Daisy E. McCabe-Lokos

The applicant sought an extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal against his firearms convictions, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed due to alleged non-disclosure by the Crown regarding the firearm's connection to a prior homicide.

The Court of Appeal applied the three-factor test for extensions of time (bona fide intention, explanation for delay, and merit of appeal).

The applicant conceded he did not form a bona fide intention to appeal within the period, and the court found his assertion of non-disclosure lacked substantiation, failing to meet the "not frivolous" merits threshold.

The court emphasized the public interest in the finality of guilty pleas and dismissed the motion.

Melissa Merritt and Christopher Fattore appealed their first-degree murder convictions.

Fattore's appeal, challenging the voluntariness of his confession, was dismissed as the court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's decision.

Merritt's appeal, however, was allowed.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in jury instructions regarding the use of a partially unintelligible "airport intercept statement" as an admission of guilt, and also misdirected the jury on the burden of proof concerning innocent explanations for "Walmart omissions" (after-the-fact conduct).

Consequently, Merritt's conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered for her.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple charges including robbery, weapons dangerous, and failing to comply with release conditions, stemming from two separate incidents involving the theft of high-value running shoes using an imitation firearm.

The Crown sought a 15-month jail sentence, while the defence argued for time served, citing enhanced pre-sentence credit due to strict bail conditions and punitive jail lockdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the planned nature of the offences, the use of an imitation firearm, and the commission of new offences while on release.

Mitigating factors included the accused's youth, guilty plea, remorse, and the harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody.

The court imposed a 1-year conditional sentence, followed by 2 years of probation, a DNA order, and a 10-year weapons prohibition, finding it consistent with sentencing principles given the accused's demonstrated efforts towards rehabilitation.

The applicant, Jeremy Pike, brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained from a search of his digital devices at the border.

The court found that his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated when he was asked for his password, as he was detained at that point and should have been informed of his rights.

While the s. 8 breach (unreasonable search under a provision later found unconstitutional) was in good faith, the Border Services Officer's failure to take proper notes increased its seriousness.

Considering the seriousness and significant impact of both breaches, particularly the s. 10(b) violation, the court concluded that the evidence obtained from Mr. Pike's digital devices should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant, a registered massage therapist, appealed his conviction on two counts of sexual assault.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of complainant credibility in the absence of expert evidence and the sufficiency of reasons for rejecting the appellant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the complainants' reactions were psychologically normal for sexual assault victims and that the reasons for conviction, based on the strength of the Crown's evidence and similar fact evidence, were sufficient.

This ruling addresses a renewed severance application brought by David Obregon Castro, who, along with co-accused Sarai Lopez-Iglesias, is charged with First Degree Murder.

Both accused intend to present "cut-throat" defences, blaming the other for the victim's death.

The application for severance was renewed after a prior ruling allowed Ms. Lopez-Iglesias to admit evidence of Mr. Obregon Castro's prior discreditable conduct.

The court dismissed the severance application, reaffirming the presumption that jointly charged accused should be tried together, especially when antagonistic defences are present.

The judge found that a single trial would promote efficiency, the truth-seeking function, and reduce the risk of inconsistent verdicts, relying on the jury's ability to follow limiting instructions regarding the use of prior discreditable conduct evidence.

This ruling addresses applications by co-accused David Obregon Castro and Sarai Lopez-Iglesias in a first-degree murder trial to adduce evidence of each other's prior discreditable conduct, given their "cutthroat" defences.

The court applies the balancing test for admissibility of co-accused bad character evidence, which is less stringent than for Crown-led evidence.

Ms. Lopez-Iglesias was permitted to introduce evidence relevant to her state of mind (fear of Obregon Castro), his propensity to commit the crime, and his credibility, including details of the "Z Bar Incident" (shooting), the assault on "Chips" (stabbing), various assaults she suffered from Obregon Castro, and his alleged gang membership (limited to her state of mind).

However, evidence of Obregon Castro's past arson/attempted murder charge (acquitted), claims of torturing "snitches," sexual assault, threats regarding Kyle Watts, a plan to shoot a pawn shop owner, and preliminary inquiry observers was deemed inadmissible due to low probative value outweighed by prejudicial effect.

Mr. Obregon Castro was also allowed to adduce evidence of Ms. Lopez-Iglesias's violence towards him, drug use, and participation in bank frauds to challenge her credibility, but not evidence of trafficking sex workers.

The judge emphasized the necessity of detailed limiting instructions to the jury regarding the use of such evidence.

David Obregon Castro and Sarai Lopez-Iglesias, accused of first-degree murder, applied to deliver an opening address to the jury immediately after the Crown.

The court dismissed the application, affirming that such a request is a matter of judicial discretion, not a constitutional right, and should only be granted in special or unusual circumstances.

The court found no such circumstances present, citing concerns about the defence's ability to commit to evidence not yet determined and the risk of the opening address straying into argument.

The Ontario Court of Appeal heard appeals from convictions and sentences related to a series of tractor-trailer thefts and robberies.

Appellants challenged the validity of cell tower production orders, the admission of evidence obtained from Charter-breaching production orders under s. 24(2), and the use of similar act evidence.

One appellant also challenged possession convictions.

The Court dismissed all conviction appeals, finding the initial production orders valid, the s. 24(2) analysis sound (due to reduced privacy expectation in public location data), and the similar act evidence properly admitted.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeals, finding the trial judge erred by analogizing the robberies to home invasions, which led to unduly high base sentences.

The Court reduced the total sentences for the three appealing accused.

The accused, Justine Ordonio, sought to adduce ante mortem hearsay statements made by the deceased, Teresa Hsin, regarding a third-party suspect, Tim Chiu, to establish motive and disposition.

The court examined three categories of statements, considering their admissibility under the state of mind exception or the principled approach to hearsay.

While necessity was established due to the deceased's unavailability, the court found the statements lacked threshold reliability.

This was attributed to the confrontational and strategic nature of one conversation, the deceased's compromised state in hospital during another, and the ambiguity and lack of specific fear of violence in statements relayed by the deceased's mother.

The motion to admit the hearsay evidence was dismissed.

The accused, Justine Ordonio, sought to adduce expert evidence from Todd Barron regarding the tendency of certain interview techniques to produce unreliable or false information, personal characteristics increasing suggestibility, and the implications of techniques used in this case for reliability.

The court dismissed the application, finding the evidence not necessary to assist the jury, as common sense and judicial instructions were sufficient.

Furthermore, the proposed expert lacked the required objectivity and did not fully review the evidence.

This ruling addresses whether the applicants, Melissa Merritt and Christopher Fattore, had a reasonable expectation of privacy (REP) in data stored on a 'loaner phone' provided by police after their original phone was seized.

The court applied the totality of circumstances test, considering the subject matter (data), the applicants' interest in it, their subjective expectation, and its objective reasonableness.

The court found that the applicants did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the personal data on the loaner phone, primarily because police had previously informed Ms. Merritt that a warrant would be required to access data on their seized family phone, fostering a reasonable belief that the same protection would apply to the replacement device.

Five appellants convicted of drug-related offences appealed their convictions, challenging the application judge's admission of evidence obtained pursuant to wiretap authorizations under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellants argued that the application judge erred in his s. 24(2) analysis by failing to adequately recognize the impact of prior police misconduct and by not giving appropriate effect to findings of serious carelessness in the affidavits.

Ba Tuan Tran also appealed his sentence of 15 months imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction appeals and the sentence appeal, finding the application judge's analysis fair, balanced, and correct.

The applicants, charged with multiple murders, brought an application to exclude electronic intercepts and tracking warrant evidence, alleging violations of section 8 of the Charter.

The application challenged the necessity of judicial authorization for police email exchanges in an undercover operation, the police's actions in repacking belongings containing listening devices, and the validity of a tracking warrant based on alleged material errors and omissions in the information to obtain.

The court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the email communications, that police actions regarding the trailer were within the scope of implied invitation, and that the tracking warrant was valid.

The applicant, Godday Dadzie, sought release via habeas corpus from immigration detention under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).

He had been detained since 2014, primarily due to being a flight risk and issues with establishing his identity and country of origin, exacerbated by his lack of cooperation.

The court considered whether his detention was "very lengthy" and of "uncertain duration," factoring in the nature of the detention facility and the applicant's non-cooperation.

The court found that the applicant's detention was not exceptionally lengthy when accounting for his lack of cooperation, nor was its duration uncertain due to his own obstructionist tactics.

The application was dismissed, as the court concluded that the detention was for a valid immigration purpose, not arbitrary, and consistent with fundamental justice principles.