Nicholas Patrick Adamson

The appellants were charged with unlawfully damaging and/or destroying protected rattlesnake habitat contrary to the Endangered Species Act, 2007.

They brought a s. 11(b) Charter application for a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay, which was dismissed by the trial judge.

The appellants then sought certiorari and s. 24(1) Charter relief in Superior Court, arguing the trial judge failed to characterize certain disclosure as "obviously relevant" and failed to attribute all delay to the Crown.

The Superior Court dismissed both applications.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no jurisdictional error and rejecting the argument that the degree of relevance of outstanding disclosure alleviates the defence's obligation to act diligently.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice that overturned the respondent's conviction under the Endangered Species Act for damaging Blanding's turtle habitat.

The appeal judge had entered an acquittal after finding the circumstantial evidence of turtle sightings from prior and subsequent years insufficient to prove the land was habitat at the time of the offence.

The Court of Appeal held that while the appeal judge's conclusion raised a question of law alone, the Crown failed to demonstrate that granting leave was essential in the public interest or for the due administration of justice.

The decision below was highly fact-specific and unlikely to establish a binding precedent requiring direct evidence of habitat use.

Leave to appeal was denied, and the respondent's request for costs was dismissed.

The applicants sought judicial review, including mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, and s. 24(1) Charter relief, of a Justice of the Peace's decision.

The Justice of the Peace had dismissed their s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay and deferred an abuse of process application in a provincial offences proceeding concerning alleged damage to Massasauga snake habitat.

The Superior Court dismissed the applicants' request for extraordinary relief, finding that the Justice of the Peace did not exceed or decline jurisdiction.

The court held that the issues raised were not appropriate for interlocutory intervention by a superior court, emphasizing that such matters are generally best addressed on appeal after the trial has concluded.

The defendants brought an application for disclosure of information related to four other land development projects, arguing it was relevant for full answer and defence, due diligence, and to demonstrate inconsistent application of environmental legislation by the Ministry.

The court determined that the materials sought were not first-party disclosure in the possession or control of the prosecution but rather third-party records held by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry.

The court outlined the proper two-step process for a third-party production application, emphasizing the need to notify the record holder and any parties with privacy interests, and provided guidance on the Crown's duty to inquire.

The application for disclosure was not granted as first-party, but the court provided a procedural path for the defendants to pursue it as third-party production.

The Town of South Bruce Peninsula appealed its conviction for damaging Piping Plover habitat under the Endangered Species Act, 2007.

The appeal raised issues regarding the interpretation of "damage" under the Act and the admissibility of expert evidence from a Ministry biologist.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the lower court's interpretation of "damage" as including actions that make habitat less attractive, useful, or valuable from the species' perspective, and affirming the admissibility of the expert's evidence, despite concerns about impartiality, as the trial judge's decision was entitled to deference and the evidence of another expert was sufficient.

The Town of South Bruce Peninsula sought leave to appeal convictions for damaging piping plover habitat under the Endangered Species Act, 2007.

The Town argued the lower courts erred in interpreting 'damage' to habitat and in applying the test for expert evidence admissibility in a regulatory offence.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal on both questions, finding the interpretation of 'damage' to be a serious legal question with broad public interest implications, and guidance on expert evidence in a regulatory setting to be appropriate.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed on a winery corporation that pleaded guilty to discharging material into a watercourse in violation of the Ontario Water Resources Act.

The trial judge imposed a fine of $600, invoking section 59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act to relieve the defendant from the statutory minimum fine of $25,000.

The appeal judge increased the fine to $5,000, still below the minimum.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and imposed the minimum fine of $25,000, holding that section 59(2) must be applied with appropriate restraint to avoid undermining the deterrent purpose of minimum fines in public welfare legislation.

The applicants sought leave to appeal their convictions under the Environmental Protection Act following a 14-day trial and a subsequent appeal to the Superior Court of Justice.

The applicants were convicted of nine provincial offences related to discharging contaminants into the environment and failing to comply with lawful orders issued following catastrophic propane explosions at their facility that killed one employee and displaced approximately 12,000 residents.

The Court of Appeal considered whether leave to appeal should be granted under section 131 of the Provincial Offences Act, which requires identification of a pure question of law that is essential in the public interest or for the due administration of justice.

The court found that the two grounds of appeal raised by the applicants were fact-laden and did not identify pure questions of law transcending the unique factual circumstances of the case.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for multiple regulatory offences under the Environmental Protection Act and the Occupational Health and Safety Act following a massive propane explosion at their facility that resulted in a worker's death and widespread environmental contamination.

The appellants argued the trial judge made numerous factual and legal errors, including rejecting their defence of officially induced error and finding a lack of due diligence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of strict liability principles.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeals, upholding over $5 million in fines due to the unprecedented magnitude of the damage and the appellants' reckless conduct.

The respondent parents brought a motion under Rule 20(5) of the Family Law Rules seeking disclosure of the names and addresses of all private investigators hired by the Children's Services society, along with copies of all correspondence, retainer agreements, and exchanges between the society and investigators since November 2012.

The parents alleged they had observed unknown persons conducting surveillance of their home and taking photographs.

The society claimed litigation privilege over the surveillance materials.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the society has a broad disclosure obligation under Stinchcombe principles, litigation privilege protects work product prepared in contemplation of litigation, including surveillance conducted for litigation purposes that has not been relied upon as evidence.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal from a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board, the respondent Ministry of Natural Resources sought partial indemnity costs.

The Divisional Court found the requested amount of $8,034.09 to be reasonable and ordered it payable forthwith.

On consent, the respondent County of Haldimand was awarded costs of $2,500.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Municipal Board regarding the revocation of a licence, arguing the Board erred in law by failing to understand that the revocation was tainted by prior allegedly unlawful actions by the Ministry.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the Board's decision and noting that the Board's conclusion that the appellant was not in compliance with licence conditions was a finding of fact that could not be disturbed.

The appellant sought a declaration that s. 43 of the Criminal Code, which justifies the reasonable use of force by way of correction by parents and teachers against children, violates ss. 7, 12, and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 43 does not offend the Charter.

The Court found that s. 43 is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and does not discriminate against children, as it is grounded in their actual needs and circumstances by protecting them from the blunt instrument of the criminal law for minor disciplinary contacts.