Marjan Delavar

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to amend their statement of claim in a solicitor's negligence action to significantly increase their claim for damages based on a new expert report.

The defendants opposed the amendments, arguing the increase was frivolous and the apportionment of damages among multiple plaintiffs was improper.

The court granted leave for the quantum amendments, finding them legally tenable and within the existing factual matrix without causing non-compensable prejudice.

The proposed amendments regarding the apportionment of damages were adjourned to allow the parties further opportunity to resolve the issue.

The appellants were charged with unlawfully damaging and/or destroying protected rattlesnake habitat contrary to the Endangered Species Act, 2007.

They brought a s. 11(b) Charter application for a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay, which was dismissed by the trial judge.

The appellants then sought certiorari and s. 24(1) Charter relief in Superior Court, arguing the trial judge failed to characterize certain disclosure as "obviously relevant" and failed to attribute all delay to the Crown.

The Superior Court dismissed both applications.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no jurisdictional error and rejecting the argument that the degree of relevance of outstanding disclosure alleviates the defence's obligation to act diligently.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicants sought judicial review, including mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, and s. 24(1) Charter relief, of a Justice of the Peace's decision.

The Justice of the Peace had dismissed their s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay and deferred an abuse of process application in a provincial offences proceeding concerning alleged damage to Massasauga snake habitat.

The Superior Court dismissed the applicants' request for extraordinary relief, finding that the Justice of the Peace did not exceed or decline jurisdiction.

The court held that the issues raised were not appropriate for interlocutory intervention by a superior court, emphasizing that such matters are generally best addressed on appeal after the trial has concluded.

The appellant appealed a decision denying him leave to amend his statement of claim in a libel action against the respondents.

The Divisional Court upheld the Associate Justice's decision, finding no error in the application of issue estoppel to prevent the addition of the appellant's professional corporation as a plaintiff, as a previous judge had already ruled the corporation had no tenable cause of action.

The court also upheld the refusal to allow scandalous and irrelevant paragraphs about a non-party, and the refusal to permit a claim for document production within the pleadings.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellants, former litigation counsel, appealed the dismissal of their summary judgment motion based on a limitations defence in a solicitor negligence claim.

The motion judge found the claim was not discoverable until the Supreme Court of Canada refused leave to appeal, or alternatively, that commencing an action earlier was not an appropriate means to remedy it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the claim was not time-barred, emphasizing that the respondents reasonably relied on their counsel's advice regarding the underlying litigation's legal errors, thus delaying discoverability of the negligence claim.

The defendants, former legal counsel for the plaintiffs, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' solicitor negligence action on the basis that it was statute-barred.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendants were negligent in failing to argue the unconscionability and public policy branches of the Tercon test regarding an exclusion clause in the underlying trial against Toyota.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding that the limitation period did not begin to run until the Supreme Court of Canada denied leave to appeal in the underlying action, as the plaintiffs reasonably relied on the defendants' advice to pursue appeals and a legal proceeding was not an 'appropriate means' to seek a remedy until the appeal process was exhausted.

The appellants sought dismissal of a defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, arising from an email sent by the appellant lawyer to a professional listserv alleging that the respondent physician had improperly altered medical assessors' reports and changed a doctor's impairment classification in the context of statutory accident benefits disputes.

The motion judge allowed the anti-SLAPP motion and dismissed the defamation proceeding; the Court of Appeal reversed that decision and remitted the defamation claim to the Superior Court.

A five-justice majority of this Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the respondent had discharged his burden under s. 137.1(4) by demonstrating grounds to believe his defamation claim had substantial merit, that the appellants had no valid defence of justification or qualified privilege, and that the public interest in permitting the defamation action to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting the impugned expression.

The majority also partially admitted fresh evidence tendered by the respondent, including a letter from the assessed specialist and letters from counsel for the magazine that republished the email.

Four justices dissented, concluding that the appellant lawyer had a valid defence of qualified privilege that gave her expression a real prospect of success at trial, and that the public interest in protecting her communication to fellow plaintiff-side personal injury lawyers outweighed the harm to the respondent's reputation.

Appeal from a Superior Court decision on a motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant brought multiple motions, including a successful section 137.1 motion but also unsuccessful constitutional and procedural motions.

The Court of Appeal addressed costs for both the motion and the appeal.

On the motion, no costs were awarded due to the presumption in section 137.1(8) and the offsetting effect of the appellant's unsuccessful meritless motions.

On the appeal, the appellant was awarded partial indemnity costs reduced to account for time spent on unsuccessful constitutional and procedural arguments.

The appellant, a medical doctor who prepares impairment assessments for insurers in motor vehicle accident claims, sued the respondent, a lawyer and OTLA president-elect, for libel following an email posted to the OTLA Listserv.

The email alleged that the respondent had altered medical reports and misrepresented expert opinions in a catastrophic impairment arbitration.

The motion judge dismissed the action under section 137.1 of the Court of Justice Act (Anti-SLAPP legislation), finding that although the expression related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff failed to meet the merits threshold and the harm was outweighed by the public interest in protecting the expression.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in his application of sections 137.1(4)(a) and (b), and that the plaintiff had met his onus on both provisions.

The court also rejected constitutional challenges under sections 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicants brought a motion to set aside an order quashing their application for judicial review of the Minister's decision to apply an Interim Enforcement Policy to certain First Nations regarding hunting and fishing rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, upholding the motions judge's finding that the Minister's decision was an exercise of prosecutorial discretion and therefore not justiciable absent an abuse of process.

The Court also agreed that the applicant's section 15 Charter claim was bound to fail as the policy did not alter his rights or impose a burden based on race.

Furthermore, the Court held it lacked jurisdiction under the Judicial Review Procedure Act because the policy was not an exercise of a statutory power.

The applicants brought a motion to set aside an order of the motions judge, which added the Williams Treaties First Nations as necessary parties or interveners to an application for judicial review and awarded substantial indemnity costs against the applicants.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the motions judge's conclusion that the First Nations would be directly affected by the declarations sought.

The court also upheld the costs award, noting that the applicants persisted with an unnecessary motion despite being on notice that elevated costs would be sought.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Minister of Natural Resources' decision to apply an Interim Enforcement Policy, which permits Aboriginal people to hunt and fish for food, social, and ceremonial purposes, within the 1923 Williams Treaties boundaries.

The Minister brought a motion to quash the application.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the application of the policy was an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, which is immune from judicial review absent an abuse of process.

The court also held that the policy did not violate the applicants' equality rights under section 15 of the Charter, as it constituted an ameliorative program under section 15(2).

Several First Nations moved to be added as party respondents in a judicial review application challenging Ontario’s Interim Enforcement Policy permitting First Nations to hunt and fish for food, social and ceremonial purposes on lands subject to the 1923 Williams Treaties pending resolution of related litigation.

The applicant organization opposed the motion, arguing the First Nations should not participate as parties or should be limited to intervenor status.

The court held that the proceeding directly targeted the asserted treaty and Charter rights of the First Nations and that effective adjudication required their participation.

The First Nations met the test for mandatory joinder under Rule 5.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and would also qualify as party intervenors under Rule 13.01.

As they were plainly proper parties and were forced to bring the motion after the applicant resisted their participation, the court awarded them substantial indemnity costs.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside two default judgments arising from a breach of contract action involving a technology services agreement.

The court applied the established test for setting aside default judgments, considering delay, explanation for the default, and the existence of a triable defence.

The court held that the motion to set aside the first partial default judgment for the liquidated portion of the claim was brought with undue delay and lacked a reasonable explanation or evidence of a meritorious defence.

However, the court accepted a limited explanation regarding the second judgment for the unliquidated portion of damages and found that issues relating to quantum and equitable remedies warranted adjudication on the merits.

The second judgment was set aside on conditions, including payment of the first judgment and costs.

The defendants appealed a Master's decision that permitted the plaintiffs to amend their statement of claim to include extra-contractual misrepresentation claims despite an entire agreement clause, and refused the defendants' amendments pleading similar fact evidence of the plaintiffs' aggressive litigation history.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Master correctly struck the similar fact pleadings as they did not constitute an affirmative defence of abuse of process.

The court also upheld the Master's decision to allow the plaintiffs' extra-contractual claims to proceed through the pleadings stage, noting that under the Tercon principle, such claims are not necessarily doomed to failure.

The Master's deferral of discovery planning was upheld as a reasonable exercise of discretion.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to issue a commission and letter of request to judicial authorities in the State of Washington to compel the former owner of the defendant hockey club, an American resident, to give evidence at trial.

The court found the witness had material evidence regarding corporate negligence and vicarious liability for an on-ice assault.

Finding a gap in the rules regarding compelling foreign witnesses to testify via videoconference at trial, the court applied the rules by analogy and granted the order for a commission and letter of request for the witness to testify live by videoconference or be examined before trial.

In a high‑value personal injury action arising from an on‑ice hockey incident, the defendant moved under s. 105 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 33 for orders compelling the plaintiff to attend a vocational assessment and to authorize access to detailed GMAT testing data.

The plaintiff alleged permanent cognitive impairment and loss of future earning capacity exceeding $60 million.

The court held that a further psychovocational examination was justified because newly delivered expert reports placed the plaintiff’s post‑injury vocational capacity squarely in issue and fairness required the defendant to obtain responsive expert evidence.

However, the court declined to compel authorization for access to the GMAT database, finding the detailed testing data irrelevant to the material issues in dispute.

The motion was therefore granted in part and dismissed in part.

The defendants appealed a Master's order that struck out one of two defence neuropsychological assessments of the plaintiff.

The Master had varied his original order allowing two assessments after discovering the defendants had entered into an undisclosed settlement agreement, reasoning they were no longer adverse in interest.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal, finding the Master erred in law.

The court held that the defendants remained adverse in interest despite the settlement, and that adversity is not a strict prerequisite for multiple defence medicals under section 105 of the Courts of Justice Act if fairness requires it.

Both assessments were permitted, but the defendants were ordered to pay full indemnity costs and fund an additional assessment for the plaintiff as a sanction for failing to disclose the agreement and breaching the examination protocol.

The plaintiffs moved to set aside an order that required the plaintiff to undergo two defence neuropsychological examinations.

The original order was made on the assumption that the defendants were adverse in interest.

It was subsequently discovered that the defendants had entered into a secret settlement agreement ending all adversity between them six months prior to the order.

The court found that the failure to disclose the agreement altered the landscape of the litigation.

The court varied the original order to permit only a single neuropsychological examination, finding that allowing two examinations by experts in the same field for non-adverse defendants was improper.

The court declined to exclude both reports entirely, finding that such a consequence would be disproportionate, but awarded the plaintiffs full indemnity costs.

The applicant's motion to set aside a judgment quashing his application for judicial review was previously dismissed.

The court determined costs for that motion.

The Attorney General of Canada sought full indemnity costs, while the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport sought partial indemnity costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $14,000 to the Attorney General and $7,000 to the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport.