Kimberly Motyl

During a trial for four counts of first-degree murder, the accused brought an application to exclude expert evidence regarding gunshot residue (GSR) found in his vehicle 14 months after the homicides.

The court reviewed the extensive history of the vehicle, including multiple police seizures and the accused's frequent discharge of firearms in other incidents.

The court concluded that the GSR evidence lacked any probative nexus to the specific homicides and that its admission would be highly prejudicial.

The application to exclude the evidence was granted.

On a pre-trial voir dire in a jury murder prosecution, the Crown sought admission of two utterances allegedly made by the accused to persons in authority.

The court held the first utterance, made upon arrest for a separate firearm discharge offence, was voluntary and had an adequate evidentiary link to that shooting to permit its admission, with the ultimate interpretation left to the jury.

The court rejected the argument that the Crown was required to call every officer present between arrest and the utterance.

The second utterance, made after an assault on a Crown witness in courthouse cells, was excluded because it did not reasonably support an inference of witness intimidation and its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

In a jury trial on four counts of first degree murder, the accused sought exclusion of proposed motive evidence tendered by the Crown.

The court held that evidence suggesting the accused wished to impress a mentor with an authentic reputation for violence had a sufficient logical connection to the alleged shooting to satisfy relevance.

The court further held that evidence of the accused having been shot in the same area in 2001 was admissible, not as proof of a generalized animus to the neighbourhood, but as part of the explanation for the choice of location.

The defence submission that the evidence would invite speculative reasoning akin to post-traumatic stress was rejected, and the motive evidence was admitted subject to strict limits ensuring no inference other than that the accused had been an innocent victim in 2001.

In a jury trial on four counts of first degree murder, the accused brought an evidentiary motion seeking edits to jail telephone intercepts before they were played to the jury.

The court applied a relevance and prejudice-versus-probative-value analysis to disputed passages, holding that most references to custody were admissible because they provided necessary context for the accused's repeated efforts to have another person alter vehicle records and avoid implication in the homicide investigation.

A violent rap lyric was excluded because its prejudicial effect outweighed its minimal probative value, and two words referring to the duration of incarceration were also removed.

The balance of the application was dismissed, with limiting instructions to be given concerning custody and the right to silence.

In a jury trial on four counts of first degree murder arising from three separate shooting incidents, the court determined pre-trial applications concerning cross-count admissibility, extrinsic misconduct evidence, and severance.

The court held that evidence on each count was admissible across counts as circumstantial evidence of possession of the same 9mm firearm, and thus of identity, but not as similar fact evidence because the shootings lacked the requisite striking similarity or objective improbability of coincidence.

The court also admitted selected extrinsic misconduct evidence relating to possession and use of the 9mm and .45 calibre firearms, consciousness of guilt, and the relationship between the accused and a Vetrovec witness, while excluding other highly prejudicial evidence with limited probative value.

Applying the severance factors, including the strong factual and legal nexus among counts, the court concluded that the interests of justice did not require severance.

Accused persons charged with murder brought applications to exclude historical text messages obtained by police through a production order directed to a telecommunications provider.

They argued that s. 487.012 of the Criminal Code did not authorize the production of private communications, or alternatively that the provision violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The court held that stored historical text messages constitute “data” within the meaning of the provision and that obtaining them by production order does not amount to interception of private communications under Part VI.

The statutory prerequisites for a production order satisfied constitutional standards for reasonable search and seizure.

The applications to exclude the evidence were dismissed.