Carlynne Sarah Bell

Following a seven-day trial, the accused was convicted of two counts of sexual interference against his niece and nephew, contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code.

Two counts of sexual assault were conditionally stayed.

The sentencing decision addresses the appropriate punishment for non-penetrative sexual contact with child victims in a position of trust.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of two years less one day concurrent with five months, followed by two years probation, along with ancillary orders including DNA, SOIRA registration, and contact prohibition orders.

The Crown brought a similar fact application to admit evidence of prior discreditable conduct, specifically a sexual assault conviction against accused E.L. involving the same complainant.

The court assessed the relevance, materiality, and probative value of the evidence against its potential prejudicial effect, particularly for co-accused V.S. The court found the evidence highly probative, especially given the child complainant and the pattern of behaviour alleged, and that its probative value outweighed the prejudice.

The application was granted, allowing the conviction and decision to be admitted, with a restriction on questioning the complainant about the substance of the prior conviction.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct in a sexual assault case involving his biological daughters.

The Crown argued the evidence was probative of the actus reus and corroborated the complainant's allegations that the accused, while intoxicated and in police uniform, used his service revolver to threaten her.

The accused contended the evidence was largely inadmissible hearsay, intrinsically weak, and lacked probative value.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding the proffered evidence irrelevant and insufficient to establish the alleged conduct, thus failing to meet the threshold for admissibility of similar fact evidence.

This decision addresses cross-motions for temporary parenting time and child support following the separation of parents with two young children.

The court considered the parents' demanding and rotating work schedules, applying the "best interests" test and the "maximum contact" principle.

A biweekly parenting schedule was ordered, primarily structured around the father's night shifts, and the father was directed to pay child support in the amount of $1,193 monthly based on an annual income of $78,800.

The applicant sought joint custody of the child on a week on/week off basis, while the respondent sought primary custody with a specific access schedule.

The court found joint decision-making impracticable due to the parties' inability to communicate.

Considering the child's historical primary caregiver (the respondent) and concerns about the applicant's proposed early morning childcare arrangements, the court granted interim primary custody to the respondent.

The applicant was granted access every second week from Thursday after school/care until Monday morning.

Child support was deferred for later argument.