Danielle Glatt

At a case conference, the plaintiff sought to abandon his summary judgment motion following extensive new documentary disclosure by the defendants, and instead proceed to trial.

The plaintiff also indicated an intention to amend his statement of claim and file a jury notice.

The defendants argued that the motion judge should remain seized as the trial judge or at least determine the costs of the abandoned motion.

The court held that the summary judgment motion would not proceed, directed further examinations on the newly produced documents, and deferred the issues of costs and whether the motion judge should be seized as the trial judge to a later formal motion.

Following a judgment allowing the plaintiffs' action, the parties made written submissions on costs and prejudgment interest.

The parties settled the issue of costs for $6,680,632.45.

On the issue of prejudgment interest, the court determined the start dates for the calculation of interest for each plaintiff.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to average the interest rate or to award compound interest, finding no unusual or special circumstances to justify departing from the presumptive statutory scheme.

The court also declined to reduce the period for calculating interest based on the plaintiffs' conduct.

The plaintiffs, shareholders and creditors in Mobilicity, a wireless telecommunications company, sued the federal government for negligence and negligent misrepresentation arising from the 2008 AWS spectrum auction.

The plaintiffs alleged that Industry Canada represented that spectrum licences acquired at auction would be transferable to incumbent carriers after a five-year moratorium, and that they relied on this representation to invest approximately $250 million in equity and $95 million in debt to capitalize Mobilicity and bid for spectrum licences.

The plaintiffs further alleged that in 2013, the government unilaterally changed the transfer framework to prohibit transfers to incumbents, and in 2014-2015 interfered with Mobilicity's sales process through threats, media manipulation, and regulatory delay.

The court found the government liable for negligence and negligent misrepresentation, holding that it owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs based on specific representations made to induce investment, and that it breached that duty through the implementation of the 2013 Transfer Framework and subsequent interference in the sales process.

The court awarded damages based on a "but for" analysis, calculating what the plaintiffs would have earned in alternative investments had they not relied on the government's representations.

The appellant, Bank of Montreal, sought to appeal an order lifting a stay of proceedings in a receivership, which allowed the respondent to terminate a project agreement.

The appellant argued it had an automatic right of appeal under s. 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, or alternatively, sought leave to appeal under s. 193(e).

The Court of Appeal held that the order lifting the stay was procedural, did not directly bring into play the value of the debtor's property, and did not directly result in a loss, meaning there was no automatic right of appeal.

The court also denied leave to appeal, finding the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious, did not raise issues of general importance, and would unduly hinder the insolvency proceedings.

During a complex commercial trial, an evidentiary dispute arose regarding the reading in of examination for discovery transcripts under Rule 31.11.

The defendant sought to introduce additional excerpts from its own witnesses' discoveries to qualify the plaintiffs' read-ins, and also sought to read in discovery evidence of the plaintiffs' witnesses who had already testified.

The court allowed some of the qualifying read-ins that directly explained the original answers but excluded others.

The court largely dismissed the defendant's request to read in the plaintiffs' discovery evidence, finding that doing so after the witnesses had testified without putting the evidence to them in cross-examination violated the rule in Browne v. Dunn and caused trial unfairness.

The appellant, a cryptocurrency mining company, appealed a motion judge's dismissal of its motion for the interim preservation of specific funds or assets purchased with those funds under Rules 45.01 and 45.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant had made upfront payments to the respondents for power supply, which the respondents co-mingled with general funds to build power generation infrastructure.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge applied the correct legal tests and made no palpable and overriding errors in concluding that the appellant failed to establish a right to a specific fund or identify specific assets to be preserved.

The applicants sought a declaration that a 2001 easement and restrictive covenant registered on title to a former golf course prohibited the respondent from developing the lands for residential use.

The respondent argued the covenant only protected storm water management access and did not prevent development.

The court applied contract interpretation principles and found the plain language of the restrictive covenant, read in context, constituted a complete prohibition on building structures on the golf course lands.

By operation of the Land Titles Act, the covenant was deemed to expire 40 years after registration, prohibiting residential development until 2041.

The moving parties, representing U.S. class action claimants, sought leave to appeal a supervising judge's order in a CCAA proceeding.

The supervising judge had dismissed their motion seeking to be treated as unaffected creditors or to have an expedited adjudication of their claims prior to a creditor vote.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious and did not raise issues of significance to the insolvency practice.

The Court emphasized the high level of deference owed to a CCAA supervising judge's discretionary decisions balancing stakeholder interests.

In a CCAA proceeding, the court considered supplementary written submissions regarding the appropriateness of differential consideration offered to unsecured creditors in the proposed Plan.

The court accepted the applicants' submission that the fairness of the differential consideration, which involves providing shares to Term Loan Lenders and cash to General Unsecured Creditors, should be determined at the Sanction Hearing rather than at the Meetings Order stage, given the low threshold for a Meetings Order and the presence of conflicting expert reports.

The Applicants sought an Authorization Order and Meetings Order under the CCAA.

The primary issues in dispute concerned the voting rights and classification of Litigation Claimants, which included uncertified U.S. class actions, a certified Ontario class action, and Texas mass tort claims.

The court held that the Litigation Claimants are creditors entitled to vote, but restricted them to one vote per action to prevent them from overriding other stakeholders on numerosity grounds.

The court also ordered summary proceedings to value their claims rather than accepting the Applicants' proposal to value them at $1.

Finally, the court declined to place the Term Loan Lenders in a separate class from other unsecured creditors, finding sufficient commonality of legal interests.

The plaintiff, CryptoStar Corp., sought an interim order for the preservation of specific funds (Upfront Payments) or assets purchased with them, and a declaration of interest in property to facilitate a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) in Alberta.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Upfront Payments did not constitute a "specific fund" under Rule 45.02 as they were co-mingled and not contractually segregated.

The court also found no serious issue to be tried regarding the refund claim under the Agreement's terms and no basis for a CPL as the plaintiff failed to establish an interest in land.

The plaintiff, an accounting firm, brought a motion to compel the non-party Deloitte LLP to produce documents related to two client audits.

The plaintiff alleged that a former partner, now at Deloitte, misused and misappropriated confidential client data upon his departure.

The defendant and Deloitte refused disclosure.

The court applied Rule 30.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering the relevance of the documents to liability and damages, and whether it would be unfair for the plaintiff to proceed without them.

The court found the documents relevant and necessary for the plaintiff's expert, and that the defendant's discovery evidence was inadequate.

Despite Deloitte's confidentiality concerns, the court ordered production, subject to a non-disclosure agreement and sealing order, finding Deloitte was not a "stranger" to the litigation.

Dentons Canada LLP ("Dentons") brought an application seeking declarations regarding insurance coverage for a social engineering fraud loss.

Trisura Guarantee Insurance Company ("Trisura"), the respondent insurer, moved to convert the application to an action under Rule 38.10(1)(b), arguing that there were disputed facts, unproduced evidence, and a need to consider other insurance policies and join other insurers.

Dentons subsequently narrowed its application to seek an "advisory opinion" on the interpretation of only the Computer Fraud Rider, without addressing other policy conditions or exclusions.

The court granted Trisura's motion, converting the application to an action.

The judge found that a full determination of coverage issues required a complete factual record, consideration of all potentially responsive policies, and the involvement of other insurers, which could not be achieved through a narrow application seeking an advisory opinion.

The court emphasized judicial efficiency and economy, consistent with Hryniak v Maudlin, to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings and inconsistent findings.

The court approved the class action distribution plan, which allocated proceeds proportionally based on prior wind-down payments, and the class counsel's retainer agreement, fees, and disbursements.

The court also approved honourariums for the representative plaintiff and another instrumental class member.

A dispute regarding priority between General Motors' security interest and Class Counsel's first charge was noted for a subsequent decision.

The Bernstein Defendants brought a motion seeking to dismiss the crossclaim of Norma Walton and Ronauld Walton (the "Waltons") for damages due to their failure to pay a $32,000 costs award.

Alternatively, they sought to stay the crossclaim until costs were paid and the Waltons posted $200,000 security for costs.

The court ordered the Waltons to pay the outstanding $32,000 costs plus an additional $12,000 for the current motion within 60 days, failing which their crossclaim for damages would be dismissed.

If these costs were paid, the Waltons were then required to post $200,000 security for costs for their damages crossclaim within another 60 days, failing which it would also be dismissed.

The Waltons' claims for contribution and indemnity were permitted to proceed irrespective of these conditions.

This decision addresses two post-appeal issues: the costs of administering a class action settlement and the final quantification of damages.

The court ordered the defendant, Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP, to pay reasonable administration costs.

For damages, following directions from the Court of Appeal, the court adopted the defendant's mathematical approach, awarding $28,745,304.00 to the plaintiff, Trillium Motor World Ltd., rejecting the plaintiff's proposed higher amounts based on proportional mathematical approaches or alleged enhanced bargaining power.

A private mortgage lender purchased mortgage insurance from an insurer and became the victim of mortgage fraud.

The lender's lawyer paid mortgage proceeds to the borrower's lawyer in trust rather than directly to the borrower.

The insurer denied coverage based on an exception clause requiring proceeds to be paid to the registered title holder.

The application judge found the exception did not apply.

The insurer appealed.

The majority of the Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, holding that payment to the borrower's lawyer in trust constitutes payment to the borrower for purposes of the insurance policy.

The dissent argued the exception clause was unambiguous and applied because the funds were not paid directly to the registered title holder.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge's finding that the purchaser (241 Ontario) had actual notice of a defect in the power of sale process.

The trial judge had conflated actual knowledge with constructive knowledge, finding that receipt of information suggesting the need for inquiry constituted actual notice.

The appellate court clarified that actual notice requires actual knowledge of the defect itself, not merely knowledge of facts that might prompt inquiry.

The court held that 241 Ontario was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice and could rely on the protections of the Land Titles Act.

The court also found that sections 35 and 36 of the Mortgages Act do not limit the right to rely on registration under the Land Titles Act, and that these provisions provide complementary methods of protecting bona fide purchasers.

The post-sale mortgagees' interests were upheld, and Ginkgo's mortgage was found to be valid.

This is a costs decision following a successful appeal by the appellants.

The appellants sought recovery of costs from the respondents, specifically requesting the same amounts that had been awarded to them at first instance ($51,885.55 from Christine DeJong Medicine Professional Corporation and $14,017.28 from Dennis and Peggy Condos).

The respondents sought no costs, arguing that all parties were victims of fraud and that the contest was between victims.

The court awarded costs to the appellants as requested, finding this to be a just and fair disposition given that the appellants were successful on all aspects of the appeal and that no costs of the appeal had been awarded to them despite their success.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming her involuntary psychiatric admission.

She sought a declaration that a forced injection of anti-psychotic medication violated her Charter rights and requested rescission of her detention certificate as a remedy.

The central issue was whether the Board has jurisdiction to grant remedies under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal held that the Board does not have s. 24(1) Charter jurisdiction, despite having authority to decide questions of law.

The court found that the legislature clearly intended to exclude Charter remedies from the Board's jurisdiction based on the removal of s. 52(1) jurisdiction, strict statutory timelines, limited remedial powers, composition of the Board, and the availability of Superior Court appeals.