Paula A. Rochman

This decision concerns a Gardiner hearing following S.M.'s guilty plea to two counts of sexual assault against his biological daughters, V.M. and M.G. The court reviews the evidence to determine aggravating facts, including the number, nature, and circumstances of the assaults.

The decision addresses the credibility and reliability of the complainants, the timing and location of the assaults, and the extent of family knowledge and disclosure.

The court finds the core details of the assaults proven beyond a reasonable doubt, despite some inconsistencies in peripheral details, and concludes that the complainants did not collude or exaggerate their testimony.

The court found J.A.S.G. guilty of two counts of assault and two counts of sexual assault against his estranged spouse, following a trial in which the complainant was the sole witness.

The decision reviews the legal principles of credibility, consent, and the assessment of evidence in sexual assault cases, and applies them to the facts as found.

The court accepted the complainant’s evidence as credible and reliable, and found that the Crown had proven the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant, Clayton Williams, appealed his conviction and indeterminate sentence for offences arising from two break and enters, one involving the sexual assault of a 13-year-old girl.

The Court of Appeal rejected arguments that the verdict was unreasonable, that the search warrant was invalid, and that a determinate sentence with long-term supervision was more appropriate.

The court found the trial judge’s factual findings and risk assessment reasonable and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals of James Keena, who was convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault involving a complainant aged 14-15.

The court found that the trial judge correctly applied the law regarding the accused’s failure to take all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age and was justified in finding recklessness.

The sentence of five years’ imprisonment was found to be within the appropriate range, considering aggravating and mitigating factors.

The court rejected the argument that the complainant’s participation was a mitigating factor.

The Crown applied for a psychiatric assessment of Lionel Brian Williams under s. 752.1 of the Criminal Code, on reasonable grounds that he might be found a dangerous offender or long-term offender due to a serious personal injury offence (assault with a weapon).

The court reviewed extensive evidence including police synopses, CPIC records, and transcripts, noting Mr. Williams' long history of violent and non-violent offences, his marginalized status, and patterns of repetitive and persistent aggressive behaviour.

The court found the low threshold for ordering an assessment met, emphasizing the procedural nature of s. 752.1 and the importance of protecting public safety.

The application for psychiatric assessment was granted.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings for sexual assault charges, arguing a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay from information sworn to the anticipated end of trial was 36 months, exceeding the *Jordan* ceiling of 30 months.

The court found that a significant portion of this delay (352 days) was solely attributable to the applicant's repeated requests for adjournments to secure legal representation or funding, including pursuing a *Rowbotham* application.

Subtracting this defence-caused delay resulted in a net delay of approximately 24 months, which falls below the *Jordan* ceiling.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

Melissa Merritt and Christopher Fattore appealed their first-degree murder convictions.

Fattore's appeal, challenging the voluntariness of his confession, was dismissed as the court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's decision.

Merritt's appeal, however, was allowed.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in jury instructions regarding the use of a partially unintelligible "airport intercept statement" as an admission of guilt, and also misdirected the jury on the burden of proof concerning innocent explanations for "Walmart omissions" (after-the-fact conduct).

Consequently, Merritt's conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered for her.

The accused, Islamunddin Attayee, was charged with assaulting his spouse and an intervening member of the public.

The primary issue at trial was the identity of the assailant, as the spouse was uncooperative.

The court found the in-dock identification by witnesses insufficient to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt, citing the need for caution as per R. v. Hibbert.

Additionally, the court noted disturbing surreptitious communications between a testifying police officer and the officer in charge during the Zoom trial, which undermined the fairness of the process and led to the accused being left without counsel.

The Crown's inaction in investigating these communications was criticized, emphasizing the Crown's heightened duty of fairness and disclosure as per R. v. Ahluwalia.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

Oliver Kwafo was tried on charges of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The central issue was whether Mr. Kwafo had knowledge of the drugs found hidden in his vehicle.

Despite suspicious circumstances, the Crown failed to prove knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt, primarily due to a key police witness's inability to recall crucial details about the discovery of the drugs.

Consequently, Mr. Kwafo was found not guilty on all three counts.

This appeal concerned the conviction of Elaine Biddersingh for second-degree murder.

The appellant raised three grounds: the trial judge erred in dismissing her application for a judge-alone trial due to negative pretrial publicity, erred in ruling certain statements admissible, and erred in refusing to instruct the jury on an intervening act of drowning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the conviction.

The Crown's cross-appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The accused was charged with two break-ins occurring within 900 metres of each other in Brampton on September 2, 2018.

The first involved a break and enter with theft at a residential property.

The second involved a break and enter with sexual assault of a thirteen-year-old girl.

The Crown's case relied primarily on circumstantial evidence including video surveillance footage, the complainant's testimony, probation officer identification evidence, and recovered stolen property.

The defence challenged identification and the reliability of the complainant's evidence.

The trial judge found the accused guilty on all counts based on a holistic assessment of the circumstantial evidence, rejecting the defence application to admit similar fact evidence regarding prior convictions.

The applicant challenged the validity of a search warrant issued to search his residence on the grounds of alleged violations of s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained inaccuracies and omissions that rendered the warrant invalid.

The Crown contended that the warrant was valid on both facial and subfacial analysis.

The court conducted a voir dire and examined three main areas of challenge: non-disclosure of relevant information, misdescription or omission of identification evidence, and grounds to believe items were at the premises.

The court found that despite certain inaccuracies in the ITO, the issuing justice could have properly granted the warrant based on the totality of the evidence presented.

The Crown applied for a ruling on the admissibility of opinion evidence from a probation officer regarding the identification of an unknown male recorded on home surveillance video from a residence proximate to where a break-in and sexual assault allegedly occurred.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine admissibility under the "prior acquaintance/better position" test established in Leaney.

The probation officer had supervised the accused on multiple occasions and observed his physical appearance, gait, clothing, and other characteristics.

The court found the evidence admissible, as the witness had sufficient familiarity with the accused and was in a better position than the court to identify similarities between the accused and the person in the video.

The witness testified only to consistencies and similarities, not to a positive identification.

The accused, Stasky St. Clair, was found guilty of eight offences, including possession of a loaded, prohibited firearm, possession of an over-capacity magazine, two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and two counts of possession of a firearm while prohibited by court orders.

The court imposed a global penitentiary sentence of eight years, reduced to six years, one month, and one week after accounting for 22 months and three weeks of pre-sentence custody.

The sentencing emphasized denunciation and deterrence for serious firearm and drug offences, considering the accused's lengthy criminal record and prior firearm convictions.

This ruling addresses disputed facts for sentencing following a jury verdict where Andrew Mitchell was found guilty of break and enter with intent and assault causing bodily harm.

The Crown sought to include a black eye, hand injury, and concussion as bodily harm for the assault charge, while the defence argued only the black eye.

The court, applying principles from R. v. Ferguson, determined the factual basis for sentencing.

It found that the complainant suffered a black eye, hand injury, and concussion for the assault, and that the break and enter involved some level of violence and/or threats.

The offender pleaded guilty to firearm-related offences including unauthorized possession of a firearm, possession of a firearm knowing its possession was unauthorized, possession of a loaded restricted firearm, and careless storage of ammunition.

The court imposed a 28-month custodial sentence (after credit for restrictive bail conditions) on the primary charge, with concurrent sentences on the remaining counts.

The court emphasized the principles of deterrence and denunciation while considering the offender's early guilty plea, first-time offender status, and excellent rehabilitation prospects.

Ancillary orders included a 10-year firearms prohibition, a DNA order, forfeiture orders, and a victim fine surcharge.

A young person was charged with second degree murder in connection with the death of S.K., who died from a single stab wound to the chest during a marijuana trafficking transaction that went wrong.

The accused admitted holding the knife that caused the fatal injury but claimed he was acting in self-defence and that the stabbing was accidental.

The Crown alleged intentional stabbing with either intent to kill or intent to cause bodily harm known to be likely to cause death.

The court found the accused not guilty of murder but guilty of unlawful act manslaughter, finding that while self-defence was not established, the accused did not have the specific intent required for murder.

The appellant appealed his conviction on one count of aggravated assault (acquitted on attempted murder) and his designation as a dangerous offender with an indeterminate sentence.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the verdicts were irreconcilable, and second, that the trial judge erred in failing to limit the use of bad character evidence relating to a prior assault.

The appellant also appealed the dangerous offender designation, arguing the trial judge failed to make sufficient factual findings regarding the index offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the verdicts were logically reconcilable, the jury received adequate instructions on character evidence, and the trial judge made sufficient factual findings to support the dangerous offender designation.

At a preliminary inquiry into a charge of second-degree murder, the court determined whether sufficient evidence existed to commit the accused for trial.

The accused was charged with causing the death of a five-month-old infant through head injury while babysitting.

The Crown argued that medical evidence of severe brain injury, combined with evidence of animus and post-offence conduct, supported committal on second-degree murder.

The defence conceded sufficient evidence for manslaughter but argued the medical evidence alone was insufficient to establish the subjective intent required for murder.

The court found that a jury could reasonably infer from the medical evidence of severe repetitive mechanical assault, the ruling out of accident, evidence of animus, and post-offence conduct that the accused possessed the requisite subjective intent for second-degree murder.