Michael James Statham

The appellant, a property developer, purchased contaminated land in 1990 and commenced an action in January 2004 seeking damages for soil contamination.

The motion judge granted summary judgment, finding the action was statute-barred because the appellant had actual knowledge of the contamination by April 1991, triggering a six-year limitation period that had expired long before the action was commenced.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in principle, made palpable and overriding errors of fact, and failed to consider whether its continuing nuisance claim was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant's knowledge of contamination in 1991, albeit to an uncertain extent, was sufficient to trigger the limitation period, and the appellant was not required to know the full extent of the contamination for the period to begin running.

The court considered the allocation and quantum of costs following summary judgment in favour of Canadian Pacific Railway Company (CPR), where the third party, Canada Colors and Chemicals Limited (CCCL), sought costs from the plaintiff, 863880 Ontario Limited.

The court found that exceptional circumstances justified ordering the plaintiff to pay CCCL’s costs, but not the full amount claimed.

The court directed a revised calculation, holding the plaintiff responsible for half of CCCL’s reasonable costs up to the discontinuance of a related third party claim, and all reasonable costs thereafter, subject to a 20% reduction and further specific deductions.

The defendant, Canadian Pacific Railway Company (CPR), brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss an action by 863880 Ontario Limited (863) as statute-barred.

The action sought damages for TCE contamination on a property purchased by 863 from CPR's predecessors.

CPR argued 863 had sufficient knowledge of the contamination by April 1991, triggering the six-year limitation period. 863 contended it only gained full knowledge in 1998.

The court found that 863 had actual knowledge of the contamination in April 1991, sufficient to trigger the limitation period, as perfect or complete knowledge of the extent or source of damage is not required.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and 863's action against CPR was dismissed.

The court approved the class action distribution plan, which allocated proceeds proportionally based on prior wind-down payments, and the class counsel's retainer agreement, fees, and disbursements.

The court also approved honourariums for the representative plaintiff and another instrumental class member.

A dispute regarding priority between General Motors' security interest and Class Counsel's first charge was noted for a subsequent decision.

This decision addresses two post-appeal issues: the costs of administering a class action settlement and the final quantification of damages.

The court ordered the defendant, Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP, to pay reasonable administration costs.

For damages, following directions from the Court of Appeal, the court adopted the defendant's mathematical approach, awarding $28,745,304.00 to the plaintiff, Trillium Motor World Ltd., rejecting the plaintiff's proposed higher amounts based on proportional mathematical approaches or alleged enhanced bargaining power.

This is a motion to vary the Court of Appeal's decision in a solicitor's negligence case.

The moving party sought to clarify the trial judge's discretion regarding the final quantification of damages and the process for calculating the damages award, subject to a ceiling of $36.9 million.

The respondent opposed the motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party could not bring itself within the applicable rules permitting reconsideration of appellate decisions, and that it was not in the interests of justice to invoke the court's narrow jurisdiction to reconsider.

This appeal arises from the 2009 General Motors of Canada bailout and the termination of franchise dealerships.

The franchisor offered Wind-Down Agreements to 240 dealers, providing payment in exchange for comprehensive releases of all claims, including those under the Arthur Wishart Act.

The dealers were required to obtain independent legal advice before signing.

A class action was subsequently brought by terminated franchisees claiming breaches of statutory rights.

The trial judge found the releases valid under the Tutor Time exception to section 11 of the Wishart Act, as they constituted settlements of known and existing claims entered into with legal advice.

The trial judge also held that covenants not to sue and indemnity provisions were void for public policy reasons but were severable from the release.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the validity of the releases and the severance of the covenant not to sue.

This appeal concerns a class action by General Motors of Canada Limited (GMCL) dealers against the law firm Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP for breach of fiduciary and contractual duties.

During the 2009 financial crisis, Cassels represented three potentially conflicting clients: the Saturn Dealers, Industry Canada (regarding GMCL bailout financing), and GMCL dealers generally regarding a potential restructuring or insolvency.

The trial judge found that Cassels breached its duties by failing to disclose the conflict of interest with Industry Canada to the dealers and by failing to provide proper advice regarding Wind-Down Agreements (WDAs) offered by GMCL.

The dealers lost the opportunity to negotiate collectively for better compensation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the liability findings but reduced the damages award from $45 million to approximately $41 million (subject to further calculation regarding class composition).

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel the defendants to answer questions and produce documents refused during cross-examination on an affidavit filed in response to a certification motion in a proposed securities class proceeding.

The dispute concerned the interpretation of s. 138.8(2) of the Ontario Securities Act, which governs affidavit evidence on a motion for leave to commence a statutory secondary market misrepresentation claim under Part XXIII.1.

The plaintiff argued that because the defendants filed an affidavit addressing certification, they should be required to answer questions relevant to the leave motion.

The court followed the line of authority beginning with Ainslie v. CV Technologies Inc. holding that defendants are only required to file an affidavit if they intend to lead evidence on the leave motion.

As the defendants had intentionally filed no affidavit addressing the leave motion, they could not be compelled to answer questions for that purpose.

In a certified class action arising from the termination of automobile dealerships following the 2009 automotive industry restructuring, the plaintiff brought a Rule 30 motion seeking production of documents withheld on the basis of solicitor‑client privilege by a non‑party dealers’ association.

The court reviewed 211 disputed documents in camera to determine whether they constituted privileged legal advice or merely legal information.

Applying the distinction between general legal information and particularized legal advice concerning rights, duties, or liability, the court found that many communications concerned general information about potential bankruptcy proceedings under the CCAA rather than legal advice.

Of the documents reviewed, 60 were held to be privileged while the remainder were ordered produced.

The decision clarifies the analytical distinction between legal advice and legal information for purposes of solicitor‑client privilege in document production disputes.

Following the dismissal of two Rule 30 motions brought by the defendants seeking production of allegedly privileged documents in a certified class proceeding, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

Although the court agreed that solicitor-client privilege had been expressly waived during cross-examinations, the motions were dismissed because the legal advice received by an individual class member was irrelevant to the certified common issues.

On the costs issue, the court rejected the defendants’ submission that success was divided and held that the responding party was substantially successful.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01(1) and the guidance from the Court of Appeal in Boucher, the court fixed a fair and reasonable costs award below the amount claimed.

Costs of $20,000 all-inclusive were awarded to the responding party, divided equally between the two defendants.

In a certified class action involving former automobile dealers whose franchises were terminated during the 2009 automotive industry restructuring, the defendants sought production of documents relating to legal advice the representative plaintiff received from its own lawyer when signing wind‑down agreements.

The moving parties argued that solicitor‑client privilege had been waived and that the advice was relevant to issues such as causation and damages.

The court held that although privilege regarding advice about the wind‑down agreement had been expressly waived during earlier cross‑examination, relevance for discovery in a class proceeding prior to the common issues trial is confined to the certified common issues.

Because the certified issues focused on the defendants’ conduct under provincial franchise legislation and alleged professional duties, and did not require examination of the individual legal advice received by class members, the requested documents were not relevant at this stage.

The motions to compel production were therefore dismissed.