Yolanda Yuanfeng Song

The moving party purchaser entered into an agreement of purchase and sale for a pre-construction condominium and paid a $500,000 deposit, $400,000 of which went directly to the developer.

The developer defaulted on its first mortgage, and a receiver was appointed.

The receiver sought to disclaim the purchaser's agreement.

The purchaser brought a motion to compel the receiver to complete the sale, arguing he had an equitable interest in the property.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the purchaser's interest was contractually subordinate to the first mortgagee and that the equities did not justify overriding the mortgagee's legal priority.

The applicant, a monocular bus driver, challenged the constitutionality of the vision standards in s. 18(3) of the Drivers' Licences Regulations under s. 15 of the Charter.

The regulations imposed a blanket prohibition on monocular individuals holding a Class C commercial driver's licence.

The court found that the regulations substantively discriminated against the applicant based on her physical disability by perpetuating the stereotype that all monocular drivers are unsafe, without allowing for individual assessment.

The court further held that the infringement was not minimally impairing and therefore not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The court declared the regulations unconstitutional but suspended the declaration for 12 months to allow the government to amend the legislation, denying the applicant's request for an immediate individual exemption.

The respondent brought a motion to transfer an estate application from Ottawa to Newmarket.

The applicant, who commenced the application in Ottawa, opposed the transfer.

The court considered the factors under Rule 13.1.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found that the convenience of the parties was equally balanced.

The court also noted that keeping the matter in Ottawa would trigger mandatory mediation under Rule 75.1, which would benefit the parties.

The motion was dismissed as the respondent failed to establish that Newmarket was a significantly better venue.

The appellant purchased a pre-construction condominium detached house unit under an Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

On the closing date, the appellant's solicitor advised that certain common elements (a parkette and entrance/exit gates) had not been constructed, contrary to the disclosure statement, and reserved the right to rescind.

The respondent terminated the agreement and forfeited the deposit.

The appellant subsequently rescinded and sought return of the deposit.

The application judge found the appellant breached the agreement and dismissed the application for return of the deposit.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no material change in circumstances under the Condominium Act and that time was not of the essence for construction of the common elements.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the plaintiff's claims of defamation and libel.

The defendant argued that the statements were true, protected by qualified privilege or fair comment, and that the libel claim was barred due to lack of proper notice.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that there were genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly concerning the truth of the allegations and the presence of malice, which necessitated credibility assessments.

The court also determined that the lack of specific notice for the libel claim was not an absolute bar given the circumstances where the defendant's identity was initially unknown and the publisher promptly retracted the advertisement.