Christine Josic

Following jury convictions for multiple firearms and drug trafficking offences, the court sentenced the offender for possessing three loaded prohibited handguns, overcapacity magazines, ammunition, and fentanyl, cocaine, and oxycodone.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for firearms and fentanyl trafficking offences, while also materially reducing moral culpability in light of the offender's anti-Black racism context, childhood instability, community violence exposure, and the IRCA evidence.

Applying concurrency within offence categories, consecutive treatment between firearms and drug categories, and the totality principle, the court reduced the global sentence from 14 years to 12 years.

After Summers credit for pre-trial custody and Duncan credit for harsh detention conditions, the remaining sentence was nine years and five months, together with lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA, and forfeiture orders.

The accused, Connor-Jay Cassells-Watson, was detained and searched by police during an operation targeting his co-accused.

During the detention, police conducted a pat-down search and discovered a loaded handgun in the accused's waistband.

The accused brought a Charter application under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) seeking to exclude the firearm, arguing arbitrary detention, unreasonable search, and delayed access to counsel.

The court found a breach of section 10(b) due to an unexplained delay in transporting the accused to the police station, and assumed a section 8 breach for the sake of analysis.

However, applying the section 24(2) balancing test, the court determined that the administration of justice would not be brought into disrepute by admitting the firearm, and dismissed the application.

The applicant, charged with various firearm offences, sought a bail review of a detention order made by a Justice of the Peace.

The applicant argued the Justice of the Peace erred in law by finding the proposed release plan and surety inadequate to address secondary ground concerns, and that a proposed move to the Niagara region constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding no error of law or misapprehension of evidence in the original decision, and concluding that the proposed change of residence was not a material change.

Accused persons charged following a large police investigation sought disclosure of source materials underlying wiretap authorizations to support anticipated Garofoli and Dawson applications.

The defence argued that all investigative materials, including pre‑Part VI materials referenced or relied upon by the affiant, were presumptively relevant and disclosable under Stinchcombe principles.

The Attorney General of Ontario argued that disclosure should be limited to materials relevant to the accused’s ability to make full answer and defence at trial unless the defence first demonstrated a reasonable possibility that additional materials would assist in challenging the authorization.

The court acknowledged conceptual difficulties with the Crown’s narrower approach but held that existing authorities required an accused to meet a minimal relevance threshold before obtaining additional disclosure beyond what was before the authorizing judge.

Applying principles of judicial comity and following prior decisions adopting that approach, the court dismissed the disclosure applications.

The appellant appealed his sentence.

The Crown conceded that the circumstances of the appellant's confinement justified a 1.5 to 1 credit for pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to time served.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

He brought a pre-trial application to exclude evidence, arguing his arrest was unlawful because the undercover officer who allegedly formed the grounds for arrest did not testify, violating his s. 9 Charter rights, and that the subsequent warrantless searches of his person and vehicle violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court dismissed the application, finding the arresting officer had subjective and objective reasonable and probable grounds to order the arrest based on the totality of circumstances, including observations of hand-to-hand transactions.

The court also held the vehicle search was a lawful search incident to arrest.

The offender was convicted by a jury of possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown sought a penitentiary term of two years, citing the offender's prior convictions for similar offences.

The defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court weighed the aggravating factor of the offender's criminal record against his compliance with previous court orders and his 40 months on bail without incident.

The court concluded that the offender did not pose a danger to the community and imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by 12 months of probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for importing and trafficking almost 112 kilograms of cocaine.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence in finding reasonable and probable grounds for the search.

The Court of Appeal found no material misapprehensions of evidence and upheld the conviction.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was within the proper range given the unprecedented quantity of drugs and the appellant's prior record for the same offence.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that the approximately 35½‑month delay between arrest and trial violated the right to be tried within a reasonable time.

Applying the framework from R. v. Morin, the court assessed the length of delay, waiver, reasons for delay, and prejudice.

Significant portions of the delay were attributed to neutral causes, including the co‑accused’s efforts to retain counsel and institutional scheduling limitations, with only minimal Crown delay.

The court found no demonstrable prejudice to the accused’s liberty, security, or trial fairness interests.

Balancing the individual and societal interests, the court concluded that the delay did not amount to a Charter breach.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that a pat-down search conducted by a police officer was unreasonable and that the trial judge's finding that the cocaine belonged to him was speculative.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the search was conducted solely for officer safety and that the amount and value of the cocaine justified the inference of ownership.