Jenna Marguerite Dafoe

Following a seven-day trial, the accused was convicted of two counts of sexual interference against his niece and nephew, contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code.

Two counts of sexual assault were conditionally stayed.

The sentencing decision addresses the appropriate punishment for non-penetrative sexual contact with child victims in a position of trust.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of two years less one day concurrent with five months, followed by two years probation, along with ancillary orders including DNA, SOIRA registration, and contact prohibition orders.

The accused, Taylor Javer, was found guilty of sexual interference and luring.

The court considered aggravating factors including the victim's age (14-15), vulnerability due to autism and Dissociative Identity Disorder, the extensive grooming behavior over four months, and the severe emotional and psychological impact on the victim and her mother.

Mitigating factors included his youthful age (25 at time of offence, 28 at sentencing), lack of prior record, and family support.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing principles for child abuse offences.

A total sentence of six years in penitentiary was imposed, consisting of four years for sexual interference and a consecutive two years for luring, reflecting the distinct harms and legal interests protected by each offence.

Following a non-jury trial, the defendant, Mark Taylor, was found guilty of 18 Criminal Code offences, including human trafficking, financially benefitting from human trafficking, receiving material benefit from human trafficking, advertising, exercising influence, sexual assault, obtaining sexual services for consideration, and breaching recognizance.

The court considered the legal parameters, positions of the Crown and Defence, the Kienapple principle, the nature of the offences, the offender's background, victim impact statements, and sentencing principles, including the Lopez factors for human trafficking.

The Crown sought a 23-year sentence, while the Defence sought 9 years.

The court imposed a global custodial term of 15 years, deducting pre-sentence custody and a Duncan credit for harsh COVID-19 conditions.

Ancillary orders were issued, but restitution orders were dismissed due to lack of quantifiable pecuniary damages and evidence of the offender's ability to pay, directing complainants to civil avenues.

The defendant, Mark Taylor, who was convicted of human trafficking and related charges, brought an application under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to stay the proceedings due to alleged unreasonable judicial delay in the delivery of the trial judge's reasons.

The trial judge had reserved her decision for 6 months and 9 days.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the deliberation time, while slightly exceeding the 6-month guideline, was not "markedly longer" than reasonably required given the complexity of the case, which involved multiple counts, seven complainants, two former co-accused, and a four-week trial.

The court also noted the trial judge's competing responsibilities and the defence's failure to proactively seek an earlier return date for the 11(b) application.

This is a sentencing decision for Andrew Kirkpatrick, who pleaded guilty to one count of assault with a weapon (a pellet gun) arising from a domestic incident.

The accused shot the complainant, his intimate partner, in the neck while intoxicated.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 180 days, 18 months probation, and a 10-year s. 109 order, which the court ultimately imposed.

The court considered mitigating factors such as the guilty plea and completion of a Partner Assault Response Program, alongside significant aggravating factors including prior convictions, the dangerous nature of the assault, lack of genuine remorse, and the domestic violence context.

The decision discusses the application of sentencing principles, including denunciation and deterrence, and the criteria for conditional sentence orders under the Criminal Code.

S.B.S., currently serving a sentence and detained on other serious charges including human trafficking, applied for a second bail review.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to a strengthened supervision plan.

Despite the serious nature of the charges and a reversed onus, the court determined that the revised plan, including 24/7 surety supervision and electronic monitoring, sufficiently attenuated the risk to public safety and maintained confidence in the administration of justice.

The detention order was vacated, and S.B.S. was released on stringent conditions.

The applicant, J.B., sought a bail review to be released on a surety bail with house arrest and electronic monitoring, having previously consented to detention.

The Crown opposed her release, citing her extensive criminal record, history of violence including stabbings, and breaches of court orders.

The court found jurisdiction for the review based on a material change in circumstances (the proposed release plan).

However, the court was not satisfied that the proposed plan, involving supervision by her mother recovering from surgery and electronic monitoring, was sufficient to attenuate the substantial likelihood of re-offence (secondary ground) or to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice (tertiary ground).

The application for release was denied, and J.B.'s detention was continued pending trial.

The applicant, S.B.S., convicted of drug offenses and serving a sentence, sought a bail review of his continued detention on new charges including human trafficking, breach of recognizance, and drug trafficking.

He proposed a stringent release plan with three sureties and electronic monitoring, citing his nearing parole eligibility and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Crown opposed, arguing an unacceptable risk to public safety.

The court found that the applicant had not met his onus to establish that continued detention was not justified on the secondary ground, citing the egregious nature of the new allegations, his prior flagrant breach of recognizance, and the inadequacy of the proposed surety plan.

The application for bail review was dismissed.

The accused, W.M., was convicted of sexual interference involving a 12-year-old victim, J.D., whom he forcibly masturbated while in a position of trust.

The Crown sought a 2-year jail sentence, emphasizing the profound impact on the victim.

The defence proposed 9-12 months or 90 days intermittent, arguing for credit for stringent bail conditions and that the victim's impact was inherent in the sentencing range.

The court found the assault to be very serious and invasive, rejecting the defence's argument that the victim's impact was already accounted for.

While acknowledging prior rulings on the unconstitutionality of the mandatory minimum of 1 year for sexual interference, the court still considered Parliament's view.

The court sentenced W.M. to 18 months in custody, followed by 3 years of probation, a DNA order, 15-year Sex Offender Information Registration, and various prohibitions, noting that without credit for stringent bail, the sentence would have been 2 years.

The accused was charged with alcohol-impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and care or control with a legally excessive blood alcohol concentration following a traffic stop on Highway 400.

The trial proceeded on the merits with a blended Charter voir dire.

The court found that police violated the accused's Charter section 10(b) right to counsel by failing to provide a Prosper warning when the accused indicated a change of mind regarding legal representation.

The Intoxilyzer readings were excluded as a result.

However, the court found the Crown proved impairment based on the accused's driving pattern and roadside observations, resulting in conviction on the impaired charge and acquittal on the over 80 charge.

The accused, Gerald Quigley, was charged with criminal negligence causing death and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death following a multi-vehicle collision on Highway 400.

The court found that the accused failed to conduct a mandatory daily inspection of the tractor-trailer's air brakes, resulting in severely compromised braking ability.

This failure constituted a wanton and reckless disregard for public safety and a marked departure from reasonable driving conduct.

The court concluded that the accused's criminal negligence was a significant contributing cause of the victim's death.

Convictions were entered for both charges, with the dangerous operation causing death charge conditionally stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The defendant applied for exclusion of breath sample evidence pursuant to Charter sections 8, 9, and 24(2), alleging that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds to arrest her or demand breath samples under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and care or control with excessive blood alcohol concentration.

The court found that the officer had objectively reasonable grounds based on the totality of circumstances, including the defendant's operation of a vehicle without lights, delay in stopping, improper stopping position, apparent attempt to mask breath odor through smoking, failure to produce documents promptly, provision of irrelevant documents, odor of alcohol on breath, failure to recite the alphabet accurately, and alteration of her account regarding alcohol consumption.

The Charter application was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with racing a motor vehicle on a highway contrary to section 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, specifically for outdistancing or attempting to outdistance another vehicle while driving at a marked departure from the lawful speed limit.

The Crown's evidence, provided by a police constable, alleged the defendant was driving in the northbound lane at 110-120 km/h beside another vehicle.

The defendant testified he remained in the southbound lane at approximately 60 km/h, attempting to pass a stopped vehicle.

The court found the defendant's evidence credible and, when considered in context with all evidence, raised a reasonable doubt as to whether he was outdistancing another vehicle or driving at a marked departure from the lawful speed.

The defendant was acquitted of racing but convicted of the included offence of speeding.

The defendant was charged with careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act and fail to remain at the scene of an accident contrary to section 200(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial proceeded ex parte after the defendant failed to appear.

The Crown proved that the defendant lost control of his vehicle while driving at 70-80 km/h in a 60 km/h zone on a curve, causing it to leave the roadway and roll down an embankment.

The defendant admitted to leaving the scene immediately and not returning until police contacted him.

The court acquitted on the careless driving charge, finding the speed excess of 10-20 km/h constituted inadvertent negligence rather than conduct deserving of punishment.

The court convicted on the fail to remain charge, finding all elements of the strict liability offence proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was charged with three offences arising from an incident on November 18, 2013: speeding (120 km/h in a posted 60 km/h zone), stunt driving (excessive speed), and failing to have an insurance card.

The defendant did not appear at trial.

The Crown presented evidence from a police officer who used a Lidar laser speed measuring device to record the defendant's speed.

The court found the defendant guilty of all three charges but applied the rule against multiple convictions, entering a conviction for the more serious stunt driving charge and staying the speeding charge.

The insurance card charge conviction stood.

The defendant was charged with two offences under the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act: operating a motor vehicle without insurance and knowingly using a false insurance card.

The trial proceeded in the defendant's absence.

The Crown proved that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle on Highway 403 in Oakville on November 7, 2011, and that she was the registered owner of the vehicle.

The defendant's insurance policy had been cancelled on October 8, 2011, due to non-payment of premiums.

The defendant failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the vehicle was insured at the time of the offence.

The defendant also failed to establish the defence of reasonable care.

The Crown stayed the second count, and the defendant was convicted on the first count.