Introduction

[1] Edgar Ferreira is charged with ten offences arising from a search of his residence conducted by the police pursuant to a Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 (the “CDSA”) search warrant. The warrant at issue in this application was granted pursuant to s. 11 of the CDSA on May 24, 2011. On May 24, 2011 the police entered and searched the residence of the Applicant. They located 117.1 grams of cocaine, 252 tablets of MDMA, 97 tablets of Oxycontin, drug paraphernalia including scales and baggies and a .45 calibre Cobray firearm with 60 rounds of ammunition.

[2] The warrant obtained by the police authorized the police to enter and search the dwelling house, chattels, locker and storage facilities of Edgar Ferreira at 806 Lansdowne Avenue, unit #308 in Toronto for cocaine, scales and contracts or paperwork in respect of which the offences of trafficking in cocaine and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking had been committed.

[3] Mr. Ferreira has applied to have all of the evidence excluded pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”) on the basis that his rights protected by s. 8 of the Charter have been violated.

The Procedure on the Application

[4] The Information to Obtain the Warrant (the “ITO”) was sworn by Officer Stehlik. His grounds for seeking the warrant relied heavily on information provided to the police by a confidential informant (the “CI”). As a result, the Crown disclosed a redacted version of the ITO to defence counsel together with a draft judicial summary of the redacted portions.

[5] Prior to hearing the application, I was given a copy of the sealed, unredacted ITO that was before the issuing justice pursuant to the "step six" procedure outlined by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Garofoli.[^1] The unredacted ITO has been marked as a sealed exhibit on this application. I reviewed the Crown's editing of the ITO and the draft judicial summary, heard the submissions of Ms. Freeman, and concluded that no further material could be disclosed. I also concluded that the draft judicial summary prepared by the Crown should be the final version.

[6] As I indicated at the time of the approval of the judicial summary, the information provided was sufficient to permit a facial and sub-facial challenge to the warrant.

[7] Ms. Freeman applied for leave to cross-examine Officer Stehlik. The Crown agreed that leave should be granted to cross-examine Officer Stehlik on the narrow issue of his omission from the ITO of the information that the CI had a monetary motivation for providing information to the police.

[8] In addition to the testimony of Officer Stehlik, I heard the evidence of Officer Taylor who took a statement from the Applicant following his arrest. Ms. Freeman relies upon this evidence in part for her s. 24(2) argument.

[9] The record before me on the application consisted of the following:

(1) the unredacted and redacted copies of the ITO that was before the issuing justice, and the judicial summary of the redactions,

(2) the unredacted and redacted copies of the search warrant issued on May 24, 2011,

(3) the “Search Warrant Executed” report setting out the evidence discovered from search conducted pursuant to the warrant,

(4) the testimony of Officer Scott Taylor, and,

(5) the testimony of Officer Michael Stehlik.

Positions of the Parties

[10] Ms. Freeman submits that the search of Mr. Ferreira's residence violated his rights protected by s. 8 of the Charter, and as a result, the evidence obtained should be excluded pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter. Ms. Freeman submits that the ITO contained significant omissions, and did not constitute full, fair and frank disclosure. She further argues that the police did not have reasonable and probable grounds to obtain the warrant. The information provided by the CI was neither compelling nor corroborated and the credibility of the CI was weak.

[11] Ms. Capozzi submits that, with the exception of the information regarding the motivation of the CI which was inadvertently omitted, Officer Stehlik’s reasonable and probable grounds for belief were set out in the ITO in a full, fair and frank manner, and amply supported the issuance of the warrant. Ms. Capozzi argues that to the extent that there were weaknesses in the credibility of the CI, the compelling nature of the information provided by the CI and the corroboration through police investigation compensated for those weaknesses.

[12] I have concluded that the warrant is invalid. The omission of important information concerning the credibility of the CI, the inclusion of unreliable second hand information and the mischaracterization of some of the important details led to the issuance of the warrant without reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the items sought would be found in the residence of the Applicant. I find the conduct to be serious and the impact on the Charter protected rights of the Applicant significant. In the circumstances these factors outweigh the interests of society in an adjudication of the case on the merits and the evidence must be excluded.

The Standard of Review

[13] To be reasonable under s. 8 of the Charter, a search must be authorized by law.[^2]

[14] The search in this case was authorized by a search warrant. A search warrant is presumed to be valid, and the onus is on the Applicant to show that there was not sufficient credible and reliable evidence to permit a justice of the peace to issue the warrant.[^3]

[15] The standard of persuasion for the issuance of a warrant is reasonable grounds to believe. There must be reasonable grounds to believe that the offence or offences have been committed and that the evidence or illicit substances relating to the offences will be found in the place to be searched.

[16] This standard is one of credibly-based probability, and requires proof of reasonable probability or reasonable belief. It requires more than an experienced-based “hunch” or reasonable suspicion.[^4]

[17] This standard was explained by Paciocco J. in R. v. Floyd[^5] as follows:

¶9 In sum, the ‘reasonable and probable grounds’ or ‘credibly-based probability’ concept requires that the grounds furnished must demonstrate that there is a probability as opposed to a suspicion that the relevant facts could be true, assuming the information to be true (the ‘sufficiency inquiry’), and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the information relied upon is credible enough to support a conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the relevant fact exists (the ‘credibility inquiry’).

¶10 This two-part ‘reasonable and probable grounds’ standard is relevant to two inquiries that must each be met before a ‘reasonable and probable grounds’ search warrant can issue. First, the affiant who has sworn the ‘Information to Obtain’ affidavit… must honestly believe that they have reasonable grounds to believe that an offence is occurring and that what is being sought is evidence that will be found at the place to be searched…. If the affiant does not actually believe that, the search warrant is invalid. This first inquiry is the ‘subjective’ component of the reasonable and probable grounds standard: (R. v. Storrey, 1990 CanLII 125 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241 at 250.) The second inquiry, the "objective" component, requires that the affiant's belief that they have reasonable and probable grounds must be supported by enough information to enable a reasonable person to come to the same conclusion: R. v. Storrey, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241 at 250.

¶11 Not only must there be ‘reasonable and probable grounds’ as described before a warrant can issue, those grounds must be demonstrated to the issuing justice. This latter requirement is ‘known as the requirement of 'prior authorization'’: (R. v. Morris, 1998 NSCA 229, [1998] N.S.J. no. 492 at para. 32 (N.S.C.A.). It is meant to ensure that the decision to compromise a reasonable expectation of privacy is made by an impartial and independent judicial officer rather than an investigator who may have an interest in pursuing the investigation.

[18] When the police rely upon information from a confidential informer to meet this standard, consideration must be given to whether the information from the informer is compelling or corroborated by other aspects of the police investigation and whether the informant was credible. These are not discrete, isolated inquiries, however, and weaknesses in one area may be offset by strengths in another.[^6]

[19] In a review of the validity of a warrant, the reviewing court must show deference to the issuing justice. In R. v. Morelli,[^7] the test to be applied by a reviewing justice was set out as follows:

In reviewing the sufficiency of a warrant application, however, the test is whether there was reliable evidence that might reasonably be believed on the basis of which the authorization could have issued (R. v. Araujo, 2000 SCC 65, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992, at para. 54). The question is not whether the reviewing court would itself have issued the warrant, but whether there was sufficient credible and reliable evidence to permit a justice of the peace to find reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an offence had been committed and that evidence of that offence would be found at the specified time and place.

[Emphasis original]

[20] In R. v. Vu[^8] the Supreme Court pointed out that “in applying this test, the reviewing judge must take into account that authorizing justices may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence in the ITO; the informant need not underline the obvious...”.

[21] A search warrant is obtained ex parte and the Applicant for the warrant must provide full and frank disclosure of relevant facts.[^9]

[22] In Morelli, Fish J. made it clear that a reviewing court does not undertake its review based only on the ITO, but must exclude erroneous information and may have reference to ‘amplification’ evidence.

[23] As summarized by Paccioco J. in R. v. Floyd,[^10] the relevant principles in settling the record for review are as follows.

¶14 First, factual claims made in the "Information to Obtain" affidavit that are without an objective foundation of credibility should be disregarded. For this reason, bald unsupported conclusions and erroneous or false facts should notionally be excised from an "Information to Obtain" affidavit.

¶15 Second, facts that should have been disclosed that weaken the significance or credibility of the grounds relied upon should also be taken into account since it is expected that during ex parte warrant applications the affiant will make full and frank disclosure of the actual state of affairs. Where this has not occurred such facts can be considered by the reviewing judge as if they had been before the reviewing judge.

¶16 Third, in appropriate cases even information that could have supported the warrant but that was not put before the issuing justice by the affiant can be added during the review stage through "amplification." In particular, amplification can occur where additional information that was available to the affiant at the time the "Information to Obtain" affidavit was sworn is inserted to correct errors or inaccuracies in the "Information to Obtain" affidavit that have been made in good faith.

[citations omitted]

[24] As set out in R. v. Garofoli, supra, at para. 56, in the review process, the “existence of fraud, nondisclosure, misleading evidence and new evidence are all relevant but rather than being a prerequisite to review, their sole impact is to determine whether there continues to be any basis for the decision of the authorizing judge.”

Settlement of Issues relating to the Record

[25] It is conceded that the affiant failed to disclose to the issuing justice the monetary motivation of the CI. On the voir dire, Officer Stehlik testified that the motivation of the CI was monetary and that he knew that when he swore the ITO. He also testified that no money was paid to the informant or promised to the informant prior to the execution of the search warrant. Money was paid after the execution of the warrant.

[26] Officer Stehlik had no explanation for omitting this information from the ITO. He acknowledged that he knew at the time that he swore the ITO that the nature of the motivation of the CI should be included in the ITO in order to meet his obligation to be full, frank and fair. The officer could not remember when he first realized that he had failed to include this informaiton. He made no note of any meetings with the Crown.

[27] Officer Stehlik agreed that either he or the handler of the CI would have been present with the Crown for the editing of the ITO before it was provided to the defence. He could not say whether he realized at that stage that the motivation of the CI had not been disclosed to the issuing justice. He agreed that the editing would have occurred long before August 2014. Officer Stehlik was shown a letter from the Crown to counsel for Mr. Ferreira dated August 5, 2014 indicating that the Crown had recently learned that the motivation of the CI was financial. Officer Stehlik would not agree that this was the timeframe in which he told the Crown about the omission. After Officer Stehlik was given an opportunity to refresh his memory from emails between him and the Crown he was still unwilling to say that he first realized the omission and disclosed it in August 2014. Officer Stehlik testified that it was around August of 2014 that the Crown had specifically asked him whether the CI had been paid and that he told the Crown that the informant had been paid.

[28] The officer objected to the characterization of the omission as an ‘error’. He said: “I don’t want to sound like I am being difficult because I am really trying not to. When we say error it paints the picture in my mind that there is like a checklist of things that must be in every single ITO. That’s really not the case from my experience and training. So while I do my absolute best to be full, frank and fair and include everything, positive and negative, to the investigation that I possibly can to be as open and fair to the justice that is going to be reviewing it, by saying that it is an error that would suddenly jump out at me and I would have to make a note quickly and report to people, I look at it now as an experienced affiant as: that is something I definitely should have included, it is important . And I don’t know why I didn’t in this case but it wasn’t on purpose. I did not make a conscious decision to keep it out of the warrant. It’s simply something I forgot and it is unfortunate. I don’t know what else I can say about it.”

[29] When pressed about the characterization of the omission as ‘unfortunate’ he conceded that it was a ‘mistake’. He had no explanation for the mistake.

[30] In re-examination the officer testified that the payment of money to the CI would have been conditional on a successful result in the investigation: seizure of evidence or arrest. He had no knowledge of any specific conditions in this case but testified as to the general practice in dealing with CIs.

[31] I must take into account the omitted information that the motivation of the CI was monetary. I infer that the CI sought the monetary compensation. I have no evidence of any conditions attached to the payment of the money. I draw the inference that the general practice of attaching some conditions would have been followed but the nature of the conditions in this case cannot be determined.

Credibility of the Informant

[32] In this case, the Applicant argues that the credibility of the CI is weak at best. The ITO contains only a conclusory statement that the CI “is a proven and reliable source having provided accurate information to the police in the past.” It is evident from the unredacted portions of the ITO and the judicial summary that no detail was provided as to the nature of the information provided in the past, the frequency with which the CI provided information to the police,[^11] how recently the CI had last provided such information or how the accuracy of the information was assessed. In addition it is argued that the failure of the affiant to disclose to the issuing justice the monetary motivation of the CI further undermines the credibility of the CI.

[33] I find that there is little in the ITO to support the credibility of the CI. The conclusory statement that the CI “is a proven and reliable source having provided accurate information to the police in the past” is of little value without any supporting detail. The monetary motivation of the CI raises real concerns about credibility. In this case, information about conditions attached to the payment is lacking except in the most general sense.

[34] The Crown concedes that the information supporting the credibility of the CI is not strong. However, the Crown argues that there is some information about the credibility of the CI and that the information concerning the financial motivation of the informant should not significantly affect the assessment of credibility.

[35] Primarily however, the submission of the Crown is that the compelling nature of the information provided by the CI and the corroboration compensate for any weakness in the credibility of the CI.

Compelling nature of the information

[36] The next factor to consider is whether the CI’s information was compelling. This requires a consideration of factors that relate to the reliability of the information provided. Such factors include the degree of detail provided and the means of knowledge. It is important to consider under this heading whether the CI relayed first hand observations or second hand hearsay, rumour or gossip.[^12]

[37] In this part of my reasons I must consider carefully the redacted material from the ITO. As a result, my reasons will not be as specific and detailed as they would be if not for the need to protect the identity of the CI.

[38] The nature of the information provided by the CI contained in the redacted ITO and judicial summary is as follows:

(1) Timing: The redacted information discloses that the handler and the affiant received first hand and second hand information from the CI about the criminal activities of Mr. Ferreira. The unredacted ITO provides the specific dates that the criminal activity is alleged to have occurred and the dates that the information was provided.

(2) CI’s knowledge of Mr. Ferreira: The redacted ITO indicates that the CI identified Mr. Ferreira from a single, seven year old photograph shown to him. The unredacted ITO gives a detail relating to the limits of the CI’s knowledge.

(3) Address: The redacted ITO discloses that the CI indicated that a male who lived in a building at the corner of Dupont and Lansdowne was dealing in cocaine. Police investigation disclosed that Mr. Ferreira lived in a building at the corner of Dupont and Lansdowne.

(4) Vehicle: The CI said that the male dealing in cocaine drove a black Cadillac with a licence plate BLHS 564. Mr. Ferreira, at that time, drove a black Cadillac Escalade with that licence plate number. The registered owner of the vehicle was Mr. Ferreira’s mother.

(5) Criminal behaviour: The CI advised that the male was actively dealing drugs: specifically cocaine. The unredacted ITO discloses the type of cocaine and specific details about the drug dealing.

[39] A review of the original unredacted ITO reveals that the information provided by the CI about the circumstances of the drug dealing was reasonably detailed. Some of the information was first hand.

[40] Of particular significance in this case is that some of the information provided by the CI was second hand. There is no indication of the recency of the second hand information, the source of the second hand information or the credibility of the source. The Applicant argues that the second hand information should be given no weight. It was conceded by the Crown that the second hand information could not be given a great deal of weight.

[41] The second hand information in this case in my view amounts to bald unsupported assertions from an unproven source. It is no better than rumour or gossip. The second hand information is the only direct information with respect to the grounds to believe that items sought in the warrant would be found in the residence of the Applicant.

[42] While I find that the CI provided compelling information grounding the reasonable belief of the affiant that the Applicant had committed the enumerated offences, I find that the information provided by the CI was not compelling with respect to the grounds to believe that evidence of the offences would be found in the residence of the Applicant. The second hand information is entitled to no weight given the complete absence of any information that would support the reliability of the source.

[43] The only other information to connect the residence of the Applicant to an illicit substance or evidence was the information provided by the CI of the specific details of criminal activity in the redacted portion of the ITO on page 9. The information is not compelling on this issue based on the sequence of events and timing.

[44] The affiant, at page 11, refers back to the details provided by the CI. However, at page 11 the affiant subtly mischaracterizes the timing and sequence of events in a manner that tends to suggest a greater connection to the residence than was actually provided by the detailed account of the CI.

Corroboration

[45] The police investigation independently established Mr. Ferreira’s address, physical description, make of car he drove, and licence plate associated with that car. All of these facts corroborated the information received from the CI with respect to the drug dealing. This was corroboration of the type referred to in R. v. Caissey.[^13]

[46] I am satisfied that there was some independent investigative corroboration that supported the information of the CI with respect to the drug dealing. The corroborative investigation however did not support the belief that evidence would be found in the residence of the Applicant.

Conclusion on the Validity of the Warrant

[47] In spite of the weakness in the credibility of the CI, the information with respect to drug dealing was sufficiently compelling and corroborated to support the conclusion that there were reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the Mr. Ferreira was committing the offences set out in the ITO.

[48] However, the information provided by the CI was not compelling with respect to the location of the things sought in the ITO in Mr. Ferreira’s residence. It was second hand information that amounted to no more than gossip or rumour. The remaining, first hand, information that could be argued to provide such grounds is not compelling. I have considered the case of R. v. Soto[^14] relied upon by the Crown. In that case, the objective circumstances observed by two different police officers supported an inference that the accused left his residence with drugs on his person. Any observations in this case were made by a CI with weak credibility. More significantly, in the case before me, the circumstances are different from those in Soto in very material ways. I cannot explain the differences in the circumstances without disclosing redacted information. This case is wholly distinguishable from Soto.

[49] Given the weakness in the credibility of the CI, the absence of any indicia of reliability in the second hand information and the absence of any corroboration with respect to the location of evidence or drugs in the residence, the totality of the circumstances could not support the granting of the warrant. I find that there was a breach of the Applicant’s s. 8 rights.

Should the evidence be excluded under s. 24(2)?

[50] In R v. Grant,[^15] the Supreme Court set out at para. 71 the approach to the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2):

[A] court must assess and balance the effect of admitting the evidence on society’s confidence in the justice system having regard to: (1) the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct (admission may send the message the justice system condones serious state misconduct), (2) the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interests of the accused (admission may send the message that individual rights count for little), and (3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits. The court's role on a s. 24(2) application is to balance the assessments under each of these lines of inquiry to determine whether, considering all the circumstances, admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

[51] I have considered the three avenues of inquiry identified in R v. Grant. This was a warrantless search of the residence of the Applicant. It is not disputed that the impact on the Applicant’s Charter-protected rights was significant. This factor weighs in favour of exclusion.

[52] There is also little dispute that society’s interest in the adjudication of this case on its merits weighs in favour of admission. The offences in this case are extremely serious and are of concern to the community. The Crown will be unable to prosecute the offences without the evidence seized in the search. As set out in R. v. Blake,[^16] “Society’s interest in an adjudication on the merits is seriously undercut where highly reliable and important evidence is excluded.”

[53] Critical to the Grant analysis in this case is the assessment of the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct. The police sought and were granted a search warrant. This was not a case where the police failed to seek prior authorization. In R. v. Rocha,[^17] Rosenberg J. wrote that “applying for and obtaining a search warrant from an independent judicial officer is the antithesis of wilful disregard of Charter rights. The search warrant process is an important means of preventing unjustified searches before they happen. Unless the applicant for exclusion of evidence can show that the warrant was obtained through the use of false or deliberately misleading information or the drafting of the ITO in some way subverted the warrant process, the obtaining of the warrant generally…tells in favour of admitting the evidence.”

[54] In this case, as I have found, the ITO was misleading in three ways: it failed to disclose the monetary motivation of the CI; it failed to provide any details of the past accuracy of the CI; and, it relied on second hand information and an overstatement of the firsthand information to ground the belief that evidence would be found in the residence of the Applicant.

[55] The next step of the analysis is to place the conduct on the spectrum of seriousness referred to in Grant.

[56] Simmons J.A. wrote in R. v. Dhillon:[^18] “Although not at the extreme end of the spectrum of state misconduct, significant carelessness on the part of the police that leads to the issuance of an invalid warrant must nonetheless be placed on the serious side of the spectrum.”

[57] I find that the omission of the motivation of the CI and the conclusory statement regarding the CI’s proven reliability showed, at best, significant carelessness. I am troubled by the failure of the officer to acknowledge and disclose his omission with respect to the motivation of the CI. The testimony of the officer that there is no ‘checklist’ for warrants and his unwillingness to describe the omission as an error show a casual attitude towards the obligations of an affiant on an ex parte application. Where, as in this case, the affiant relies on a CI and knows that the ITO will likely be heavily redacted when provided to the defence, that attitude toward disclosure is serious. Had it not been for the diligence of the Crown who thought to ask the officer a very specific question about payment of money to the CI his omission might never have come to light.

[58] I also reach the conclusion that the conduct was, at best, significantly careless based on the misleading characterization of the information said to provide grounds to believe that the items to be seized were at the residence of the Applicant. The wording chosen by the affiant on page 11 is only subtly slanted towards a greater connection to the residence than was actually conveyed by the CI. It is possible that the mischaracterization was inadvertent and due to carelessness rather than a deliberate attempt to mislead. It is, in either case, serious. Again, this exaggeration of the connection to the residence is of elevated gravity in a case where the ITO is likely to be heavily redacted and less open to challenge.

[59] As Fish J. wrote in R. v. Morelli:[^19] “The repute of the administration of justice is jeopardized by judicial indifference to unacceptable police conduct. Police officers seeking search warrants are bound to act with diligence and integrity, taking care to discharge the special duties of candour and full disclosure that attach in ex parte proceedings. In discharging those duties responsibly, they must guard against making statements that are likely to mislead the justice of the peace. They must refrain from concealing or omitting relevant facts. And they must take care not to otherwise exaggerate the information upon which they rely to establish reasonable and probable grounds for issuance of a search warrant.”

[60] I have concluded that the omission of the motivation, the conclusory statement concerning the reliability of the CI and the misleading characterization of the connection to the residence led to the issuance of the invalid warrant.

[61] Balancing the relevant factors, I find that the evidence should be excluded. The Applicant’s rights were significantly impacted and the Charter infringing conduct was serious. These factors weigh very heavily in favour of exclusion of the evidence.

[62] I conclude that the Applicant has met the onus of establishing on a balance of probabilities that the evidence should be excluded.

[63] The Application is therefore allowed and the evidence is excluded.

Forestell J.

Released: February 8, 2016

CITATION: R. v. Ferreira, 2016 ONSC 2039

COURT FILE NO.: CR/11/10000739

DATE: 20160208

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

and -

EDGAR FERREIRA

RULING ON APPLICATION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE

Forestell J.

Released: February 8, 2016

[^1]: 1990 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421 [^2]: R. v. Collins, 1987 CanLII 84 (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 at p. 278 [^3]: R. v. Pires, 2005 SCC 66, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 343 at para. 30 [^4]: R. v. Sadikov, 2014 ONCA 72 at para. 81. R. v. Boussoulas 2014 ONSC 5542 at paras 21 and 22 [^5]: [2012] O.J. No. 3133 at paras. 14-16 [^6]: R. v. Debot (1986), 1986 CanLII 113 (ONCA), 30 C.C.C. (3d) 207 (Ont. C.A.), at pp. 218-219, affirmed, 1989 CanLII 13 (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140, at pp. 1168-1171 [^7]: 2010 SCC 8, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253 at para. 40 [^8]: 2013 SCC 60, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 657 at para. 16 [^9]: R. v. Araujo (2000), 2000 SCC 65, 149 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.) at paras. 46-47 [^10]: [2012] O.J. No. 3133 at paras. 14-16 [^11]: Although at a later point in the ITO under ‘Grounds to believe the offences have been committed’, the affiant refers to the CI having provided information to the police on “numerous occasions”. [^12]: R. v. Debot supra at para. 54; R. v. Greaves-Bissesarsingh 2014 ONSC 4900 at para. 35. [^13]: 2007 ABCA 380, affirmed on appeal at 2008 SCC 65, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 451 and R. v. Rocha, 2012 ONCA 707 [^14]: 2010 ONSC 1734 affirmed [2011]ONCA 828 [^15]: 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353 [^16]: 2010 ONCA 1 at para. 31 [^17]: 2012 ONCA 707 at para 28 [^18]: 2010 ONCA 582 at para. 51 [^19]: 2010 SCC 8 at para. 102

R. v. Ferreira, 2016 ONSC 2039

Case Summary

Introduction

The Procedure on the Application

Positions of the Parties

The Standard of Review

Settlement of Issues relating to the Record

Credibility of the Informant

Compelling nature of the information

Corroboration

Conclusion on the Validity of the Warrant

Should the evidence be excluded under s. 24(2)?

Judge

Counsel

Parties

Areas of Law

Fact Patterns

Issues

Statutory Provisions 3

Legal Tests 2

Legislation 2