this rule did not apply.

The court dismissed the application, finding it was functus officio and lacked jurisdiction to declare a mistrial post-verdict, except for specific, inapplicable exceptions.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and other offences against his wife, sought to adduce WhatsApp messages exchanged between them.

He brought an application for a ruling that the messages were not 'records' under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code and thus not subject to the admissibility regime in s. 278.92.

The court first ruled that the Crown was not entitled to review the messages at the threshold stage to argue whether they constituted a record.

After reviewing the messages, the court held that the complainant did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the messages, as they were voluntarily exchanged with the accused and were innocuous in nature.

Therefore, the messages were not 'records' and the accused was not required to bring an application under s. 278.93 before using them at trial.

During a trial for attempted robbery, the accused brought an application to adduce third party suspect evidence relating to a separate carjacking incident that occurred months later in the same neighbourhood.

The defence argued the accused was an innocent bystander hit by the victims' fleeing vehicle and that the true perpetrators were the suspects from the other incident.

The court dismissed the application, finding no sufficient nexus or air of reality connecting the two incidents, as the descriptions and circumstances were generic and not significantly similar.

The applicant, charged with attempted robbery, brought a pre-trial application challenging the constitutionality of Bill C-75 amendments to the Criminal Code which eliminated peremptory challenges and altered the challenge for cause procedure.

The applicant argued these changes infringed sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the new procedures, including expanded judicial powers to stand aside jurors, adequately safeguard the right to an independent and impartial tribunal.

The court also held that the amendments are procedural in nature and therefore apply retrospectively.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug.

The Crown and defence conceded the actus reus—that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle and was impaired.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved the mens rea of the offence.

The defendant claimed he mistakenly consumed alprazolam (Xanax) believing it was citalopram, a medication he had been prescribed for anxiety, and therefore lacked the intent to consume an intoxicant.

The court found that the defendant's urine sample contained alprazolam and carboxy THC (a cannabis metabolite), which aligned with the drug recognition expert's assessment.

The court applied the presumption under s. 320.31(6) and found no evidence to the contrary.

The court rejected the defendant's involuntary intoxication defence, finding that he was aware of his impairment before and during driving, and chose to continue operating his vehicle despite knowing it was dangerous.

The defendant was convicted.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The total time from the swearing of the information to the anticipated end of trial was over 38 months.

However, the accused had left Canada for over 10 months before being arrested.

The court held that the pre-arrest period did not engage s. 11(b) interests as the accused was unaware of the charges, or alternatively, it constituted a discrete event exceptional circumstance.

The remaining delay fell below the presumptive ceiling, and the accused failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness due to defence delay, including allowing his Legal Aid certificate to lapse.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, Anthony Magiri, brought an application seeking a declaration that section 273.1(2)(b) of the Criminal Code, which states "no consent is obtained...where...the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity" is void for vagueness and violates sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the term "incapable" in relation to consent is not vague and has been consistently interpreted in jurisprudence.

The court emphasized that capacity is implicit in the concept of voluntary agreement for sexual activity and that the jurisprudence does not show fundamental conflict regarding the concept of capacity, even in cases involving intoxication.

The accused, Oswald Poyser, was convicted by a jury of uttering threats to Caryn Humphrey, contrary to s. 264.1(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence, while the defence requested a conditional discharge.

The threats, which included demeaning and degrading language, occurred over a nine-month period within an intimate relationship.

The court found that the jury's verdict implied the accused sent multiple threatening messages.

Despite mitigating factors such as the accused being a 27-year-old father, a small business owner, respected in the community, and having completed domestic abuse counselling, the court determined that a conditional discharge was contrary to the public interest, especially given a prior conditional discharge for Trafficking in Stolen Property.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with one year of probation and a 10-year s. 110 order.

The offender was convicted by a jury of possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The police seized 554 grams of methamphetamine and $2,000 from a hotel suite rented by the offender.

The court weighed the aggravating factor of commercial mid-level trafficking against the mitigating factor of the offender's 15-year drug addiction.

The offender was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment, reduced to 80 days after credit for pre-trial custody, followed by two years of probation.

A home invasion robbery occurred at a Toronto townhouse complex on March 3, 2016.

Three armed robbers entered a residence, demanded money at gunpoint, and fled with cash, a phone, and chocolate milk.

The robbers were observed on surveillance footage entering another unit in the complex.

Two defendants were arrested approximately six hours later at that unit.

The Crown sought to commit them for trial based on resemblance evidence and their presence at the unit where the robbers fled.

The court found that the identification evidence amounted only to resemblance, not identification, and that critical gaps in surveillance evidence prevented reasonable inferences connecting the defendants to the robbery.

Both defendants were discharged.

The accused pleaded guilty to importing approximately 1.568 kilograms of cocaine into Canada.

The court considered the established sentencing range for cocaine importation of roughly three to five years for quantities around one kilogram, noting the seriousness of the offence and the societal harm caused by cocaine trafficking.

Mitigating factors included the accused’s guilty plea, lack of prior criminal record, and personal circumstances.

After considering the quantity of cocaine and the early guilty plea, the court determined that a fit sentence before credit would be just under 39 months.

Applying enhanced credit for pre‑trial custody at a 1.5:1 ratio for 176 days served, the effective sentence imposed was 30 months’ imprisonment, along with a weapons prohibition order and a DNA order.

The offender was sentenced following conviction for possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking under s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Police seized significant quantities of crack cocaine and powder cocaine along with cash from a residence associated with the offender, indicating a mid‑level commercial trafficking operation.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of five to six years, while the defence requested a sentence of two and a half to three and a half years with substantial credit for pre‑trial custody and restrictive bail conditions.

The court rejected arguments that the trafficking was driven primarily by addiction and declined to grant the full credit sought for time spent on judicial interim release.

Balancing denunciation and deterrence with the offender’s youth and the jump principle, the court imposed a four‑year penitentiary sentence with credits applied, along with forfeiture, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.

The accused brought Charter applications alleging infringements of their rights under sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 12 during a police vehicle take down and subsequent strip searches.

The police had relied on confidential informant information and surveillance to arrest the accused for drug trafficking.

The court found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrests and the search warrant.

While the court held that one of the accused's section 8 rights was infringed because she was left completely naked for five minutes during a strip search at the police station, the court declined to stay the proceedings or exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the police conduct was not in bad faith and the evidence was crucial to the prosecution.

During a murder trial involving multiple accused, an issue arose regarding a potential conflict of interest after counsel for one accused had previously represented a co‑accused on an unrelated impaired driving matter years earlier.

The court considered whether the prior representation created a risk of misuse of confidential information or an appearance of conflict under the principles in MacDonald Estate v. Martin.

Although the risk of prejudice was assessed as minimal and both affected accused were willing to waive any conflict, the court emphasized the unpredictability of a multi‑accused criminal trial and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The judge permitted counsel to continue acting subject to strict conditions, including written waivers, restrictions on cross‑examination of the former client, and prohibitions on accessing or using any prior confidential information.

In a homicide prosecution arising from a stabbing at a banquet hall, the Crown sought to admit a seven‑hour videotaped police interview of one accused.

During the interview the accused repeatedly asserted the right to silence and relied on prior legal advice not to speak.

The court found that the interviewing officer repeatedly urged the accused to speak, suggested that cooperation could improve his status from suspect to witness, implied a legal obligation to assist police, and undermined the accused’s confidence in his lawyer.

Considering the totality of circumstances, the court held that the accused’s ability to make a meaningful choice whether to speak was impaired and the statement was not proven voluntary.

The statement was therefore inadmissible under the confessions rule and would in any event be excluded under s. 24(2) for breaches of ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Charter.

The respondent was convicted of seven counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after a high-speed collision.

The trial judge suspended the passing of sentence and imposed two years' probation and a two-year driving prohibition, relying heavily on the parity principle due to the lenient sentence received by the other driver involved.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in applying the parity principle and failed to adequately reflect general deterrence and denunciation.

A nine-month custodial sentence and a five-year driving prohibition were substituted.