M. Bornfreund

Following a jury conviction for trafficking cocaine, the accused brought an application to stay the verdict on the basis of entrapment.

The court applied the Supreme Court of Canada's framework for dial-a-dope operations to determine if police had reasonable suspicion before providing the opportunity to commit the offence.

The court found that the undercover officer's initial exchange with the accused crystallized the requisite reasonable suspicion before the officer requested to purchase drugs.

The entrapment application was dismissed.

Following a jury verdict finding the applicant guilty of manslaughter, the applicant brought a motion seeking the trial judge's recusal from the sentencing hearing, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The applicant cited several incidents, including the judge's post-verdict comments to the deceased's family, accepting doughnuts brought by the family, and various procedural rulings and expressions of frustration.

The court dismissed the application, finding that a fully informed reasonable person would not apprehend bias from any of the isolated incidents or their cumulative effect, noting that the presumption of judicial impartiality had not been displaced.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of being an accessory after the fact to murder.

She changed the registration colour of a vehicle used by her boyfriend during a murder to avoid police detection.

The court considered her 876 days of pre-trial custody, credited as 1,314 days (3.5 years).

The court imposed a sentence of one day in jail in addition to the pre-trial custody, declining to order probation as the offender had demonstrated rehabilitation while on bail.

During a jury trial for being an accessory after the fact to murder, the accused argued that the defence of duress should be left with the jury.

The alleged duress arose from the accused’s relationship with a violent offender and prior threatening communications.

The court applied the “air of reality” test and held that there was no evidence of an explicit or implicit threat temporally connected to the accused’s conduct or made for the purpose of compelling the offence.

Earlier threats and violent conduct occurring a year prior lacked the necessary nexus to the impugned acts.

The defence of duress was therefore withdrawn from the jury.

Accused persons charged with murder brought applications to exclude historical text messages obtained by police through a production order directed to a telecommunications provider.

They argued that s. 487.012 of the Criminal Code did not authorize the production of private communications, or alternatively that the provision violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The court held that stored historical text messages constitute “data” within the meaning of the provision and that obtaining them by production order does not amount to interception of private communications under Part VI.

The statutory prerequisites for a production order satisfied constitutional standards for reasonable search and seizure.

The applications to exclude the evidence were dismissed.