Leslie Chapin

The Public Prosecution Service of Canada applied for forfeiture of cash and property seized during the execution of a search warrant at an illegal marijuana dispensary located at 1111-A Finch Avenue West in Toronto.

The accused, Zoran Vujisic, pleaded guilty to trafficking in marijuana and other offences and relinquished his interest in the seized property.

A third party, Sina Majidi, the building owner and property manager, claimed ownership of cash found in two safes located in a first-floor storage unit.

The court found that the cash was offence-related property connected to the dispensary operation through a concealed pulley system.

The court rejected Majidi's claim of lawful ownership, finding his evidence not credible and establishing his complicity in the illegal operation.

The court ordered forfeiture of all seized property and cash.

The accused was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while having more than the legal limit of alcohol in his blood.

The central issue was whether police breached the accused's Charter right to counsel of choice by failing to provide him with access to his preferred lawyer.

The court found that police made reasonable and extensive efforts to locate and contact the accused's counsel of choice, including attempting multiple phone numbers, connecting him with an associate lawyer, and facilitating calls to duty counsel.

The court rejected the argument that police failed in their informational and implementation duties and found no Charter breach.

The accused was convicted.

The City of Toronto appealed sentencing decisions by a Justice of the Peace who had imposed no victim surcharge on fines for provincial offences, relying on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Boudreault.

The appellant sought a ruling that the Justice of the Peace erred in law in declaring that no surcharge would be imposed, arguing that the Provincial Offences Act surcharge operates differently from the Criminal Code surcharge addressed in Boudreault.

The court found that the Justice of the Peace erred in law by failing to provide adequate reasons and by failing to comply with notice requirements under the Courts of Justice Act before raising a constitutional challenge.

Media outlets applied for access to exhibits filed in 2003 proceedings where Bruce McArthur pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm and assault with a weapon.

The exhibits included a psychological report and pre-sentence report.

McArthur, facing murder charges, opposed release arguing it would prejudice his fair trial rights.

The court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck test and granted access to the reports with redactions of family members' names and residential information, finding the open court principle presumptively favoured disclosure and McArthur failed to establish a serious risk to fair trial rights.

Media outlets sought access to photographic exhibits from a 2003 guilty plea proceeding involving assault charges, to be used in reporting on the defendant's current murder charges.

The court balanced the open court principle and freedom of expression against fair trial rights and privacy concerns.

The court granted limited access to photographs of the weapon only, while denying access to photographs of the victim's injuries due to their inflammatory nature, the risk to jury impartiality, and the victim's privacy rights.

The Crown applied to exclude the public from the courtroom pursuant to section 486(1) of the Criminal Code while the complainant testified at a preliminary inquiry.

The accused was charged with multiple offences including extortion, sexual assault, invitation to touch, permitting a person under 16 to be in premises for sexual activity, sexual interference, and defamatory libel.

The complainant, a member of the Afghan community, feared serious repercussions including physical violence and social isolation if her identity became known.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that the complainant had a genuine and objectively reasonable fear for her physical safety and that excluding the public was necessary for the proper administration of justice.

The accused was charged with assaulting a police officer causing bodily harm.

The incident occurred on New Year's Eve 2013/January 1, 2014 near Nathan Phillips Square in Toronto.

The Crown alleged that the accused head-butted Officer Bragg, causing facial fractures and other injuries.

The accused testified that he fell to the ground with Officer Bragg, and that Officer Bragg's head struck his head as they fell.

The court found that the evidence presented four completely different versions of events from the officers and the accused, making it impossible to determine how the injuries were sustained.

The accused was acquitted due to reasonable doubt.

The Crown brought an application under section 672.11(b) of the Criminal Code seeking an assessment order to determine whether the accused was suffering from a mental disorder at the time of committing the offences so as to be exempt from criminal responsibility.

The accused had pleaded guilty to public mischief and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the evidence did not establish reasonable grounds to believe an assessment was necessary.

The evidence consisted of observations of odd behaviour and a statement by the accused that he was schizophrenic and receiving treatment, which was insufficient to meet the threshold for ordering an assessment.

The accused was charged with possession of less than thirty grams of marijuana found in a sock thrown from a holding cell at the Etobicoke Courthouse.

The Crown relied on security camera footage to establish identification, showing an individual in cell 2-27 throwing the sock containing the contraband.

The court found that while the video depicted the alleged offense and showed the individual throwing the sock, the quality and clarity of the footage, combined with the individual's obscured face (due to cell bars and a pulled-up hoodie), was insufficient to establish identification beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

The respondent parents brought a motion under Rule 20(5) of the Family Law Rules seeking disclosure of the names and addresses of all private investigators hired by the Children's Services society, along with copies of all correspondence, retainer agreements, and exchanges between the society and investigators since November 2012.

The parents alleged they had observed unknown persons conducting surveillance of their home and taking photographs.

The society claimed litigation privilege over the surveillance materials.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the society has a broad disclosure obligation under Stinchcombe principles, litigation privilege protects work product prepared in contemplation of litigation, including surveillance conducted for litigation purposes that has not been relied upon as evidence.

The defendants were charged with multiple offences under the Food and Drugs Act relating to the sale, importation, and advertising of 1-(Phenylmethyl) Piperazine (BZP), a synthetic substance sold under brand names including Freq, Peaq, Rush, Rush 2, Spun, and Flow.

The Crown alleged the defendants sold these products without proper drug identification numbers (DINs), without filing new drug submissions, and without proper labeling.

The defendants argued that Health Canada had not determined BZP was a drug during the relevant timeframe and that the charges were duplicative.

The court found that the Crown proved the actus reus of the offences beyond a reasonable doubt, that Adam Wookey was the controlling mind of Purepillz Corporation, and that Health Canada had clearly identified BZP as a drug subject to regulation from at least April 2008 onward.

The court convicted on counts 1-6, 8-13, 29, and 33, and stayed counts 15-20 and 22-27 as duplicative under the Kienapple principle.

All charges against Pure Principles Inc. were dismissed due to insufficient evidence.

The Crown brought a motion at a preliminary inquiry seeking an order to admit evidence of ten separate attacks on nine victims as similar act evidence on the question of identification against the accused.

The attacks occurred in the Parkdale area of Toronto between December 2009 and April 2011.

The accused was charged with two counts of assault, seven counts of assault causing bodily harm, and one count of second-degree murder.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that the ten attacks demonstrated sufficient cumulative similarities to warrant admission as similar fact evidence, despite some dissimilarities in witness descriptions.

The court applied the test from R. v. Arp and R. v. Handy, examining proximity in time, similarity of detail, number of occurrences, and the balance of probative value against prejudicial effect.

The Crown charged the defendants with offences under the Food and Drug Act for selling BZP (1-Benzyl-Piperazine) capsules without obtaining required drug identification numbers and establishment licenses.

The defendants moved for a directed verdict, arguing that BZP products marketed for recreational purposes do not fall within the definition of "drug" under the Food and Drug Act.

The court rejected this argument, finding that the Act applies to substances that modify organic functions regardless of whether medicinal claims are made, and that the legislation's purpose is to protect Canadians from potentially harmful substances.

The motion was dismissed.

The accused was charged with theft of electricity, production of marijuana, possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, and simple possession of marijuana.

The accused brought an application for a directed verdict of acquittal on all counts except simple possession.

The Crown presented evidence of a large-scale marijuana grow operation discovered at a residence owned by the accused, including sophisticated equipment, electrical bypass modifications, and chemical baths.

The Crown also presented circumstantial evidence linking the accused to the operation through documents found at both the grow operation location and the accused's residence.

The court applied the test from R. v. Arcuri, assessing whether the evidence, if believed, could reasonably support an inference of guilt.

The court found sufficient circumstantial evidence to support inferences of knowledge and control by the accused and dismissed the application for a directed verdict.

The accused was charged with driving a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding eighty milligrams of alcohol in one hundred millilitres of blood.

The Crown called two police officers who testified regarding the traffic stop, the approved screening device test, and the subsequent breath samples provided at the police station.

The central issue was whether a proper demand pursuant to section 254(3) of the Criminal Code had been made.

The trial judge found that the officers had only made an approved screening device demand under section 254(2), not the required approved instrument demand under section 254(3).

The trial judge concluded that a proper demand under section 254(3) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of the breath certificate and that the Crown could not rely on the presumption of accuracy.

An acquittal was entered.