Anna Martin

The appellant challenged a conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking in carfentanil and fentanyl found in a bedroom linked to a suspected drug operation, arguing that the circumstantial evidence did not exclude the reasonable possibility that a former co-accused possessed the drugs.

Applying the circumstantial evidence principles in Villaroman and appellate deference to a trial judge’s inference drawing, the court held that the alternative theory was speculative because the appellant had keys to the building and unit, had been seen repeatedly in the bedroom, and had been linked to a debt list found there, while the former co-accused had none of those connections.

The appellant also sought to reduce a fit 10-year sentence through fresh evidence of extensive post-sentence rehabilitation.

Applying the Palmer criteria and sentence appeal principles concerning changed circumstances, the court refused the fresh evidence and held the sentence remained fit because rehabilitation had already been recognized as a major mitigating factor and ongoing custodial progress was better addressed by correctional and parole authorities.

The conviction appeal and sentence appeal were dismissed, although leave to appeal sentence was granted.

The court sentenced Tahir Ul-Haq for trafficking fentanyl, after he sold what he believed to be cocaine to a friend, resulting in one death and one serious injury.

The court found that Mr. Ul-Haq was not a commercial trafficker, did not know the substance was fentanyl, and sold it as a favour without profit.

The sentence imposed was a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by probation, with ancillary orders.

The decision carefully weighs aggravating and mitigating factors, including the tragic consequences, Mr. Ul-Haq’s personal circumstances, and the collateral immigration consequences of conviction.

The defendant, Kelvon Clarke, was charged with possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime not exceeding $5,000.

Police executed a search warrant at an apartment, finding controlled substances and cash.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on video evidence showing Clarke entering the building with a distinctive purple bag, which was later found in the apartment containing the bulk of the drugs.

The court found Clarke guilty, concluding that the only reasonable inference based on the totality of the evidence was his knowledge and control of the drugs, either through physical possession, constructive possession, joint possession, or aiding.

The applicant brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) rights during the execution of a search warrant at an apartment where he was a found-in.

The police discovered approximately 1.3 kgs of fentanyl in the apartment and smaller quantities of drugs and cash on the applicant.

The applicant alleged police used excessive force by tackling and punching him, and conducted an unreasonable search.

The Crown conceded a s. 10(b) breach due to a 30-minute delay in providing rights to counsel.

The court dismissed the other Charter claims, finding the police use of force and manner of detention were reasonable given the dynamic and potentially volatile situation.

The court declined to stay the proceedings or exclude the evidence under s. 24, concluding the physical evidence was not obtained as a result of the s. 10(b) breach and its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Lin Yang appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the sole defence witness, Ze Yi Xu, who offered exculpatory evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made two material errors in assessing Mr. Xu's credibility: a misapprehension of evidence regarding vehicle availability and an illogical reasoning error concerning Mr. Xu's delay in informing the police.

These errors were deemed essential to the trial judge's rejection of the witness's testimony.

The appeal was allowed, and a retrial was ordered.

The accused applied to exclude evidence of 18 kilograms of cocaine, 7 kilograms of crystal methamphetamine, and over $200,000 in cash seized during a drug trafficking investigation.

They alleged multiple Charter violations, including unreasonable search of a condominium parking garage, arbitrary arrest, warrantless entry into a dwelling, and denial of the right to counsel.

The court found that the police did not violate sections 8 or 9 of the Charter, as the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the garage and the police had reasonable grounds for arrest.

However, the court found breaches of section 10(b) due to a failure to hold off questioning and a delay in facilitating access to counsel.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute and dismissed the application.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and possession for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the trial judge gave deficient jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification, voice identification, and circumstantial evidence (Villaroman caution).

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did err in failing to provide these cautions.

However, the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, finding that the evidence against the appellant was overwhelming, making a conviction inevitable despite the errors.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant brought a Charter motion to exclude drugs and money seized from her apartment during a police search.

The police obtained a warrant based on information from confidential informants targeting two other individuals, believing one of them lived with the applicant.

The court found the Information to Obtain (ITO) did not disclose reasonable grounds to believe the target lived at the applicant's address, rendering the warrant invalid and the search a violation of section 8 of the Charter.

Additionally, the police seriously breached the applicant's section 10(b) right to counsel by failing to facilitate contact with her lawyer despite her repeated requests.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded the serious, multiple Charter breaches and their significant impact on the applicant's privacy and security interests warranted the exclusion of the evidence.

The appellant, Todd Crowe, appealed his total sentence of twelve years imprisonment for drug trafficking and weapons offences.

He argued that the concurrent four-year sentences for possession of proceeds exceeded the statutory maximum and that the sentencing judge failed to properly apply Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal reduced the sentences for possession of proceeds to 18 months concurrently, as conceded by the Crown, but dismissed the appeal regarding the Gladue principles, finding no error in the sentencing judge's application or the weight given to the factors.

The court also denied the admission of fresh evidence.

The accused applied for a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, seeking release on a house arrest plan with two sureties and GPS monitoring.

The accused was previously detained on the secondary ground due to a substantial likelihood of reoffending, having allegedly committed the current drug trafficking offences while on multiple bails.

The court found that while there was a material change in circumstances, the proposed sureties lacked sufficient knowledge of the accused to provide effective supervision.

The application was dismissed as the release plan did not adequately address the secondary ground concerns.

The applicant sought an order under ss. 462.34(1) and 462.34(4) of the Criminal Code for the return of $99,475 in seized Canadian currency to cover reasonable legal expenses.

The primary issue was whether the applicant was required to apply for Legal Aid funding as a prerequisite.

The court, informed by R. v. Rafilovich, found that requiring a Legal Aid application would conflict with the statutory objectives of providing access to counsel and upholding the presumption of innocence, especially given the applicant's desire for counsel of choice.

The court was satisfied that the applicant had an interest in the seized property and no other available assets or means.

The application for the return of funds for legal expenses was granted, with the reasonableness of the expenses to be determined at a subsequent in camera hearing.

The accused, an Indigenous man with a significant history of trauma and addiction, pleaded guilty to possession of crystal methamphetamine and a heroin/fentanyl mixture for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a global sentence of 5 years, while the defence sought 3 years.

Applying Gladue principles and weighing the severe aggravating factors of the drugs involved against the accused's background, the court imposed a global sentence of 5 years.

The accused received enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody and harsh conditions, resulting in 45 months and 24 days left to serve.

The accused entered a guilty plea to possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and possession of methylenedioxyethylvalerone (bath salts) for the purpose of trafficking.

The plea was entered shortly after the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the mandatory minimum sentence in R. v. Nur.

The accused subsequently sought to have the plea struck, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court struck the plea, but not on the basis of ineffective assistance.

Rather, the court found that the accused did not fully understand the ramifications of entering the plea, particularly that Charter violations could no longer be argued post-plea.

The court noted the accused's tendency to hear what he wanted to hear and the difficulty in assessing his true comprehension of the proceedings.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence for trafficking in fentanyl and using a forged prescription.

The conviction was based entirely on circumstantial evidence of identity.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty of three counts of using a forged document and three counts of trafficking in fentanyl, sentencing him to six years imprisonment less eighteen months credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable because the evidence was insufficient to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt and that another person could have impersonated him using fake identification.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the circumstantial evidence of identity was sufficient and that the trial judge properly applied the legal standard for convictions based on circumstantial evidence.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the six-year sentence was fit and proportionate to the appellant's role in the trafficking ring.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking contrary to section 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Police seized 81.64 grams of cocaine powder from the accused's family residence where three young children and a teenager were living.

The Crown sought a 15-month custodial sentence, while the defence sought 3 to 6 months followed by probation.

The court imposed a 6-month custodial sentence followed by 3 years' probation with conditions including a curfew and 180 hours of community service.

The court balanced aggravating factors (quantity of drugs, prior trafficking conviction, presence of children in the home) against significant mitigating factors (full cooperation with police, genuine remorse, role as primary caregiver and financial provider for extended family, successful completion of counselling, low risk of reoffending).

A youth was charged with two counts of possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking following a police raid on an apartment.

The Crown alleged the accused moved a white plastic bag containing 89.76 grams of cocaine using his foot while police were present.

The accused conceded possession of 1.19 grams of crack cocaine found sewn into his pants.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused possessed the larger quantity of cocaine in the white bag for purposes of trafficking, or alternatively, whether he was in joint or constructive possession of drugs in the apartment or was a party to the offence.

The court found the accused guilty of simple possession of the crack cocaine on his person but acquitted him of possession for purposes of trafficking on both counts.

The defendant, a 19-year-old first-time offender, pleaded guilty to trafficking in cocaine on January 16, 2015, with two additional trafficking incidents read in on consent.

The Crown sought an intermittent custody sentence, while the defence sought a suspended sentence with probation.

The court found exceptional circumstances existed based on the defendant's difficult background, including childhood trauma, abuse, and displacement, combined with demonstrated rehabilitation efforts post-offence.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with a two-year probation term, finding that custody would jeopardize rehabilitation and that protection of the public was better served by a non-custodial sentence.

The accused was convicted of obstruct police, personation, and possession of marijuana, and acquitted of three counts of assault police and one count of threatening an officer.

The court found breaches of sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to extensive police misconduct, including excessive force, collusion, and false testimony.

The Crown sought a reduced sentence as the remedy, while the defence sought a stay of proceedings.

The court granted a stay of proceedings for all three remaining offences, finding that the depth and breadth of police misconduct—including failure to address injuries, false statements to superiors, unchallenged assault, collusion in notes and testimony, and excessive force against a restrained and defenceless accused—was so egregious that only a stay could adequately address the damage to the integrity of the justice system.

The accused was charged with uttering threats, assault on three police officers, obstruction of justice, fraudulent personation, and possession of marijuana following his arrest for public intoxication.

The trial examined events occurring on January 5-6, 2012, spanning arrest, transport, booking, strip search, and cell detention.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused obstructed police by falsely identifying himself as his brother Richard Young and was in possession of marijuana.

However, the Crown failed to prove the threat and assault charges.

The court found the defence established on a balance of probabilities that the accused's Charter rights under sections 7 and 12 were violated through excessive force applied by police at the booking parade and in the holding cell.