Patricia Corneil

In a child protection proceeding under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, the court rejected a jurisdictional challenge based on the five-day rule in s. 88, holding that the technical place-of-safety event occurred when the agency completed the placement assessment and documentation, not when the child was initially left with the paternal grandmother during the investigation.

The court nevertheless sharply criticized the agency's failure to make reasonable efforts to locate and engage the mother, its failure to serve her, and its procedural unfairness in excluding her from the process after intimate partner violence allegations arose.

Applying the temporary care and custody test, the court found a real risk of harm from the child's exposure to domestic violence and concluded that a temporary protection order was necessary.

The least disruptive placement consistent with protection, and the placement priority for an Indigenous child, favoured temporary placement with the mother under supervision rather than with the paternal grandmother.

The father received supervised discretionary access, with unsupervised access not to be considered until he began a PARS program or equivalent counselling.

The respondent parents brought a motion under Rule 20(5) of the Family Law Rules seeking disclosure of the names and addresses of all private investigators hired by the Children's Services society, along with copies of all correspondence, retainer agreements, and exchanges between the society and investigators since November 2012.

The parents alleged they had observed unknown persons conducting surveillance of their home and taking photographs.

The society claimed litigation privilege over the surveillance materials.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the society has a broad disclosure obligation under Stinchcombe principles, litigation privilege protects work product prepared in contemplation of litigation, including surveillance conducted for litigation purposes that has not been relied upon as evidence.

The respondent mother brought a motion for an order requiring the applicant child protection agency to disclose the names and addresses of all private investigators hired by the agency, along with correspondence and retainer agreements.

The mother alleged she was being surveilled.

The agency relied on litigation privilege and did not file affidavit material.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that surveillance materials are protected by litigation privilege unless the agency intends to rely on them as evidence.

Since the agency had not listed any surveillance witnesses for trial, the surveillance was not part of the case the parents had to meet, and disclosure was not required.

A child protection application concerning two children, S. and J., brought by Chatham-Kent Children's Services.

The Society alleged that the children were in need of protection due to physical and emotional abuse, inappropriate discipline, and inadequate care by their mother and stepfather.

The trial addressed grounds for protection, supervision of access, and whether ongoing protection orders were necessary.

The court found that S. was in need of protection and made her a Crown ward with supervised access to her mother.

The court found that J. was in need of protection in 2007-2008 but that no ongoing protection order was warranted, and he remained in his mother's care without supervision.

The applicant children's aid society sought child protection orders for two children.

The older child, who had complex behavioural needs and diagnoses of ADHD and depression, experienced significant conflict and emotional abuse from her stepfather, leading to suicidal ideation.

The court found her in need of protection and made her a Crown ward with access to the mother at the society's discretion.

The younger child had historically been subjected to inappropriate discipline, including being locked in his room, but was currently thriving.

The court found the younger child was historically in need of protection but declined to make an ongoing supervision order, allowing him to remain in the mother's care without conditions.