Paula A. Rochman

The appellant appealed his conviction on one count of aggravated assault (acquitted on attempted murder) and his designation as a dangerous offender with an indeterminate sentence.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the verdicts were irreconcilable, and second, that the trial judge erred in failing to limit the use of bad character evidence relating to a prior assault.

The appellant also appealed the dangerous offender designation, arguing the trial judge failed to make sufficient factual findings regarding the index offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the verdicts were logically reconcilable, the jury received adequate instructions on character evidence, and the trial judge made sufficient factual findings to support the dangerous offender designation.

The offender was found guilty of bookmaking for the benefit of a criminal organization known as Platinum Sports Book.

The court found the offender held a leadership or management role in the organization, directing other agents.

The Crown sought up to 2 years less a day, while the defence sought a suspended sentence or fine.

The court weighed the aggravating factor of committing an offence for a criminal organization against mitigating factors including a dated criminal record and no evidence of direct profit.

The offender was sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment.

The applicants, charged with bookmaking and criminal organization offences, brought a pre-trial application challenging the constitutional validity of the gaming and criminal organization provisions of the Criminal Code and related regulations.

They argued that the gaming provisions were ultra vires Parliament's criminal law power, that the regulation deeming gaming offences as 'serious offences' violated section 7 of the Charter due to overbreadth and gross disproportionality, and that the bookmaking prohibition violated freedom of expression and association under section 2 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding the provisions were a valid exercise of the criminal law power, did not violate the Charter, and in any event, would be saved under section 1.

The respondent, previously convicted of sexual interference and subject to a s. 161 prohibition order barring him from school grounds, attended a secondary school for a 'spa day' where he interacted with students.

He pleaded guilty to breaching the order and was granted an absolute discharge at trial.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the sentence failed to apply principles of denunciation and deterrence.

The absolute discharge was set aside and replaced with a six-month custodial sentence followed by three years of probation.

At a preliminary inquiry into a charge of second-degree murder, the court determined whether sufficient evidence existed to commit the accused for trial.

The accused was charged with causing the death of a five-month-old infant through head injury while babysitting.

The Crown argued that medical evidence of severe brain injury, combined with evidence of animus and post-offence conduct, supported committal on second-degree murder.

The defence conceded sufficient evidence for manslaughter but argued the medical evidence alone was insufficient to establish the subjective intent required for murder.

The court found that a jury could reasonably infer from the medical evidence of severe repetitive mechanical assault, the ruling out of accident, evidence of animus, and post-offence conduct that the accused possessed the requisite subjective intent for second-degree murder.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to eight years in custody.

He appealed the sentence, arguing he should have received enhanced pre-trial custody credit on a 1.5 to 1 basis and that the sentence was unfit because he did not bring the gun to the scene.

The Crown conceded the pre-trial custody issue, and the Court of Appeal applied the Summers framework to increase the credit to 39 months.

However, the court dismissed the fitness of sentence appeal, finding the sentencing judge had already accounted for the fact that the appellant did not bring the gun and that the sentence was fit given the aggravating factors.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial based on the transcript of a prior jury trial that ended in a mistrial, the court found that the accused inflicted fatal head injuries and extensive bruising on a five-and-a-half-month-old infant while babysitting.

The court rejected the defence theory that the child's mother caused the injuries after returning from a wedding and found the accused's alternative explanations, including prior falls and a shower incident, to be fabricated.

Applying W.(D.), the court held the Crown had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused caused the fatal injuries.

However, given the uncertainty in the medical evidence as to mechanism and force, and the accused's post-assault conduct suggesting concern for the child, the court was not satisfied that the Crown proved the subjective foresight of likely death required by s. 229(a)(ii).

Accused persons charged with murder brought applications to exclude historical text messages obtained by police through a production order directed to a telecommunications provider.

They argued that s. 487.012 of the Criminal Code did not authorize the production of private communications, or alternatively that the provision violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The court held that stored historical text messages constitute “data” within the meaning of the provision and that obtaining them by production order does not amount to interception of private communications under Part VI.

The statutory prerequisites for a production order satisfied constitutional standards for reasonable search and seizure.

The applications to exclude the evidence were dismissed.

The accused was convicted of multiple offences including committing offences for the benefit of a criminal organization, instructing the commission of offences for a criminal organization, firearms possession and transfer offences, and trafficking in heroin.

The evidence, largely derived from wiretaps and surveillance, established that the accused was a leader of a street gang involved in organized drug trafficking and firearms activity across multiple jurisdictions.

The court considered aggravating factors including the scale of the trafficking enterprise, leadership role within the organization, and involvement of firearms, as well as mitigating factors including youth, lack of prior record, and expressions of remorse.

Applying principles of denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, and considering the totality principle, the court imposed a global penitentiary sentence.

Thirty‑three accused sought exclusion of wiretap evidence arising from “Project Marvel,” a large police investigation into shootings, robbery, and organized gang activity in Toronto.

The applicants argued the authorizations violated s. 8 of the Charter because the police failed to establish “investigative necessity” under s. 186(1)(b) of the Criminal Code and improperly named certain individuals as “known persons” under s. 185(1)(e).

The court applied the deferential Garofoli review standard and held the authorizing judge had a reasonable basis to conclude investigative necessity existed despite alternative investigative techniques such as cell‑phone analysis.

The court further held that the challenged individuals were properly named as targets because interception of their communications could assist the investigation and the statutory threshold is low.

A separate sub‑facial challenge relating to the search of a backyard shed and the curtilage doctrine was also rejected.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession of 26 pounds of raw marijuana found in the trunk of his car.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest and search based on an officer smelling raw marijuana, and that the trial judge failed to reconcile conflicting officer testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in relying on the smell evidence to establish grounds for arrest.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge did not err in rejecting a conditional sentence given the appellant's antecedents and the quantity of marijuana.

The Crown applied to admit two out‑of‑court statements made by the shooting victim to police officers in hospital under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, or alternatively as original evidence of identification.

The witness testified at trial but claimed no memory of speaking to police and denied seeing the shooter.

The court held that necessity was not established because the Crown failed to follow the procedure under s. 9 of the Canada Evidence Act and the framework from B.(K.G.) for prior inconsistent statements.

The court further held that threshold reliability was not demonstrated because the statements were not sworn, recorded, or verified, and the circumstances of the interview and inconsistencies in the statements undermined reliability.

The court also rejected reliance on the Langille identification principle because the case did not involve identification of a stranger.

The accused pleaded guilty to importing 2.2 kilograms of cocaine into Canada.

The court considered the established sentencing ranges for cocaine importation set out by the Court of Appeal, which indicate sentences of six to eight years for multi‑kilogram quantities, while recognizing that ranges are guidelines and may be adjusted based on aggravating and mitigating factors.

Aggravating factors included the serious nature of cocaine importation and the significant quantity involved.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s youth, lack of prior criminal record, genuine remorse, strong community support, and a guilty plea.

Balancing denunciation and general deterrence with the offender’s personal circumstances, the court imposed a penitentiary sentence below the Crown’s request but above the defence position.

The accused was arrested at Pearson International Airport after returning from Panama when customs officers discovered approximately two pounds of cocaine hidden in four health care product bottles in her checked luggage.

The accused claimed she was an innocent courier who had been tricked by her travelling companion into carrying the bottles.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as implausible and inconsistent, finding that her demeanour and actions at the airport, including attempting to abandon her suitcase and hiding baggage tags in her bra, demonstrated guilty knowledge.

The court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knowingly imported the cocaine and found her guilty.

The Crown appealed a sentencing decision that designated the respondent as a long-term offender rather than a dangerous offender.

The respondent had a serious criminal record for sexually-motivated offences and was diagnosed with Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD).

The sentencing judge accepted defence expert evidence that the respondent's FASD symptoms could be treated, allowing him to participate in sex offender programs and reducing his risk of re-offending to an acceptable level in the community.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's preference for the defence expert's evidence or her exercise of discretion.

The appellant was convicted of internet luring after engaging in sexually explicit conversations with an undercover police officer posing as a 13-year-old girl.

The appellant testified he believed he was communicating with an adult in a role-playing game.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, stating his credibility must be assessed bearing in mind his explanation came long after disclosure was available.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred in law by using the appellant's constitutional right to disclosure against his credibility, shifting the burden of proof, and presuming witnesses tell the truth.

The appellant appealed a sentence for breach of probation.

The trial judge had effectively imposed a 34-month sentence, considering pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence manifestly excessive, noting the appellant had no prior record for breach of probation, had never been imprisoned, and had successfully served a conditional sentence.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to time served, with the probation order remaining in place.

The accused, an 18-year-old, was caught shoplifting and used an inoperable sawed-off shotgun to threaten security guards and escape custody.

He was convicted of multiple offences, including three counts of using an imitation firearm while committing an indictable offence.

The trial judge declared the mandatory consecutive sentencing provision in s. 85(4) of the Criminal Code unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter and imposed a suspended sentence with probation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal applied the Kienapple principle to stay two of the three imitation firearm convictions, finding they arose from a single transaction.

The Court also set aside the declaration of unconstitutionality, holding that the trial judge erred in his s. 12 Charter analysis and that s. 85(4) does not impose grossly disproportionate punishment.

The sentence itself was not varied.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and numerous other offences arising from a robbery and shooting at a sporting goods store.

At trial, the Crown relied on similar fact evidence from five other armed robberies to prove the identity of the appellant as the shooter.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of two of the other robberies, as they lacked striking similarity to the charged offences and failed to establish a nexus to the appellant.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.