Craig Harper

The appellant, S.B., appealed his adult sentence for first-degree murder, arguing the youth court judge erred in finding him the shooter, provided insufficient reasons, and failed to consider the presumption of diminished moral culpability for young offenders.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding that while the youth court judge erred by not explicitly applying the presumption of diminished moral culpability, a de novo analysis applying the correct principles still resulted in the imposition of an adult sentence due to the seriousness of the offence and S.B.'s demonstrated maturity and lack of rehabilitation.

Benard Asante appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and attempted murder, challenging the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and jury instructions.

The appeal focused on the admission of prior firearms convictions (Corbett application), the admissibility of a photograph of a handgun found on the appellant's cell phone, and the jury instructions on party liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's exercise of discretion regarding the Corbett application, the admission of the photograph as circumstantial evidence of access to means, or the comprehensive and balanced jury instructions on aiding and party liability.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arising from a home invasion robbery, on two grounds: alleged errors in jury instructions regarding the mens rea for murder as a party to the killing and the requirements for a party to be found guilty of first-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions on party liability for murder and first-degree murder were proper, adequately related to the evidence, and did not require hypothetical scenarios not supported by evidence, distinguishing the case from R. v. Ferrari.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms and drug offences, and the sentence imposed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's inference that the appellant knew about the hidden firearm.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by concluding that a conditional sentence was outside the range for firearms offences.

Considering the appellant's significant rehabilitative progress and personal circumstances, the Court varied the sentence for the firearms charge to a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by two years of probation, while maintaining the time served sentence for the drug charges.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and attempted robbery and sentenced to nine years imprisonment.

On appeal, he challenged the validity of the search warrant used to obtain evidence, arguing that the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained misleading information.

He also argued that the trial judge erred in finding the weapon used was a real firearm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even after excising misleading information, the ITO provided sufficient cumulative grounds for the warrant's issuance.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the weapon was a real firearm based on witness testimony and surveillance.

The appellant was convicted by jury of possession of a loaded restricted firearm after a nightclub incident.

At trial, the trial judge made four rulings curtailing defence counsel's cross-examination of the sole Crown witness linking the appellant to the gun.

The majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding three of the four rulings were proper exercises of trial management power and the one erroneous ruling was saved by the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, as there was no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The dissent would have allowed the appeal, finding that trial management powers cannot be used to exclude relevant and material evidence, and that the erroneous ruling — which prevented cross-examination on a prior inconsistent statement going to the heart of the indictment — was not harmless and could not be saved by the proviso.

The applicant, T.M., sought release pending appeal after being convicted of sexually assaulting his intimate partner and choking her, for which he received a four-year sentence.

The application for release was based on an alleged misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge regarding the assessment of evidence and credibility.

The Crown opposed the release, arguing the appeal was frivolous and that detention was necessary in the public interest due to the applicant's extensive criminal record, including prior convictions for intimate partner violence and breaches of court orders.

The court dismissed the application, finding the appeal was frivolous as the alleged misapprehension of evidence was not material to the trial judge's reasoning.

Furthermore, the court determined that the applicant's detention was necessary for public safety and to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice, given his history of violence and non-compliance with court orders.

The appellant appealed convictions for robbery, attempted robbery, using an imitation firearm, and uttering a threat, arguing the trial judge's jury charge was inadequate.

The appellant contended the charge failed to relate evidence to the issues and did not adequately address exculpatory evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury charge sufficient given the short, straightforward trial and the absence of objections from counsel during the pre-vetting process.

The appellant, Jamie Simpson-Fry, appealed an indeterminate dangerous offender sentence imposed following convictions for sexual assault, forcible confinement, and threatening death.

The appeal challenged the sentencing judge's weighing of the appellant's statements to psychiatric experts, arguing it effectively penalized him for not testifying and violated his right to silence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's approach, which considered the statements in light of the entire evidentiary record and afforded them less weight due to the lack of cross-examination.

The appellant, Feisal Noor, sought release pending appeal of his convictions for gun-related charges.

The Crown opposed, arguing the appeal grounds were frivolous and detention was necessary in the public interest.

The court found the appeal was not frivolous, citing recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on Charter ss. 8 and 9 issues related to police detentions and gun seizures.

Balancing enforceability and reviewability interests, and considering the appellant's compliance with prior release terms and family sureties, the court granted bail pending appeal, with a strict condition for expeditious perfection of the appeal.

The appellant, a youth convicted of two counts of second-degree murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault, and reckless discharge of a firearm stemming from a mass shooting, appealed the imposition of an adult sentence.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred by misunderstanding the Intensive Rehabilitative Custody and Supervision (IRCS) program and by failing to consider collateral immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, concluding that the alleged IRCS error did not impact the sentence and that immigration consequences could not reduce a sentence to a point disproportionate to the gravity of the offence or the moral blameworthiness of the offender.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Carl Quinton, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, which was largely based on a confession obtained through a "Mr. Big" undercover operation.

The trial judge failed to hold a voir dire to determine the confession's admissibility under R. v. Hart, accepting defence counsel's mistaken concession that Hart did not apply.

The Court of Appeal found that the operation clearly fell under Hart, and the purported waiver of the voir dire was invalid because counsel was not fully informed and the agreement offered no benefit to the defence.

The Court highlighted significant abuse of process concerns, given the police exploitation of the appellant's vulnerabilities (alcoholism, mental health issues, physical stroke, social isolation, and financial destitution).

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered, with the Court emphasizing the need for rigorous judicial scrutiny of police conduct in Mr. Big operations.

The applicant sought leave to appeal from the Summary Conviction Appeal Court's refusal to extend time to appeal a 2014 sentence.

The applicant argued the original sentence was illegal, an issue not raised previously.

The Court of Appeal found a strong argument for illegality and granted leave to appeal, setting aside the SCAC's refusal and remitting the matter to the SCAC to determine if time should be extended for an appeal on the legality of the sentence and, if so, to determine the appropriate sentence.

The appellant, Stewart Pascal, appealed his conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm and his designation as a dangerous offender.

The appeal centered on the Crown's failure to disclose the criminal record and outstanding charges of a key Crown witness, Deidre Jarvis.

The Court found that the police knew about Jarvis's outstanding charges and had a disclosure obligation to provide this information to the Crown, who then had to disclose it to the defence.

The non-disclosure deprived the defence of crucial impeachment material, as Jarvis's second statement, given after charges were laid, was significantly more incriminating than her first.

The Court concluded that the non-disclosure impaired the appellant's right to make full answer and defence, affecting both the reliability of the verdict and the overall fairness of the trial.

The conviction appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Mathew Hayes, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, raising nine grounds of appeal.

These grounds included allegations of police trickery in obtaining his statement, errors in denying third-party suspect applications, failure to disclose a Crimestoppers tip, denial of a directed verdict of acquittal, and misdirections in jury instructions regarding circumstantial evidence and the proper use of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the conviction, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's decisions or jury instructions.

This is a bail application pending leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The applicant, Marshall Kazman, was convicted of serious fraud and money laundering offences, and his appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario was dismissed.

He sought release under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, arguing that his application for leave was not frivolous and that exceptional circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic, his age (64), and pre-existing health conditions (asthma, respiratory, heart) made his continued detention unnecessary in the public interest.

The Crown opposed, emphasizing the high enforceability interest given the serious convictions and the weak merits of the leave application.

The court granted bail, finding that while the merits of the leave application were weak, the applicant's specific health vulnerabilities combined with the public health risks posed by COVID-19 in a correctional setting constituted exceptional circumstances justifying release, without undermining public confidence in the administration of justice.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two counts of first degree murder and one count of attempted murder while using a firearm, arising from a planned drug robbery on July 16, 2005.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of two accomplices with significant credibility issues.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that while the verdicts were not unreasonable, the cumulative effect of errors in the trial judge's final instructions to the jury—particularly regarding post-offence conduct and the failure to adequately address alternative inferences—required a new trial.

The appellant, B.J.T., was convicted of two counts of sexual interference and two counts of sexual assault for shaving his daughter's pubic hair at her request in 2011 (when she was 13) and again in 2013 (when she was 15).

The trial judge struck down the mandatory minimum sentences as unconstitutional and imposed minimal sentences.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the 2011 sexual interference conviction and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge failed to adequately address the specific intent requirement.

The Court dismissed appeals on the 2013 convictions and upheld the sentencing decisions, including the finding that the mandatory minimum sentences violated the Charter.

The appellant, B.J.T., was convicted of two counts of sexual interference and two counts of sexual assault for shaving his daughter's pubic hair at her request in 2011 (when she was 13) and again in 2013 (when she was 15).

The trial judge struck down the mandatory minimum sentences as unconstitutional and imposed minimal sentences.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the 2011 sexual interference conviction and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge failed to adequately address the specific intent requirement.

The Court dismissed appeals on the 2013 convictions and upheld the sentencing decisions, including the finding that the mandatory minimum sentences violated the Charter.

The appellant appealed a December 13, 2018 Ontario Review Board disposition ordering his detention on a General Forensic Unit at Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care.

The appellant had been on conditional discharge and did not attend his Board hearing on December 10, 2018.

His counsel requested an adjournment without providing reasons or a timeframe.

The appellant argued the Board denied him procedural fairness by rejecting the adjournment request and proceeding in his absence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Board's discretionary decision to proceed with the hearing.