Jessica S. Parise

The appellant, Feisal Noor, sought release pending appeal of his convictions for gun-related charges.

The Crown opposed, arguing the appeal grounds were frivolous and detention was necessary in the public interest.

The court found the appeal was not frivolous, citing recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on Charter ss. 8 and 9 issues related to police detentions and gun seizures.

Balancing enforceability and reviewability interests, and considering the appellant's compliance with prior release terms and family sureties, the court granted bail pending appeal, with a strict condition for expeditious perfection of the appeal.

Intact Insurance Company moved for summary judgment to dismiss an action brought by J.P. Towing Service & Storage Ltd. concerning towing and storage fees.

J.P. Towing cross-moved for various declarations and consolidation.

The court dismissed Intact's motion, finding that while most of J.P. Towing's claims (vexatious litigant, prohibitive order, consolidation, and monetary/punitive damages) were not viable, its claim for a declaration that the daily storage rate of $70.00, as determined in a prior Small Claims Court decision (Sherwood), was res judicata against Intact, was valid.

The court allowed J.P. Towing's cross-motion and granted summary judgment on this specific declaration, holding that Intact was bound by the Sherwood decision regarding the daily storage rate when acting on behalf of its insureds.

The accused, charged with fraud and theft relating to real estate investments, brought an application to stay the proceedings as an abuse of process and subpoenaed Crown counsel and civil litigators.

The Crown brought a motion to summarily dismiss the abuse of process application on the basis that it had no reasonable prospect of success, and applications were brought to quash the subpoenas.

The court analyzed the six grounds of alleged abuse of process, including claims of compelled self-incrimination, improper coordination between civil and criminal proceedings, and lack of independent police investigation.

The court found all grounds to be speculative, factually misconceived, or legally unfounded.

Applying the Cody and Babos tests, the court summarily dismissed the abuse of process application and quashed the subpoenas.

The Bernstein Defendants brought a motion seeking to dismiss the crossclaim of Norma Walton and Ronauld Walton (the "Waltons") for damages due to their failure to pay a $32,000 costs award.

Alternatively, they sought to stay the crossclaim until costs were paid and the Waltons posted $200,000 security for costs.

The court ordered the Waltons to pay the outstanding $32,000 costs plus an additional $12,000 for the current motion within 60 days, failing which their crossclaim for damages would be dismissed.

If these costs were paid, the Waltons were then required to post $200,000 security for costs for their damages crossclaim within another 60 days, failing which it would also be dismissed.

The Waltons' claims for contribution and indemnity were permitted to proceed irrespective of these conditions.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the plaintiff's claims of defamation and libel.

The defendant argued that the statements were true, protected by qualified privilege or fair comment, and that the libel claim was barred due to lack of proper notice.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that there were genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly concerning the truth of the allegations and the presence of malice, which necessitated credibility assessments.

The court also determined that the lack of specific notice for the libel claim was not an absolute bar given the circumstances where the defendant's identity was initially unknown and the publisher promptly retracted the advertisement.

The offender pleaded guilty to sexual interference after performing oral sex on his 3-year-old half-sister while babysitting her.

The Crown sought an 18-month custodial sentence, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence.

The court noted that a conditional sentence was statutorily unavailable and emphasized the need for denunciation and deterrence given the offender's position of trust and the victim's extreme youth.

The court sentenced the offender to 15 months in custody, followed by 3 years of probation, and imposed various ancillary orders including a 20-year SOIRA order.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel, which had set aside a Hearing Panel's 18-month suspension and substituted a penalty of licence revocation for professional misconduct.

The Appeal Panel had also overturned the dismissal of two particulars of misconduct, finding the appellant had misled investigators and filed false reports.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Appeal Panel's decisions on both the penalty and the findings of misconduct were reasonable and entitled to a high degree of deference.

The Crown applied for a pre-trial ruling on the voluntariness of statements made by the defendant, C.C., during a police interview concerning charges of sexual assault and sexual interference.

The defence sought to exclude statements made after C.C.'s arrest, arguing they were involuntary due to emotional, physical, and psychological condition, oppressive questioning, and inducements.

The court found no evidence that C.C.'s will was overborne, noting his consistent reliance on the right to silence regarding the allegations, the non-oppressive nature of the interview, and the absence of a "quid pro quo" inducement.

The court ruled the statements were voluntarily made and admissible.

The accused was charged with sexually abusing his step-daughter over a six-year period beginning when she was eight years old.

The abuse included sexual touching, forced anal intercourse, and other sexual acts.

The accused initially could not plead guilty due to alcohol-induced blackouts preventing him from recalling the offences, but he accepted the victim's evidence as truthful and credible.

The court found him guilty of sexual touching of a child under sixteen.

At sentencing, the court imposed a six-year custodial sentence, balancing significant aggravating factors including the breach of trust, the victim's young age, the prolonged nature of the abuse, and the serious harm suffered by the victim, against mitigating factors including the accused's difficult childhood, his remorse, his steps toward rehabilitation, and his decision to accept responsibility without requiring the victim to testify at trial.

Following a finding of civil fraud against the respondents, the applicants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court awarded the applicants $550,832.92 in substantial indemnity costs due to the respondents' frivolous counter-application, concealment of information, and failure to deliver financial information.

The court also resolved costs claims from other involved parties, awarding various amounts on partial and substantial indemnity scales based on their respective offers to settle and participation in the proceedings.

The applicants, Dr. Bernstein's corporations, moved for judgment against Norma Walton, Ronauld Walton, and their companies for $66.9 million, alleging civil fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation, and sought a declaration that the debt would survive bankruptcy.

The Waltons brought a counter-application for damages and a cross-motion for a trial on the fraud issue.

Christine DeJong Medicine Professional Corporation and Gideon and Irene Levytam also sought relief regarding their investments.

The court found the Waltons liable for civil fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation, awarding the applicants $66.9 million plus interest, and declared the debt non-dischargeable in bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(d) and (e) of the BIA.

The Waltons' counter-application was struck as frivolous and vexatious.

The applicants' claims against Schedule C Companies for knowing assistance and knowing receipt were dismissed.

DeJong was granted constructive trusts over specific Schedule C properties for their investments due to the Waltons' breach of fiduciary duties.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving an 11-year-old complainant.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) framework, misapprehended evidence, rendered an unreasonable verdict, provided insufficient reasons, and imposed a harsh sentence.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or application of legal principles.

The consecutive sentences totaling ten months were upheld as fit, considering the totality principle and the aggravating factor of the victim's age.