Paul Joseph Calarco

The appellant pleaded guilty to unprovoked aggravated assault against a fellow NCR resident, causing severe life-threatening injuries and permanent serious brain damage.

He was sentenced to four years' imprisonment, less credit for presentence custody.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentencing judge erred in failing to further reduce his sentence to reflect the harsh presentence custody conditions he experienced due to his mental illness.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, holding that the sentencing judge expressly considered and gave credit for the appellant's mental health difficulties in custody and imposed a sentence at the lower end of the appropriate range.

An appeal concerning a non-publication order imposed under section 517 of the Criminal Code at a bail hearing.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued reasons for decision regarding the applicability and scope of the publication ban, which restricts the publication, broadcast, or transmission of evidence, information, representations, and reasons given at the bail hearing.

This decision concerns a non-publication order imposed under section 517 of the Criminal Code at a bail hearing.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued reasons addressing the application of the publication ban, which restricts the publication, broadcast, or transmission of evidence, information, representations, and reasons given at the bail hearing.

The decision itself contains information covered by the non-publication order and will only be made available on the Court of Appeal's website once the order ceases to be in effect.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of Varinder Singh, who had been convicted after a jury trial of obtaining sexual services for consideration.

The court found that the trial judge erred by directing a verdict of guilt on a lesser included offence, rather than leaving the verdict to the jury.

The court held that, even where the evidence is overwhelming, an accused is entitled to the jury’s verdict.

A new trial was ordered on the included offence.

The appellant, Jason Windebank, appealed his designation as a Dangerous Offender and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence following convictions for violent offences against his domestic partner.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge’s errors were immaterial, that Gladue principles were sufficiently considered, and that the judge properly exercised her discretion in imposing an indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the Crown’s appeal from a sentencing decision that declined to impose a SOIRA order on the respondent, who had pled guilty to sexual interference with a 15-year-old.

The appellate court found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to apply the statutory presumption in favour of a SOIRA order and by not properly considering all relevant factors under s. 490.012(4) of the Criminal Code.

The court set aside the exemption and imposed the SOIRA order.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a home invasion at a university residence and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in jury selection, misdirected the jury on reasonable doubt, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended an expert opinion on his likelihood of re-offending.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's jury screening or instructions, and upheld the sentence as eminently fit given the gravity of the offence and the appellant's extensive criminal record.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter for acting as the getaway driver in a premeditated murder-for-hire plot.

He was sentenced to nine and a half years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred in finding he was aware the shooter had a gun and that the sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge's factual conclusions were supported by the evidence and consistent with the jury's verdict.

The sentence was held to be fit given the appellant's significant moral culpability and the premeditated nature of the offence.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges including sexual exploitation and sexual assault.

The appeal argued that the trial judge erred by relying on stereotypical reasoning in assessing the complainant's credibility and by overemphasizing peripheral inconsistencies in the context of childhood abuse.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's repeated focus on why the complainant continued to engage with the respondent, despite knowing the risk of assault, constituted stereotypical reasoning, which is an error of law.

This error was deemed to have materially affected the verdict, as the trial judge's assessment of the respondent's credibility was inextricably linked to her flawed assessment of the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence of seven years imprisonment for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, which was consecutive to a prior four-year sentence for similar offences.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge failed to apply the totality principle, resulting in an unfit total sentence of eleven years.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge did consider the totality principle and that the combined sentences were fit, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence given the quantity of drugs, commercial gain, and the commission of new offences while on release.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal after being convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching against his daughter and two nieces, for which he received a 10-year sentence.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The court found the grounds of appeal, concerning similar fact evidence and the trial judge's assessment of credibility, to be weak, though not frivolous.

In balancing enforceability and reviewability under section 679(3)(c) of the Criminal Code, the court emphasized the seriousness of the offences, the vulnerability of the victims, and the breach of trust, concluding that the public interest in enforceability outweighed the interest in reviewability.

The appellant, William Savage, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

The appeal raised several grounds, including issues with oath-helping evidence, the sufficiency of cautionary instructions regarding a key witness's reliability, the use of ante-mortem statements, instructions on post-offence conduct, alleged misstatements by Crown counsel in closing arguments, the W.(D.) instruction, and the trial judge's decision to instruct the jury on included offences (second-degree murder and manslaughter).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's instructions or the Crown's conduct that would warrant a new trial.

The appellant, O.F., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his 15-month sentence.

The appeal raised issues regarding the admissibility of fresh evidence (social media chats/postings), the trial judge's dismissal of a s. 276 application to admit prior sexual activity evidence, and the finding that consent was vitiated by abuse of a position of trust.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence application due to lack of cogency and credibility.

It upheld the trial judge's s. 276 ruling, finding the prior sexual activity irrelevant to consent or honest but mistaken belief in consent, and that the defence's argument invoked prohibited twin-myth reasoning.

The court found it unnecessary to rule on the vitiated consent issue, as the trial judge's finding of no factual consent was dispositive.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the appeal was dismissed, as the 15-month sentence for a sexual assault on a vulnerable victim was deemed fit.

The appellants, C.O. and N.P., appealed convictions for failure to provide necessaries of life and an order for a new trial on unlawful confinement, stemming from the unsanitary conditions in their apartment and the confinement of their four-year-old daughter, J. The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, affirming that risk of harm is an element of the necessaries offence under s. 215(2)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code and that the conditions of confinement are relevant to the "lawful authority" defence under s. 279(2).

The court found the trial judge erred in refusing to take judicial notice of the health risks posed by the cumulative unsanitary conditions.

The matter was remitted for sentencing on the necessaries charge.

The appellant, Jevane Fuller, appealed his convictions for multiple break and enters, assault, confinement, and robbery, and his total sentence of 15 years.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of a key witness's evidence and the admission of similar act evidence, both cross-count and from prior Toronto robberies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, and the appeal was allowed only to the extent of removing a victim fine surcharge, with the overall 15-year sentence upheld as fit.

The appellant, Dwayne Brown, appealed his conviction for drug trafficking offences, challenging the validity of a general warrant that authorized covert entries into a storage locker.

Police discovered cocaine, marijuana, oxycodone, alprazolam, and Canadian currency in the locker.

Brown argued that the warrant violated his s. 8 Charter rights, contending that the reviewing judge applied an incorrect standard for reasonable grounds and that the requirements of s. 487.01 of the Criminal Code were not met.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the reviewing judge correctly applied the "reasonable probability" standard for issuing the warrant and that all statutory preconditions for a general warrant, including the "best interests of the administration of justice" and "no other provision" elements, were satisfied.

The Crown sought leave to appeal two sentences imposed on the respondent for failing to remain at the scene of an accident and firearms offences, arguing that the first sentencing judge erred in calculating pretrial custody credit, which impacted the subsequent sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted leave for both appeals.

For the first sentence (Marshall #1), the Court found the trial judge erred by departing from an agreed-upon "Duncan" credit and by "double counting" mitigating factors, varying the pretrial custody credit from 39 days to 107 days, but not altering the suspended sentence.

For the second sentence (Marshall #2), the Court dismissed the Crown's appeal, upholding the suspended sentence, finding that the trial judge was entitled to give substantial credit for guilty pleas given the unique circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on the justice system.

The appellant, Todd Crowe, appealed his total sentence of twelve years imprisonment for drug trafficking and weapons offences.

He argued that the concurrent four-year sentences for possession of proceeds exceeded the statutory maximum and that the sentencing judge failed to properly apply Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal reduced the sentences for possession of proceeds to 18 months concurrently, as conceded by the Crown, but dismissed the appeal regarding the Gladue principles, finding no error in the sentencing judge's application or the weight given to the factors.

The court also denied the admission of fresh evidence.

The accused, R.A., appealed a global sentence of five and one-half years' imprisonment (reduced to five years for time served) imposed after pleading guilty to sexual assault, making sexually explicit material available to a child, and two counts of child luring.

The complainant was 15 years old, and the accused also engaged with an undercover officer posing as a 14-year-old.

The sentencing judge considered significant mitigating factors, including a guilty plea, remorse, openness to therapeutic intervention, absence of a criminal record, and strong work history, alongside aggravating factors such as the victim's age, age gap, grooming techniques, and repeated sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle by the sentencing judge and concluding that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The court affirmed the importance of deterrence and denunciation for child sexual offences and noted that mid-single digit penitentiary terms are normal for such crimes.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and the mandatory victim fine surcharge following convictions for criminal harassment and breaching a Long-Term Supervision Order.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by relying on a victim impact statement without cross-examination, and by finding his conduct met the threshold for a serious personal injury offence and the criteria for a dangerous offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against the designation, finding no error in the sentencing judge's reliance on the victim impact statement or his application of the dangerous offender provisions.

The appeal against the victim fine surcharge was allowed on consent.