Joanne Marie Capozzi

The accused was found unfit to stand trial due to an untreated psychotic illness.

The Crown applied for a treatment order under s. 672.58 of the Criminal Code.

The defence argued that committal to the Ontario Review Board was the least onerous and least restrictive option.

The court accepted expert evidence that the accused lacked insight and would not cooperate with the civil treatment regime, which could result in prolonged delays.

The court concluded that a treatment order was the most timely and effective means of restoring the accused to a fit state and granted the application.

During a trial for attempted robbery, the accused brought an application to adduce third party suspect evidence relating to a separate carjacking incident that occurred months later in the same neighbourhood.

The defence argued the accused was an innocent bystander hit by the victims' fleeing vehicle and that the true perpetrators were the suspects from the other incident.

The court dismissed the application, finding no sufficient nexus or air of reality connecting the two incidents, as the descriptions and circumstances were generic and not significantly similar.

The applicant, charged with attempted robbery, brought a pre-trial application challenging the constitutionality of Bill C-75 amendments to the Criminal Code which eliminated peremptory challenges and altered the challenge for cause procedure.

The applicant argued these changes infringed sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the new procedures, including expanded judicial powers to stand aside jurors, adequately safeguard the right to an independent and impartial tribunal.

The court also held that the amendments are procedural in nature and therefore apply retrospectively.

The accused was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while having more than the legal limit of alcohol in his blood.

The central issue was whether police breached the accused's Charter right to counsel of choice by failing to provide him with access to his preferred lawyer.

The court found that police made reasonable and extensive efforts to locate and contact the accused's counsel of choice, including attempting multiple phone numbers, connecting him with an associate lawyer, and facilitating calls to duty counsel.

The court rejected the argument that police failed in their informational and implementation duties and found no Charter breach.

The accused was convicted.

Following a jury conviction for aggravated assault arising from the discharge of a loaded handgun in an apartment, the court was required to resolve disputed sentencing facts.

Applying the post-verdict fact-finding framework, the court rejected the Crown's theory of an intentional shooting and found that the accused produced the gun to scare others and that it discharged unintentionally while being removed from a bag.

The court held that the Bellissimo range for intentional gun violence did not apply and fixed the appropriate range for serious injury caused by the unintentional discharge of an illegally possessed firearm at three to seven years.

Considering catastrophic injuries to the victim, the accused's youth, lack of record, remorse, rehabilitation prospects, collateral immigration consequences, and concurrency with an earlier firearm sentence, the court imposed 21 months' imprisonment after credit, followed by 12 months' probation and ancillary orders.

The court ruled on a defence application for a mistrial and the probative value of after-the-fact conduct in an aggravated assault jury trial.

The defence sought a mistrial due to alleged improprieties in Crown counsel's closing address, specifically regarding the credibility of a Crown witness.

The defence also requested a "no probative value" instruction for the accused's flight and disposal of the firearm, arguing it was equally consistent with illegal firearm possession as with the aggravated assault.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding the Crown's comments on witness credibility, while concerning, could be remedied by jury instruction and did not impact the accused's credibility.

The court also denied the "no probative value" instruction for after-the-fact conduct, distinguishing the case from *R. v. Chambers* and finding the accused's flight disproportionate to the admitted firearm possession, thus allowing the jury to infer guilt regarding the shooting.

The accused, Nerville Ferdinand, was charged with aggravated assault.

During his jury trial, the Crown sought to advance an alternative theory of liability based on transferred intent, arguing that Ferdinand intended to shoot a third person ("Jimbo") but accidentally hit the victim, Tristan Kelly.

The defence objected, arguing there was no evidentiary basis for this theory.

The court applied the "air of reality" test for theories of liability, similar to that for defences, which requires a limited weighing of evidence to determine if a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict based on the theory.

The court found no direct evidence of intent to shoot Jimbo and concluded that the circumstantial evidence, even viewed most favorably to the Crown, did not reasonably support an inference of transferred intent, as it would require speculation and contradiction of witness testimony regarding aiming direction.

The Crown was therefore prohibited from advancing this alternative theory to the jury.

Ayub Ali was found guilty of manslaughter as a party to the first-degree murder of Kadir Abdulkhadir.

The co-accused, Mohamud Dirie, was found guilty of first-degree murder.

The court was tasked with sentencing Mr. Ali, who was 19 at the time of the offence and a youthful first offender.

The jury's verdict implied Mr. Ali knew Mr. Dirie was armed and intended to recklessly discharge a firearm, and Mr. Ali aided in tracking the victim and positioning Mr. Dirie for the ambush.

The Crown sought 12-13 years imprisonment, while the defence sought 6 years.

The court considered the aggravated nature of the manslaughter, the use of a firearm (triggering a 4-year minimum), and the principles of denunciation, general deterrence, and rehabilitation for a youthful first offender.

The court imposed a sentence of 9 years imprisonment, reduced to an effective term of 3 years and 11 months after enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Crown brought an application during a first-degree murder trial to admit the preliminary inquiry evidence of two unavailable witnesses under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code.

One witness was too ill to testify, which the defence conceded.

The other witness had left Canada and was evading his subpoena.

The court found that the witness was absent from Canada and that it was not feasible to take his evidence via video link.

Balancing the probative value of the evidence against potential trial unfairness, the court admitted the preliminary inquiry evidence, noting the defence could lead evidence regarding the witness's credibility.

During a first-degree murder trial, the accused brought an application under s. 24(1) of the Charter to exclude the evidence of a Crown witness, arguing that the police's failure to properly record and preserve evidence from group meetings with witnesses breached his rights under ss. 7 and 11(d).

The court dismissed the application, finding that the police did not deliberately fail to make a record to avoid production, and that the imperfect note-taking and group interviews did not render the trial unfair given the extensive disclosure available to the defence for cross-examination.

During a trial for first degree murder, the Crown brought an application to admit several ante-mortem hearsay statements made by the deceased to his mother and cousin.

The statements detailed a history of animosity and fear of the accused.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, assessing the threshold reliability of each statement.

The court admitted several statements that possessed sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, such as those made shortly after traumatic events or expressing present fear.

However, the court excluded other statements that were made under circumstances of suspicion or were inextricably intertwined with double hearsay.

The court also declined the defence's request to cross-examine the deceased's mother on the voir dire, finding that her preliminary inquiry transcripts were sufficient to assess threshold reliability and that her credibility was not so deficient as to rob the statements of all probative value.

The Crown applied for certiorari with mandamus in aid to review a preliminary inquiry judge's decision discharging the respondents on charges of first degree murder.

The preliminary inquiry judge had committed one respondent for second degree murder and the other for accessory after the fact, concluding there was 'no evidence' of planning and deliberation.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by concluding there was no evidence, rather than insufficient evidence, given the circumstantial evidence of the respondents following the deceased and shooting him.

The application was granted, the discharges quashed, and the matter remitted with a direction to commit both respondents for first degree murder.

The applicant, charged with accessory after the fact to murder, applied for judicial interim release.

The charges arose from an execution-style shooting in downtown Toronto where the applicant allegedly acted as the getaway driver.

The Crown was seeking certiorari to reinstate a first-degree murder charge.

The court denied bail, finding that while the primary and secondary grounds might be manageable with a strict supervision plan, detention was necessary under the tertiary ground to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice given the gravity and circumstances of the offence.

The defendant was charged with two counts of assaulting police officers in the execution of their duty, two counts of assaulting the same officers with intent to resist arrest, and assault with a weapon (a wooden staff).

The last count was withdrawn at the close of the Crown's case.

The defendant was arrested following a physical altercation in the foyer of a courthouse after he was observed filming inside a courtroom during a recess.

The court found that the police officers lacked statutory authority to detain and arrest the defendant, as their conduct fell outside the scope of powers granted under the Police Services Act.

Consequently, the defendant's resistance to the unlawful detention was justified, and he was acquitted of all remaining counts.

The accused applied to exclude evidence seized during a search of his residence pursuant to a warrant obtained under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The warrant relied heavily on information from a confidential informant.

The court found the warrant invalid because the affiant failed to disclose the informant's monetary motivation, provided no details of past reliability, and relied on uncorroborated second-hand information to connect the residence to the drugs.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the Charter-infringing conduct was serious and the impact on the accused's rights was significant, warranting the exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter as a party to a shooting death committed by a co-accused.

The Crown sought a sentence of six to eight years, arguing the four-year mandatory minimum for manslaughter with a firearm applied.

The court found the offender did not know the co-accused had a gun and held that the mandatory minimum does not apply in such circumstances.

Weighing the offender's lack of prior record, strong prospects for rehabilitation, and lesser degree of responsibility against the gravity of the offence, the court imposed a sentence of four years (credited as time served) followed by two years' probation.

In a first degree murder trial arising from a fatal shooting outside an apartment elevator, the Crown sought to admit ante-mortem statements of the deceased and multiple prior statements of a key eyewitness who fled to the United States before trial.

Applying the principled hearsay framework, the court found necessity established for both categories because the deceased had died and the eyewitness had deliberately removed herself from the court's reach despite diligent efforts to secure her attendance.

The deceased's statements were admitted because their temporal proximity, surrounding circumstances, partial corroboration, and available cross-examination of the reporting witnesses provided threshold reliability.

The eyewitness's statements were excluded because she had repeatedly lied under oath and to police, had a possible motive to deflect blame, and her prior preliminary inquiry testimony offered no meaningful substitute for contemporaneous cross-examination.

The defendant was charged with failing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand after being pulled over for speeding and suspected impaired driving.

Despite multiple opportunities and instructions, the defendant was unable to produce an adequate breath sample, resulting in arrest.

The Crown sought conviction under section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The court acquitted the defendant, finding that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally failed to comply with the demand.

The court adopted the Lewko/Soucy formulation of mens rea, requiring proof of intentional non-compliance rather than mere knowledge or recklessness.

On a pre-trial evidentiary motion in a murder prosecution, the court dismissed the defence application to exclude police statements for alleged breach of the accused's right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The court held the accused was repeatedly informed of his rights, understood the jeopardy he faced, and clearly waived immediate access to counsel in order to hear what the investigator had to say.

The court further held that the accused's denials and lies to police had some probative value as post-offence conduct relevant to rebutting a self-defence claim.

The statements were admissible, with the caveat that the jury would require limiting instructions as to the permissible use of that evidence.