Michael Robert Fawcett

The Attorney General applied for restraint and management orders under the Criminal Code for cryptocurrency held by Binance, alleged to be offence-related property from a fraud.

Binance opposed the application on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that the Unifund test for prescriptive legislative jurisdiction applied and required assessing the reliability of the cryptocurrency tracing.

The court held that the Unifund test does not apply because the legislation explicitly authorizes extraterritorial reach and the orders involve enforcement rather than prescriptive jurisdiction.

Instead, the Brecknell test applies.

Consequently, the reliability of the cryptocurrency tracing was deemed irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue.

Marc Gauthier appealed his conviction for first-degree murder of Tammy Avery.

The appeal raised two main issues: the admissibility of a voicemail left for his doctor (Dr. Morrison) and the voluntariness of confessions made to police and correctional officers.

The Court of Appeal found no reasonable expectation of privacy in the voicemail, as it constituted criminal harassment, and thus it was admissible.

While the court found the trial judge erred in admitting the confessions due to an inadequate evidentiary record regarding voluntariness, it applied the curative proviso, concluding that this error did not impact the verdict as the confessions only confirmed the undisputed fact of the killing, not the mens rea for first-degree murder.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of one respondent and the sentence of another, while the second respondent appealed his conviction.

Both cases involved border officers searching the respondents' digital devices under s. 99(1)(a) of the Customs Act, leading to the discovery of child pornography.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 99(1)(a) violates s. 8 of the Charter because it authorizes highly intrusive searches of digital devices without reasonable suspicion.

The law was declared unconstitutional with a six-month suspension.

However, applying the Grant framework, the Court admitted the evidence for both respondents due to the officers' good faith reliance on existing law and the serious nature of the offences.

The first respondent's acquittal was overturned and a new trial ordered.

The second respondent's conviction was upheld.

The Court also established a new sentencing range for child pornography possession, finding the second respondent's conditional sentence demonstrably unfit and stating a three-year sentence was appropriate, though it declined to incarcerate him given the time already served on house arrest.

The Attorney General for Ontario applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a provincial court judge's refusal to issue a general warrant and assistance order.

The police sought to use the general warrant to seize cryptocurrency held on a third-party exchange (Binance) by compelling the exchange to transfer the funds to a police-controlled wallet.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the general warrant was not available because other provisions in the Criminal Code, specifically Part XII.2 relating to digital assets warrants and restraint orders, provide a substantive equivalent for seizing such assets.

The appellants appealed their convictions for second-degree murder and manslaughter/robbery, respectively, stemming from a fatal assault.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal for second-degree murder, ordering a new trial due to the improper admission and use of lay opinion evidence regarding the likelihood of death, and the trial judge's failure to conduct a voir dire or provide a limiting instruction.

The appeal for manslaughter was also allowed, and a new trial ordered, due to inadequate jury instructions on aiding and abetting.

The robbery conviction was upheld.

The court dismissed other grounds of appeal, including challenges to the pathologist's cross-examination limits and the delay argument under the Charter.

The appellant, William Cummins, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder and unlawful confinement.

The appeal raised two main issues: the trial judge's mid-trial ruling allowing the Crown to use the appellant's prior testimony from a mistrial, and the application of constructive murder provisions under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's discretionary decision regarding the use of prior testimony, finding no error.

However, the court found that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the "same transaction" test for constructive murder by stating that the unlawful confinement did not need a causal connection to the murder, which contradicted established jurisprudence.

Consequently, the first-degree murder conviction was reduced to second-degree murder, and the matter was remitted for parole eligibility determination.

The appellant, Raymond Mitchell, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board (ORB) ordering his transfer from a medium-security facility to a high-security unit.

He argued the Board erred by not adequately considering Gladue principles and that the disposition was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision to transfer reasonable given the appellant's history of disruptive and violent behaviour and public safety risk.

However, the Court noted the Board's consideration of Gladue principles was inadequate, emphasizing the need for a "different method of analysis" for Indigenous individuals in psychiatric facilities, even if it doesn't mandate a different outcome.

The appellant, S.F., appealed convictions for three counts of assault and one count of sexual assault against his wife, alleging errors in the trial judge's credibility assessment and misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, affirming that the judge was entitled to accept the complainant's evidence despite initial non-disclosure (attributed to fear of retaliation) and minor inconsistencies.

The court found no material misapprehension of evidence and deferred to the trial judge's careful assessment of the complainant's testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Akada Bruce, appealed his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The sentence appeal was resolved by joint submission from counsel, varying the original sentence to a conditional sentence of 583 days, accounting for time served.

The appellant, Ferhat Tekin, appealed his conviction for human trafficking of a person under the age of 18, among other offences.

He argued that the trial judge's factual findings were insufficient to establish the specific intent to exploit the complainant.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge accurately applied legal principles and that the finding of intent to exploit was amply supported by the record, including evidence of the appellant's manipulative conduct and the complainant's fear for her safety.

The court reiterated that where exploitation is established, inferring the accused's purpose to exploit is usually straightforward.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed on the ground that the trial judge failed to explicitly instruct the jury that the alleged unlawful confinement, which formed the basis for constructive first-degree murder, must be a distinct criminal act from the killing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions, when read as a whole and in the context of the trial, sufficiently conveyed this distinct act requirement, providing the jury with a functional understanding of their task.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault, and breach of probation, as well as his five-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the burden of proof, credibility assessments, or handling of the appellant's criminal record.

In dismissing the sentence appeal, the Court explicitly abandoned the 'Smith range' (21 months to 4 years) previously used for intimate partner sexual assaults, holding that such assaults should not attract a lower sentencing range than sexual assaults committed against strangers.

The five-year sentence was upheld as fit and proportionate.

The appellants, Elias Akhi and Jezreel Moxam, appealed their convictions for robbery, assault with a weapon, and other offences arising from a home invasion.

The Court of Appeal found serious errors in the trial judge's jury instructions, specifically regarding party liability (aiding and common intention) and the failure to adequately delineate between the two accused and the multiple counts.

The instructions were deemed confusing and insufficient to properly equip the jury.

Consequently, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered for both appellants.

The appellant, Dia 'Eddin Hanan, appealed his conviction for manslaughter and firearms-related offences, and his sentence, following a jury trial.

The appeal raised two main grounds: an alleged breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time, and alleged errors in the trial judge's jury charge regarding the burden of proof and self-defence.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

They upheld the trial judge's assessment of delay, including the attribution of defence delay and the application of the transitional exceptional circumstance under R. v. Jordan.

They also found no reversible error in the jury instructions, concluding that the charge, read as a whole, adequately conveyed the burden of proof and the W.(D.) rule.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal, finding a s. 11(b) breach and serious errors in the jury instructions.

The appellant was convicted of defrauding a business partner and sentenced to 18 months incarceration and restitution.

He appealed his conviction, arguing a s. 11(b) Charter violation (right to be tried within a reasonable time) and an error in the R. v. W.(D.) analysis.

He also sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found a s. 11(b) violation, concluding that the trial judge incorrectly applied the presumptive ceiling for delay.

The court dismissed the Crown's request to impose a remedy other than a stay of proceedings, reaffirming that a stay is the appropriate and only available remedy for a s. 11(b) breach.

The conviction for fraud was stayed.

The appellant's other grounds of appeal, including the W.(D.) analysis and the sentence appeal, were dismissed.

The appellant, Dwayne Campbell, appealed his convictions for robbery, forcible confinement, and use of an imitation firearm, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was breached.

The total delay was 28 months and 26 days, below the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the application judge erred in assessing the appellant's "meaningful steps to expedite" the case did not "markedly" exceed the reasonable time requirements, largely due to the co-accused's actions and the Crown's reasonable decision not to sever the trials.

The appellant, Bradley Priestap, appealed his convictions for multiple counts of voyeurism, break and enter to commit voyeurism, possession of instruments for break and enter, and prowling.

He abandoned his sentence appeal.

The grounds of appeal were: the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons, erred by summarily dismissing an alternate suspect theory, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, no error in limiting evidence on an alternate suspect due to lack of connection, and no demonstration of prejudice from alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant, Matthew Moreira, sought leave to appeal his sentence for manslaughter and robbery.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted leave, finding that the sentencing judge erred in determining the factual basis for the manslaughter conviction and in assessing the appellant's degree of fault, and also materially misapprehended evidence regarding pre-sentence custody conditions (Duncan credit).

The Court set aside the 12-year manslaughter sentence, substituting a 10-year sentence, while upholding the 1-year consecutive sentence for robbery.

The total global sentence was reduced from 13 years to 11 years, resulting in a net sentence of 6 years and 5 months after pre-sentence custody credit.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault, sexual assault, and uttering threats, and the custodial sentence.

The appeal against conviction argued the trial judge erred in applying R. v. W.(D.) by failing to find a reasonable doubt due to alleged inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence regarding the timing of disclosure to her brother.

The appeal against sentence argued it was excessive and that enhanced credit for COVID-19 conditions was warranted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no material inconsistency in the evidence and no error in the trial judge's W.(D.) analysis or the fitness of the sentence.

Mr. Stephens brought a motion seeking to set aside the dismissal of his motion for leave to appeal as abandoned, to appoint amicus curiae, and to order a fresh psychiatric report regarding his criminal responsibility.

The court found no explanation for reinstating the abandoned motion, no proper foundation for a new psychiatric report, and no basis for appointing amicus curiae.

The motion was dismissed.