Craig Harper

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder, pointing a firearm, and breach of recognizance, as well as his life sentence for attempted murder.

The victim was shot six times at point-blank range and paralyzed.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the reliability of the eyewitness identification evidence, which included recognition by the victim and an independent witness.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's exemplary assessment of the identification evidence.

The court also upheld the life sentence, finding it proportionate to the grave, unprovoked nature of the crime and the need to deter gun violence in public places.

The appellant appealed his convictions for threatening, sexual assault, and assault, arguing the trial judge failed to adequately explain the rejection of his evidence and failed to apply the W.(D.) framework to the threatening charges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons, read as a whole, demonstrated she evaluated all evidence, properly applied the W.(D.) principles, and made credibility findings open to her on the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for aggravated assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge properly answered a jury question regarding available verdicts and adequately described the elements of aggravated assault and assault causing bodily harm.

The sentence appeal regarding the length of the probation term was also dismissed, as the court found no error in principle.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge failed to fairly and fully assess his alibi defence before finding guilt based on the credibility of the Crown's case.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge carefully reviewed the alibi and provided several valid reasons for rejecting it, including the strength of the Crown's case and the appellant's failure to testify.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 15 months' imprisonment and a three-year driving prohibition for dangerous driving.

He argued the trial judge gave insufficient weight to the gap principle regarding his 1993 prior conviction for the same offence, and that the sentence and driving prohibition were excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge appropriately weighed denunciation and deterrence over the gap principle due to the appellant's provincial driving record.

The court held the sentence and driving prohibition were fit given the appellant's record and ongoing disregard for public safety.

The appellant was convicted of internet luring after engaging in sexually explicit conversations with an undercover police officer posing as a 13-year-old girl.

The appellant testified he believed he was communicating with an adult in a role-playing game.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, stating his credibility must be assessed bearing in mind his explanation came long after disclosure was available.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred in law by using the appellant's constitutional right to disclosure against his credibility, shifting the burden of proof, and presuming witnesses tell the truth.

The appellant was convicted of possession of counterfeit money and instruments for making counterfeit money after police discovered a large counterfeiting operation run by her husband in their shared apartment.

She appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in finding she had constructive possession under s. 4(3)(b) of the Criminal Code merely by residing there and failing to call the police.

The Court of Appeal (majority) dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge reasonably inferred a measure of control from her continued residence, knowledge of the operation, use of the computers, and flight upon her husband's arrest.

The dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal, finding no legal obligation to report the crime and insufficient evidence of control.

The appellant was convicted of multiple historical sexual and physical assaults against his daughter and stepdaughters, receiving a three-year sentence.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, failed to properly scrutinize recovered memory evidence, shifted the burden of proof, and imposed an unfit sentence given his medical needs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of credibility or application of the burden of proof.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the three-year term was at the low end of the range and the evidence did not establish that correctional authorities could not meet the appellant's medical needs.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence of two years less a day imposed on the respondent for criminal negligence causing death while street racing.

The respondent had struck a tractor-trailer, resulting in the death of its driver.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by treating the respondent's pre-sentence custody as a mitigating factor to reduce the sentence range to make a conditional sentence available, contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Fice.

The Court held that a fit sentence would be 30 months' incarceration to address denunciation and general deterrence.

However, factoring in credit for pre-sentence custody and time already served under the conditional sentence, the Court varied the sentence to time served followed by probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm, arguing that the trial judge's final instructions to the jury were inadequate.

The appellant contended that the trial judge failed to adequately review the evidence relating to the defence position, failed to instruct on prior inconsistent statements and recent complaints, and failed to properly instruct on party liability.

The majority of the Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge's charge was deficient in failing to reframe the defence position, the error was harmless and the curative proviso applied given the overwhelming strength of the Crown's case.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for large-scale counterfeiting, arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing to exclude evidence seized from his residence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge had found that the search warrant was insufficient, resulting in a s. 8 Charter breach, but admitted the evidence because the police conduct was not below the requisite level of care and the evidence was crucial to the prosecution.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's application of the s. 24(2) framework and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision that set aside a trial stay entered under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The appellant argued the Crown failed to perfect its appeal, the appeal judge improperly raised a new ground of appeal, and the appeal judge erred in the s. 11(b) analysis.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding the appeal judge's procedural decisions were discretionary and caused no prejudice.

The Court also agreed with the s. 11(b) analysis, noting that delay was an integral part of the defence tactics.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that his request for an adjournment to retain counsel was improperly denied.

The Court of Appeal found that the judge who initially refused the adjournment made four material factual errors regarding the procedural history of the case.

The trial judge subsequently adopted that erroneous decision.

The summary conviction appeal judge erred by failing to address these factual errors.

Because the refusal of the adjournment was based on an erroneous factual foundation and the appellant was forced to proceed unrepresented in a case where the Crown sought a custodial sentence, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, vacated the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed an order quashing his discharge on a charge of first degree murder following a preliminary inquiry.

The preliminary hearing judge had found that the pathologist's evidence of force applied to the deceased's wrists could not support an inference of forcible confinement, weighing it against other evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the preliminary hearing judge committed jurisdictional error by improperly weighing competing inferences.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice and upheld by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the imposition of consecutive sentences at or near the maximum for the serious offences committed.

Although fresh evidence presented an encouraging picture for the appellant's future, it did not warrant a reduction in the sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of sexual interference, incest, and assault causing bodily harm against the complainant, and was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to give limiting instructions regarding prior consistent statements, discreditable conduct, and witness opinions on credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error given the defence's tactical decisions at trial, the lack of objections, and the overall fairness of the jury charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 10-year term was within the permissible range for the grave sexual exploitation and physical abuse inflicted.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application for certiorari regarding a preliminary hearing judge's evidentiary rulings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the preliminary hearing judge's rulings on the relevance of evidence were within his jurisdiction, and certiorari is strictly a jurisdictional remedy.

The Court also noted that certiorari applications should rarely, if ever, be brought before a decision on committal for trial is made.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder after shooting at an individual who had forcibly entered his home.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge's jury instructions regarding self-defence on the attempted murder charge were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the instructions conflated the distinct issues of intent to kill and self-defence, leaving the jury with the incorrect impression that self-defence was irrelevant if intent to kill was proven.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant sought leave to appeal three concurrent sentences of six months' imprisonment for assault with a weapon, uttering a death threat, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace against his younger sister.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by failing to impose a conditional sentence and placing undue emphasis on punitive aims.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, noting the offences involved repeated acts of violence over an hour to exercise control over the victim.

Leave to appeal was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

He argued that the trial judge demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias, improperly rejected family members' evidence, improperly took judicial notice of the effects of alcohol, and failed to give adequate reasons for accepting the police officer's evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge that while some of the trial judge's conduct was inappropriate, it did not compromise the appearance of fairness.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the lower court's assessment and dismissed the appeal.