Jonathan C. Lisus

The parties separated after a 32-year marriage.

Before the marriage, the respondent wife received shares in her father's business.

During the marriage, an estate freeze was executed, transferring the growth value of the shares to a new family trust settled by her father for $100.

The trial judge, feeling bound by prior appellate jurisprudence, excluded the wife's interest in the trust from her net family property as a gift after marriage.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, distinguishing the prior case and holding that the trust interest was traceable to the pre-marital gift.

The trust interest was included in net family property, but the equalization payment was reduced to $18 million under s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act due to unconscionability.

Retroactive spousal support was ordered, but prospective support was denied.

The trial costs award against the appellant husband was upheld.

At a case conference, the plaintiff sought to abandon his summary judgment motion following extensive new documentary disclosure by the defendants, and instead proceed to trial.

The plaintiff also indicated an intention to amend his statement of claim and file a jury notice.

The defendants argued that the motion judge should remain seized as the trial judge or at least determine the costs of the abandoned motion.

The court held that the summary judgment motion would not proceed, directed further examinations on the newly produced documents, and deferred the issues of costs and whether the motion judge should be seized as the trial judge to a later formal motion.

Following a judgment allowing the plaintiffs' action, the parties made written submissions on costs and prejudgment interest.

The parties settled the issue of costs for $6,680,632.45.

On the issue of prejudgment interest, the court determined the start dates for the calculation of interest for each plaintiff.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to average the interest rate or to award compound interest, finding no unusual or special circumstances to justify departing from the presumptive statutory scheme.

The court also declined to reduce the period for calculating interest based on the plaintiffs' conduct.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a $200 million action against the provincial Crown, the Secretary of the Cabinet, a hospital, and various physicians, alleging medical malpractice and abuse of power.

The Crown requested a dismissal under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the claim against the government defendants lacked any legal basis or material facts, and the claim against the other defendants was an abuse of process as it duplicated an existing action.

The court dismissed the action in its entirety as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The appellants, a real estate developer and related corporate entities, appealed a judgment granting the respondent lender $12.9 million plus interest on a defaulted commercial loan.

The appellants argued the application judge erred by failing to convert the application to an action, by conducting a credibility analysis on a paper record, and by foreclosing a defence of equitable set-off and counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal found the application judge's reasons were clear and sufficient, the documentary record amply supported the finding that no binding second amending agreement was ever reached, and credibility assessments were not necessary given the strength of the documentary evidence.

The court declined to resolve whether the enhanced fact-finding powers available under r. 20 apply to applications under r. 14, leaving that question for another day.

The appeal was dismissed and full indemnity costs of $55,000 were awarded to the respondent pursuant to the contractual costs clause in the loan agreement.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal a lower court decision dated December 19, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

As no costs outlines were filed, the court declined to award costs of the motion.

Following the dismissal of the appeal (2026 ONCA 3), the court addressed costs.

Having considered the written submissions and costs outlines of both parties, the court fixed all-inclusive costs of the appeal payable by the appellant to the respondents in the amount of $37,000.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment decision dismissing their oppression claim against the respondent in his personal capacity.

The motion judge had found that the appellants did not qualify as 'complainants' under section 245 of the Business Corporations Act, as they were not creditors and their status as potential creditors did not make them proper persons to bring an oppression claim.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error of fact or error of law.

The court confirmed that the motion judge properly applied the test for complainant status and the framework for partial summary judgment.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant law firm appealed a motion judge's decision reducing its contingency fee from approximately $4.1 million to $3.25 million following a $14 million medical malpractice settlement.

The motion judge found the 2018 contingency fee agreement was neither fair nor reasonable under the Solicitors Act, noting the client's vulnerability and the agreement's non-compliance with regulatory requirements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's conclusion that the agreement was not fair at the time it was entered into, given the potential for fees to exceed the client's recovery and the failure to adequately explain the need for court approval.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal by the Attorney General of Canada from a certification order of a class action brought by immigration detainees.

Between May 2016 and July 2023, the Canada Border Services Agency placed approximately 8,360 immigration detainees in provincial and territorial prisons instead of Immigration Holding Centers.

The respondents challenged this practice as violating sections 7, 9, 12, and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and as constituting negligence.

The motion judge certified the class action, finding that the Charter and negligence claims disclosed reasonable causes of action and that common issues existed.

The appellate court upheld the certification, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the motion judge's analysis.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Penny J. dated March 24, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal with no order as to costs.

The plaintiffs, shareholders and creditors in Mobilicity, a wireless telecommunications company, sued the federal government for negligence and negligent misrepresentation arising from the 2008 AWS spectrum auction.

The plaintiffs alleged that Industry Canada represented that spectrum licences acquired at auction would be transferable to incumbent carriers after a five-year moratorium, and that they relied on this representation to invest approximately $250 million in equity and $95 million in debt to capitalize Mobilicity and bid for spectrum licences.

The plaintiffs further alleged that in 2013, the government unilaterally changed the transfer framework to prohibit transfers to incumbents, and in 2014-2015 interfered with Mobilicity's sales process through threats, media manipulation, and regulatory delay.

The court found the government liable for negligence and negligent misrepresentation, holding that it owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs based on specific representations made to induce investment, and that it breached that duty through the implementation of the 2013 Transfer Framework and subsequent interference in the sales process.

The court awarded damages based on a "but for" analysis, calculating what the plaintiffs would have earned in alternative investments had they not relied on the government's representations.

The court considered a motion for summary judgment by Jonathan Rosenthal, in his personal capacity, seeking dismissal of the oppression claim brought against him by Paragon Protection Ltd. and Rosencrantz & Guildenstern Inc. The central issue was whether the plaintiffs were proper "complainants" under section 245 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act and thus had standing to advance an oppression remedy claim.

The court found that the plaintiffs, not being current or former security holders or creditors of Tamstu-Harjon Holdings of Canada Limited, could not qualify as proper complainants based solely on their status as potential creditors arising from the litigation itself.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the claim against Mr. Rosenthal personally.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered a motion by Barbara Lang-Newlands regarding the operation of the automatic stay under rule 63.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure following a family law trial judgment.

The court addressed whether certain monetary awards (post-separation adjustments) should be characterized as support and thus exempt from the stay, and whether the stay should be lifted or maintained on various payments pending appeal.

The court declined to recharacterize the payments as support, but exercised its discretion to lift the stay on Ian Newlands' obligation to pay post-separation adjustments, given the risk that Barb would not recover the funds if the stay remained.

The court ordered Barb to pay Ian the net difference and expedited the appeal.

The plaintiffs, Avante Automobile (2017) Corporation and Francesco Serpa, sought damages from BMW Canada Inc. for breach of statutory, contractual, and common law duties in relation to the purchase and operation of a BMW dealership.

The court found BMW Canada liable for failing to properly document an extension to complete required renovations and for not following the termination provisions of the Retailer Agreement.

However, the court preferred the defendant’s evidence on valuation and found no net recoverable damages.

The action was dismissed, subject to costs.

This costs endorsement follows the dismissal of appeals by the Attorney General of Ontario, His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, the Town of South Bruce Peninsula, Alberta Lemon, and the Estate of Barbara Twining, and the allowance of the cross-appeal by the Attorney General of Canada and His Majesty the King in Right of Canada.

The Court orders the Town and the Families to pay costs to the Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation and the Town to pay costs to Canada, finding the amounts sought reasonable in light of the complexity and significance of the appeal.

The applicant, Minotar Holdings Inc., sought a declaration that certain sections of the Greenbelt Statute Law Amendment Act, 2023 and the Greenbelt Act, 2005 violated section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 by legislating a judicial outcome and depriving the Superior Court of its jurisdiction.

The court found that the amendments did not violate the Constitution, as the legislature has the authority to extinguish causes of action and define land use boundaries, provided it uses clear and explicit statutory language.

The application was dismissed and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment declaring that approximately 1.4 miles of coastline (the Disputed Beach) forms part of the Saugeen Indian Reserve No. 29 under Treaty 72 of 1854.

The trial judge found that the Crown breached its fiduciary duty and acted dishonourably when a surveyor improperly excluded the beach from the reserve boundaries.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's application of treaty interpretation principles or her assessment of the historical record.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's decision to deny the bona fide purchaser for value defence to private landowners, prioritizing the First Nation's constitutionally protected treaty rights.

A cross-appeal by Canada regarding the allocation of pre-Confederation liability was allowed and referred to the next phase of the trial.

The appellant, a school board trustee, appealed the dismissal of his judicial review application challenging sanctions imposed by the Toronto Catholic District School Board for breaching its code of conduct.

The trustee had made inflammatory remarks equating LGBTQ+ individuals with criminals during a public meeting.

The appeal court upheld the Divisional Court's decision, finding that the Board had the authority to reconsider its initial decision (which had not found a breach), that re-litigation doctrines did not apply to the administrative process, and that the Board's decisions reasonably balanced the trustee's Charter rights with its statutory mandate to promote an inclusive school climate.

This decision addresses an anti-SLAPP motion brought by Global News and its journalists to dismiss a libel suit initiated by Wenbin (Vincent) Ke, an Ontario MPP.

Mr. Ke sued after Global News published stories alleging his involvement in a Chinese government election interference scheme, based on leaks from CSIS agents.

The court found that while the reporting concerned a matter of public interest, there were grounds to believe the plaintiff's libel claim had substantial merit and that the defendants' defences of responsible communication and justification (of a lesser truth) could fail at trial.

The court weighed the public interest in protecting the plaintiff's reputation and ensuring democratic integrity against the freedom of expression, concluding that the public interest in allowing the proceeding to continue outweighed the interest in protecting the expression.

Consequently, the motion to dismiss was denied, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.