Joanne Marie Capozzi

The accused was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while having more than the legal limit of alcohol in his blood.

The central issue was whether police breached the accused's Charter right to counsel of choice by failing to provide him with access to his preferred lawyer.

The court found that police made reasonable and extensive efforts to locate and contact the accused's counsel of choice, including attempting multiple phone numbers, connecting him with an associate lawyer, and facilitating calls to duty counsel.

The court rejected the argument that police failed in their informational and implementation duties and found no Charter breach.

The accused was convicted.

The court ruled on a defence application for a mistrial and the probative value of after-the-fact conduct in an aggravated assault jury trial.

The defence sought a mistrial due to alleged improprieties in Crown counsel's closing address, specifically regarding the credibility of a Crown witness.

The defence also requested a "no probative value" instruction for the accused's flight and disposal of the firearm, arguing it was equally consistent with illegal firearm possession as with the aggravated assault.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding the Crown's comments on witness credibility, while concerning, could be remedied by jury instruction and did not impact the accused's credibility.

The court also denied the "no probative value" instruction for after-the-fact conduct, distinguishing the case from *R. v. Chambers* and finding the accused's flight disproportionate to the admitted firearm possession, thus allowing the jury to infer guilt regarding the shooting.

The accused, Nerville Ferdinand, was charged with aggravated assault.

During his jury trial, the Crown sought to advance an alternative theory of liability based on transferred intent, arguing that Ferdinand intended to shoot a third person ("Jimbo") but accidentally hit the victim, Tristan Kelly.

The defence objected, arguing there was no evidentiary basis for this theory.

The court applied the "air of reality" test for theories of liability, similar to that for defences, which requires a limited weighing of evidence to determine if a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict based on the theory.

The court found no direct evidence of intent to shoot Jimbo and concluded that the circumstantial evidence, even viewed most favorably to the Crown, did not reasonably support an inference of transferred intent, as it would require speculation and contradiction of witness testimony regarding aiming direction.

The Crown was therefore prohibited from advancing this alternative theory to the jury.

Ayub Ali was found guilty of manslaughter as a party to the first-degree murder of Kadir Abdulkhadir.

The co-accused, Mohamud Dirie, was found guilty of first-degree murder.

The court was tasked with sentencing Mr. Ali, who was 19 at the time of the offence and a youthful first offender.

The jury's verdict implied Mr. Ali knew Mr. Dirie was armed and intended to recklessly discharge a firearm, and Mr. Ali aided in tracking the victim and positioning Mr. Dirie for the ambush.

The Crown sought 12-13 years imprisonment, while the defence sought 6 years.

The court considered the aggravated nature of the manslaughter, the use of a firearm (triggering a 4-year minimum), and the principles of denunciation, general deterrence, and rehabilitation for a youthful first offender.

The court imposed a sentence of 9 years imprisonment, reduced to an effective term of 3 years and 11 months after enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The defendant was charged with two counts of assaulting police officers in the execution of their duty, two counts of assaulting the same officers with intent to resist arrest, and assault with a weapon (a wooden staff).

The last count was withdrawn at the close of the Crown's case.

The defendant was arrested following a physical altercation in the foyer of a courthouse after he was observed filming inside a courtroom during a recess.

The court found that the police officers lacked statutory authority to detain and arrest the defendant, as their conduct fell outside the scope of powers granted under the Police Services Act.

Consequently, the defendant's resistance to the unlawful detention was justified, and he was acquitted of all remaining counts.

The defendant was charged with failing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand after being pulled over for speeding and suspected impaired driving.

Despite multiple opportunities and instructions, the defendant was unable to produce an adequate breath sample, resulting in arrest.

The Crown sought conviction under section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The court acquitted the defendant, finding that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally failed to comply with the demand.

The court adopted the Lewko/Soucy formulation of mens rea, requiring proof of intentional non-compliance rather than mere knowledge or recklessness.