Andrew Bigioni

During a jury trial for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, the accused brought mid-trial applications under sections 276 and 278.92 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant on text messages in his possession.

The text messages referenced sexual activity and were inconsistent with the complainant's allegations regarding the timeline and nature of the assault.

The court found the evidence had significant probative value that was not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice, as it directly challenged the complainant's narrative without relying on twin myths.

To protect the complainant's dignity, the court admitted the evidence in the form of agreed factual admissions rather than the verbatim graphic texts.

Following a seven-day trial, the accused was convicted of two counts of sexual interference against his niece and nephew, contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code.

Two counts of sexual assault were conditionally stayed.

The sentencing decision addresses the appropriate punishment for non-penetrative sexual contact with child victims in a position of trust.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of two years less one day concurrent with five months, followed by two years probation, along with ancillary orders including DNA, SOIRA registration, and contact prohibition orders.

The defendant brought a motion to adjourn a criminal trial to pursue a third-party records application under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code, related to historical sexual assault allegations.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defence had not provided sufficient case-specific evidence to establish the likely relevance of the records, beyond mere speculation, as required by s. 278.3(4).

The judge emphasized the high privacy expectations of complainants and the public interest in trial efficiency, balancing these against the accused's right to full answer and defence.

This decision addresses a Stage 2 application under sections 276 and 278.93 of the Criminal Code regarding the admissibility of a complainant's prior sexual activity in a sexual assault and forcible confinement trial.

The accused sought to adduce evidence of a prior sexual encounter ("October incident") and the complainant's "comfort" level with the accused.

The Crown also sought to adduce evidence about a "FaceTime interlude" where the accused allegedly threatened to expose the complainant.

The court granted the Crown's application for the FaceTime interlude, allowing general contours but prohibiting details.

The accused's application regarding the "October incident" and "comfort" was dismissed, finding its probative value slight and substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice and the risk of encouraging "twin myth" reasoning, which links prior sexual activity to consent or credibility.

The accused, Andrew Tucker, facing charges including assault, sexual assault, and criminal harassment, brought a Charter application to exclude an in-custody statement.

The application was based on a breach of his s. 10(b) right to counsel, as he was not re-advised of his rights when his jeopardy significantly changed with additional charges.

The Crown conceded the s. 10(b) breach was egregious.

Applying the s. 24(2) analysis, the court found the breach serious and its impact on the accused's rights significant.

Given that the statement was not essential to the Crown's case, the court concluded that its exclusion would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Consequently, the accused's in-custody statement was excluded from evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) test.

The appellant had grabbed the complainant from behind, claiming he mistakenly believed she was his girlfriend.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence and convicted him.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge failed to properly apply the second step of the W.(D.) test by not considering whether the exculpatory evidence of the appellant's girlfriend raised a reasonable doubt.

The Crown appealed acquittals and sentence arising from offences involving the sale of sexual services by underage females.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by defining 'procures' and 'harbours' too narrowly when directing the jury and granting a directed verdict, which materially affected several acquittals.

New trials were ordered on multiple counts.

The court also found significant errors in principle in sentencing, including minimizing the inherent exploitation of the offences, overemphasizing bail conditions, and improperly relying on media publicity to satisfy deterrence.

While upholding declarations that certain mandatory minimum sentences were unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter, the court substituted a global sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment followed by probation.

The appellant was convicted of child luring under s. 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code for sending sexually explicit messages and images to a 15-year-old girl who was a friend of his twin daughters.

The trial judge found that the appellant believed the complainant was under 16 years of age.

The appellant appealed on four grounds: (1) the verdict was unreasonable because the trial judge found only that the appellant would have known the complainant's "approximate age" rather than that he subjectively believed she was under 16; (2) the trial judge failed to provide sufficient assistance to the self-represented appellant regarding Charter issues; (3) the trial judge erred in dismissing the s. 8 Charter application; and (4) the sentence was influenced by a mandatory minimum that was subsequently struck down as unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

Three injured workers appealed convictions or acquittal reversals under section 149(2) of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997, which makes it an offence to wilfully fail to inform the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board of a material change in circumstances affecting entitlement to benefits.

The Court of Appeal clarified the mens rea requirement for this offence, holding that the Crown must prove the accused knew of a material change, intended not to inform the Board, and either intended to receive unentitled benefits or foresaw such receipt as substantially certain.

The court restored one acquittal and ordered new trials for two convictions.

Max Bourdeau, facing serious drug trafficking charges, brought a Rowbotham application seeking state-funded counsel and a stay of proceedings pending its provision, after being denied Legal Aid Ontario (LAO) coverage.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the charges were serious and likely to result in imprisonment, the case was not sufficiently complex to require counsel for a fair trial.

Furthermore, the applicant failed to demonstrate indigence, given his income, lack of significant liabilities, and previous ability to secure bail and private counsel for earlier stages of the proceedings.