Paul Joseph Calarco

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial for manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death.

The applicant struck a pedestrian with his vehicle and fled the scene, leaving the victim helpless on the ground.

Shortly after, a reversing tractor-trailer ran over the victim, causing his death.

The applicant argued the preliminary inquiry judge erred in applying the test for causation, asserting the tractor-trailer was an intervening act.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's failure to remain was inherently dangerous and carried a reasonably foreseeable risk of immediate and substantial harm, establishing a legal basis for causation.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's risk assessment and disposition were reasonable and supported by reasons that bear a somewhat probing examination.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for offences including robbery with a firearm and aggravated assault.

The trial judge had erred by failing to apply the five-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 344(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Despite this error, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, declining to interfere with the sentence.

The Court noted the respondent's youth, the co-offender's sentence, and fresh evidence demonstrating substantial rehabilitative gains during his time in the reformatory system.

On a summary conviction sentence appeal arising from a road rage assault, the appellant challenged a no-weapons probation condition and a five-year firearms prohibition imposed after a conditional discharge.

The court admitted fresh evidence concerning the appellant’s competitive shooting activities, firearm ownership, training, and post-sentence completion of anger management, applying the Palmer framework flexibly in the interests of justice.

The court held the sentencing judge applied the proper public safety test under s. 110 of the Criminal Code and that both the probation term and firearms prohibition remained reasonable despite the fresh evidence.

The appeal was dismissed, except that the appellant was given 30 days to lawfully transfer or surrender firearms and ammunition.

On a summary conviction appeal from an over-80 conviction, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing a bolus drinking defence where the breath samples were taken outside the two-hour window and the Crown relied on toxicological opinion evidence.

The court held that the trial judge improperly treated the appellant as bearing the burden of raising a reasonable doubt about an assumption underlying the expert opinion, rather than requiring the Crown to prove the factual foundation of that opinion beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also found a central misapprehension of the evidence because the trial judge said there was no evidence of recent drinking despite accepting the appellant as credible.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

A contempt of court proceeding against defence counsel Gina DaFonte for her failure to attend court on multiple occasions in a domestic violence matter involving an application to strike guilty pleas.

The respondent failed to appear on January 28, February 4, and February 10, 2014, and most critically on March 10, 2014, despite a court order compelling her attendance on a pre-emptory hearing date.

The court found the respondent guilty of criminal contempt in the face of the court, finding that her conduct demonstrated reckless indifference to her obligations to the court and her client, despite her claims of illness.

The court imposed a fine and referred the matter to the Law Society of Upper Canada.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in calculating pre-trial custody credit.

The Court of Appeal held that because the appellant was detained under section 524(4) of the Criminal Code, the statute restricted credit to a 1:1 basis rather than 1.5:1.

The appeal was allowed to reflect a corrected effective sentence of 169 days, which had already been served.

The appellant appealed his conviction for three historical sexual offences against a minor, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility and reliability.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the trial judge's application of legal principles, noting the trial judge properly considered demeanour, level of detail, and explanations for delayed disclosure.

The appeal against conviction was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was abandoned.

The accused was charged with Impaired Care or Control and Over 80 Care or Control following a motor vehicle incident.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence based on alleged violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the accused's right to counsel under section 10(b) was violated when the officer detained him pending the arrival of an approved screening device but refused to allow him to contact counsel via his cellular telephone, despite knowing a significant delay would occur and that counsel would realistically be available during business hours on a Tuesday afternoon.

The court excluded the evidence and acquitted the accused on both counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that he was deprived of a fair trial due to unfair and inflammatory cross-examination and jury addresses by Crown counsel.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence of alleged juror misconduct based on online comments made after the trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while some of the Crown's comments were ill-advised, they did not deprive the appellant of a fair trial when viewed in the context of the entire proceedings.

The court also dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence, concluding it did not prove Crown misconduct or compromise the integrity of the trial.

This is a voir dire concerning the competency and qualifications of a Tigrinya language interpreter proffered by the Crown.

The defendant challenged the interpreter's qualifications despite his passing grade on the Ministry of the Attorney General interpretation test, arguing for an inherent error factor of approximately 30%.

The court rejected this argument, finding that mathematical precision is not required in interpretation and that the interpreter met the constitutional standard under the Charter.

The court held that interpretation is an inherently human endeavour that does not require perfection, and that the interpreter was competent to provide services during trial.

The appellant appealed his sentence.

The Crown conceded that the circumstances of the appellant's confinement justified a 1.5 to 1 credit for pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to time served.

An accused previously found unfit to stand trial as a young person sought certiorari to quash a Youth Court order finding that the Crown had established a prima facie case under s. 672.33 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown had proceeded ex parte and without notice to the accused, relying solely on an affidavit from a police officer asserting that reasonable grounds existed to believe the accused committed the offences.

The reviewing court held that the Youth Court initially had jurisdiction but lost it by proceeding ex parte, failing to require an extension of time, and relying on evidence that did not meet the admissibility requirements of s. 672.33(4).

Although the order was quashed, the Superior Court held that it lacked jurisdiction on certiorari to enter an acquittal.

The matter was remitted to the Youth Court to determine any application to extend time and to reconsider the prima facie issue on proper evidence.

The appellant sought leave to appeal an 18-month custodial sentence imposed for an integral, though indirect, role in a home invasion.

She argued the sentencing judge failed to apply the principle governing first custodial sentences and failed to properly assess evidence of rehabilitation.

The court held there was no basis to interfere because the sentencing judge carefully considered the appellant's personal circumstances, first-offender status, and rehabilitative progress.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the 90-day intermittent sentence and three years' probation imposed on a first-time offender for possession of a loaded firearm and possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number.

The sentencing judge had erroneously concluded that a conditional sentence was statutorily unavailable for both counts and imposed a single global sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that while a conditional sentence was unavailable for the loaded firearm count, it was available for the defaced serial number count.

The court substituted individual sentences totaling two years less a day, allowing the offender to serve the majority of the sentence in the community to continue her rehabilitation.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm and kidnapping, applied for an extension of time to appeal and for the appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown consented to the time extension but opposed the appointment of counsel.

The Court of Appeal granted the application, finding that the applicant lacked the means to retain counsel and could not effectively present his complex appeal, which included arguable grounds regarding after-the-fact conduct, Vetrovec warnings, and prior inconsistent statements.

The court referred the matter to Legal Aid Ontario, ordering that if legal aid is refused, counsel be appointed with fees paid by the Attorney General.

The applicant sought an order directing a court reporter to produce appeal transcripts at the copy rate of $0.55 per page, rather than the original rate of $3.75 per page, because the transcripts had already been produced for the trial.

The court granted the motion, applying the Court Services Division policy that balances access to justice with fair compensation for court reporters, and ordered that the copy rate applies to previously transcribed portions.

The appellants were convicted of importing firearms and alcohol from the United States into Canada.

One appellant's conviction appeal was dismissed as the trial judge properly assessed the unsavoury co-accused witness's testimony and found sufficient corroboration.

The other two appellants' conviction appeals were allowed and new trials ordered because the trial judge's reasons failed to address whether they had the requisite mens rea (knowledge or wilful blindness) for the firearms offences, as opposed to just the alcohol offences.

One appellant's sentence for the alcohol offences was varied to time served.

The trial judge found the accused guilty of gun-related offences and adjourned for sentencing.

Months later, the trial judge stated he had reconsidered the findings of guilt, reopened the matter, and entered acquittals without hearing submissions from the Crown.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that while a trial judge sitting alone has jurisdiction to vacate a conviction prior to sentencing in exceptional circumstances, the judge erred in law by entering an acquittal without giving the parties an opportunity to make submissions.

The appropriate remedy was to declare a mistrial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence for a large-scale commercial grow operation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no breach of section 8 of the Charter after applying judicial editing to the search warrant.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge did not err in concluding that a conditional sentence was inappropriate for this type of offence.