Danielle Glatt

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice and wrongful birth claim against a radiologist and an obstetrician.

The radiologist performed a second-trimester ultrasound that revealed fetal anomalies but failed to communicate the findings urgently.

The obstetrician failed to review the ultrasound report in a timely manner and did not expedite follow-up or refer the patient to a fetal medicine clinic before 24 weeks' gestation.

The court found both doctors breached the standard of care.

Applying the modified objective test, the court concluded that but for the negligence, the plaintiffs would have elected to terminate the pregnancy in Ontario before 24 weeks.

The defendants were found liable.

This appeal concerns a class action by General Motors of Canada Limited (GMCL) dealers against the law firm Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP for breach of fiduciary and contractual duties.

During the 2009 financial crisis, Cassels represented three potentially conflicting clients: the Saturn Dealers, Industry Canada (regarding GMCL bailout financing), and GMCL dealers generally regarding a potential restructuring or insolvency.

The trial judge found that Cassels breached its duties by failing to disclose the conflict of interest with Industry Canada to the dealers and by failing to provide proper advice regarding Wind-Down Agreements (WDAs) offered by GMCL.

The dealers lost the opportunity to negotiate collectively for better compensation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the liability findings but reduced the damages award from $45 million to approximately $41 million (subject to further calculation regarding class composition).

The applicant lender sought a declaration of coverage under a title insurance policy after a private mortgage transaction was discovered to be an identity fraud.

The respondent insurer denied coverage, relying on an exception that applied if mortgage proceeds were paid to anyone other than the registered titleholder.

The funds had been disbursed to the borrower's lawyer in trust.

The court held that the exception was ambiguous and did not clearly require direct payment to the titleholder.

Construing the ambiguity against the insurer, the court found the exception did not apply and declared that the policy provided coverage for the loss.

Following a finding of civil fraud against the respondents, the applicants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court awarded the applicants $550,832.92 in substantial indemnity costs due to the respondents' frivolous counter-application, concealment of information, and failure to deliver financial information.

The court also resolved costs claims from other involved parties, awarding various amounts on partial and substantial indemnity scales based on their respective offers to settle and participation in the proceedings.

The applicants, Dr. Bernstein's corporations, moved for judgment against Norma Walton, Ronauld Walton, and their companies for $66.9 million, alleging civil fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation, and sought a declaration that the debt would survive bankruptcy.

The Waltons brought a counter-application for damages and a cross-motion for a trial on the fraud issue.

Christine DeJong Medicine Professional Corporation and Gideon and Irene Levytam also sought relief regarding their investments.

The court found the Waltons liable for civil fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation, awarding the applicants $66.9 million plus interest, and declared the debt non-dischargeable in bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(d) and (e) of the BIA.

The Waltons' counter-application was struck as frivolous and vexatious.

The applicants' claims against Schedule C Companies for knowing assistance and knowing receipt were dismissed.

DeJong was granted constructive trusts over specific Schedule C properties for their investments due to the Waltons' breach of fiduciary duties.

The defendants, an insurance brokerage firm and its individual employees, brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim against the individual employees for failing to plead a reasonable cause of action.

The court found that the statement of claim did not sufficiently allege personal liability against the individual employees, as their actions were within the scope of their employment and lacked specific allegations of fraud, deceit, dishonesty, or actions separate from the corporate entity.

While the claims against the individual defendants were struck, the plaintiffs were granted leave to amend their statement of claim within 30 days to plead facts that could sustain a viable claim against them.

The Appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for failing to comply with a recognizance.

The grounds of appeal included unreasonable verdict, errors in finding breach of recognizance and mens rea, failure of the trial judge to ensure full answer and defence for a self-represented accused, and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's findings of fact and mens rea were reasonable, that the assistance provided to the self-represented appellant was adequate, and that there was no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellants, a second mortgagee and a tenant of a commercial property, appealed a motion judge's order regarding the distribution of a holdback from a receiver's sale.

The appellants argued that rent arrears owed by the tenant merged in a prior judgment and did not vest in the purchaser, that the second mortgagee had priority over the purchaser's claim for rent arrears, and that the tenant was entitled to a credit for a payment made under a side agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the vesting order explicitly transferred the lease and rent arrears to the purchaser, that the motion judge properly adjusted the accounts between the parties, and that the purchaser was not bound by the side agreement.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision dismissing their franchise dispute action for delay under Rule 24.01(1).

The action had been commenced in 2003 and struck from the trial list in 2010, with significant periods of inactivity largely attributed to the appellants' former counsel.

The Divisional Court denied the appellants' request to introduce fresh evidence of LinkedIn searches of the respondent's former employees.

The court upheld the Master's findings that the delay was inexcusable and that the passage of time and corporate restructuring had resulted in the loss of key witnesses, creating a substantial risk that a fair trial was no longer possible.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the appellants' appeal, the parties were unable to agree on costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the fully successful respondents on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $10,000 all inclusive, noting the overlap of issues with a companion appeal.

In an ongoing insolvency proceeding, the DeJong appellants appealed a motion judge's order dismissing their cross-motion for a constructive trust and the cancellation of shares, while granting constructive trusts over certain properties to the Bernstein applicants.

The appellants argued the motions judge failed to adjudicate their requested relief, erred in applying tracing principles for constructive trusts, and failed to apply the correct legal test under the Assignments and Preferences Act regarding a proposed settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motions judge's tracing analysis, his refusal to grant the requested relief to avoid preferring the appellants over other creditors, or his conclusion that the proposed settlement agreement constituted an unlawful preference.

The appellants appealed a judgment imposing constructive trusts over certain properties, arguing the matter was too complex for a motion and that the motion judge erred in accepting the Inspector's tracing methodology.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly applied the legal principles of constructive trust based on the appellants' fraud and misappropriation of funds, and properly appreciated the extensive evidentiary record.

The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' 2003 franchise dispute action for delay under Rule 24.01(1)(e), and the plaintiffs brought a cross-motion to restore the action to the trial list.

The court found a period of inordinate and unexplained delay, largely attributable to the plaintiffs' former counsel's neglect.

However, the court also found that the delay caused actual prejudice to the defendant, as key executives involved in the franchise negotiations had left the company during the delay period, creating a substantial risk that a fair trial was no longer possible.

The defendant's motion was granted and the action was dismissed.