Paul Joseph Calarco

The appellant appealed a substantial penitentiary sentence, arguing for a reformatory term combined with lengthy probation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the sentencing judge given the gravity of the offences, the appellant's serious criminal record, and parole violations.

A fresh evidence application was also dismissed as insufficient to impact the appeal.

The accused applicant sought extraordinary relief to quash a preliminary inquiry into a sexual assault charge and have it recommence before a different judge.

The applicant argued the preliminary inquiry judge created a reasonable apprehension of bias by expressing a tentative view on the sufficiency of the evidence and then continuing the inquiry as a discovery in his absence.

The Superior Court granted the application, finding that while expressing a tentative view alone does not create bias, proceeding as a discovery immediately afterward gave the appearance of a firm view.

Furthermore, the court held that under the Criminal Code, a preliminary inquiry judge must be present to hear the evidence and cannot allow the inquiry to proceed in their absence without consent.

The accused brought an application in the Superior Court of Justice challenging proceedings conducted before a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice.

The applicant sought to have the earlier proceedings set aside and to require that a preliminary inquiry be held.

The court granted the application and quashed the proceedings before the Ontario Court of Justice.

The matter was remitted to the Ontario Court of Justice, differently constituted, with directions that a preliminary inquiry be commenced.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge breached his right to be present at his trial under s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code by holding in-chambers discussions about a Parks challenge and having private conversations with potential jurors.

The Court of Appeal held that the in-chambers discussions were preliminary and did not breach the Code.

While the private discussions with potential jurors did breach s. 650(1), the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iv), finding that the appellant suffered no prejudice as his counsel was present, no objections were raised, and all jurors spoken to privately were excused.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence following convictions for aggravated sexual assault and other offences against a 13-year-old girl.

He argued the sentencing judge failed to consider the age-related decline in recidivism and the potential for a long-term supervision order with mandatory drug treatment conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's conclusion that there was no reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community, given the appellant's history of non-compliance with treatment and deception of supervisors.

The appellant, who became a quadriplegic following the incidents, appealed his convictions for five counts of sexual assault against a minor and his 30-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge and concluding the verdict was not unreasonable.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that incarceration was not necessary given the extraordinary circumstances of the appellant's severe physical infirmity, and reduced the sentence to two years less a day to be served conditionally.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder in the death of his three-year-old niece.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding his false statement to the police and by admitting evidence of prior acts of abuse against the child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no risk that the jury misused the false statement to infer intent, and holding that the prior abuse evidence was highly probative of animus and intent.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and corrupting morals, arguing that the trial judge gave inadequate reasons for treating the complainant's testimony differently across the charges and that the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge clearly explained his reasoning for acquitting on the sexual assault count while convicting on the others, and that there was ample evidence to support the convictions.

The accused pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting a 66-year-old vulnerable woman with a weapon in the maintenance room of an apartment building.

The assault involved forced fellatio, attempted anal penetration, forced crack cocaine use, and vaginal intercourse without protection.

The victim suffered severe physical injuries and devastating long-term psychological trauma including post-traumatic stress disorder.

The court imposed a sentence of 6.5 years less 14 months pre-trial custody, resulting in a further 5 years and 4 months incarceration, along with a lifetime firearms prohibition, DNA order, and 20-year Sexual Offender Information Registration Act compliance.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, reducing the sentence to two years less a day.

The three young person appellants appealed their convictions for gang sexual assault and forcible confinement.

They argued the trial judge erred in his credibility findings and application of the W.(D.) analysis regarding their defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) analysis, made supportable credibility findings, and reasonably concluded the complainant did not consent and the appellants did not have an honest belief in her consent.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and simple possession of cocaine and ecstasy, receiving a five-year sentence.

The drugs were found in his apartment following a gunfight, though he was acquitted of weapons charges and his role in the trafficking operation was unclear.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the five-year sentence disproportionate for the small amount of cocaine (14.87 grams) and held the trial judge erred by failing to consider the appellant's rehabilitation efforts and assistance to police.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence reduced to time served (14 months and nine days).

The respondent pled guilty to aggravated assault and was convicted of assault with a weapon after striking one victim with a beer bottle and another with a sword at a house party.

The trial judge imposed a six-month conditional sentence.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that while a conditional sentence was open to the trial judge, the duration and terms were wholly inadequate to address denunciation and general deterrence.

The appeal was allowed and the conditional sentence was increased to two years less seven days, with house arrest for the first seven months.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's disposition, noting the trial judge considered all relevant principles, the seriousness of the offence, a Gladue report, and the respondent's substantial progress in addressing his alcohol problem prior to sentencing.

The respondent's post-sentence progress further confirmed the wisdom of the sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The young person appealed their conviction for assault and robbery, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on the evidence of a tainted witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly instructed himself in accordance with Vetrovec and reasonably relied on independent confirmatory evidence, even though it did not directly implicate the appellant.

The appellant appealed his convictions and total sentence of 14.5 years for sexually assaulting his two daughters, obstructing justice, and breaching an undertaking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's jury instructions on credibility.

The sentence appeal was largely dismissed, as the severe sentence was justified by the appellant's persistent, degrading abuse and gross breach of trust.

However, the court varied a 9-year concurrent sentence for assault to one year concurrent, as the original sentence was illegal.

The young person appealed his conviction for robbery of a fast food delivery driver.

The sole issue at trial was identification, which the trial judge determined based on video surveillance, clothing seized upon arrest, and cell phone records.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reliance on the video surveillance or her application of the Nikolovski principle to compare the accused with the person in the video.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and break and enter after attacking his former partner and her new partner.

He was designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate penitentiary term.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred by relying on statements he made during a pre-trial fitness assessment, claiming they were protected under s. 672.21 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying R. v. Jones to hold that such statements are admissible at the sentencing stage to accurately evaluate the danger posed by the offender.

The Court also found the appellant had consented to the admission of the psychiatric evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and his sentence of eight and a half years imprisonment.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting lay opinion evidence, relying on bank photographs for identification, and accepting photo line-up evidence that did not strictly follow the Sophonow protocol.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the trial judge's identification analysis or reliance on the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was measured and within the range suggested by trial counsel.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal judge's decision upholding the respondent's acquittal for refusing to provide a breath sample.

The trial judge had accepted the respondent's evidence regarding why he ran from the police, a factual finding the Crown acknowledged could support an acquittal.

The Crown appealed the reasoning rather than the result.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, noting the issue was primarily factual, the legal question would not create problems in other cases, and there had been extensive delay by the Crown in perfecting the appeal.