David Hakim

The appellant challenged a conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking in carfentanil and fentanyl found in a bedroom linked to a suspected drug operation, arguing that the circumstantial evidence did not exclude the reasonable possibility that a former co-accused possessed the drugs.

Applying the circumstantial evidence principles in Villaroman and appellate deference to a trial judge’s inference drawing, the court held that the alternative theory was speculative because the appellant had keys to the building and unit, had been seen repeatedly in the bedroom, and had been linked to a debt list found there, while the former co-accused had none of those connections.

The appellant also sought to reduce a fit 10-year sentence through fresh evidence of extensive post-sentence rehabilitation.

Applying the Palmer criteria and sentence appeal principles concerning changed circumstances, the court refused the fresh evidence and held the sentence remained fit because rehabilitation had already been recognized as a major mitigating factor and ongoing custodial progress was better addressed by correctional and parole authorities.

The conviction appeal and sentence appeal were dismissed, although leave to appeal sentence was granted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sexual interference against his stepdaughter, contrary to sections 271 and 151(a) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued that the trial judge improperly used the complainant's lack of embellishment as a credibility factor, contrary to Supreme Court precedent, and that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient for appellate review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reference to the complainant being a careful and cautious witness was a proper credibility assessment, and that the reasons, though brief, adequately explained the trial judge's findings when read in context and as a whole.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder, aggravated assault, and assault with a weapon following a fatal stabbing at a gathering.

The appellant claimed self-defence, asserting he acted to protect himself and a vulnerable woman from an angry group.

The trial judge instructed the jury to assess the reasonableness of the appellant's response separately for each victim, fragmenting the evidence into isolated incidents.

The jury also asked whether a group could constitute "force" under the self-defence analysis, and the trial judge's response suggested that a group alone could not constitute force without specific action.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury instructions inadequately equipped the jury to evaluate the appellant's self-defence claim by failing to address the group dynamic as a unified threat and by artificially compartmentalizing the evidence.

The applicant sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from his sentence for various firearms and drug trafficking offences.

The applicant had absconded prior to sentencing and was sentenced in absentia to 5 years and 2 months imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to demonstrate a timely intention to appeal, did not adequately explain the delay, and failed to show that the proposed appeal had merit.

The appellant, a 19-year-old first-time offender, pled guilty to possessing a loaded prohibited handgun for a dangerous purpose after brandishing it during an altercation.

The sentencing judge imposed a four-year penitentiary sentence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred by breaching the appellant's right to be heard regarding his intent to shoot, and by overlooking principles governing the sentencing of youthful first-time offenders, family separation consequences, and multiple offences arising from the same circumstances.

The appeal was allowed and a three-year sentence was substituted.

This criminal trial concerned a charge of manslaughter against Ahmed Rafin following the fatal stabbing of Maahir Dosani during a schoolyard swarming incident.

The Crown argued unlawful act manslaughter, positing that Rafin either intentionally stabbed his attackers (with Dosani being an incidental victim) or committed offenses of weapon possession and threatening.

The defence contended that Rafin acted in self-defence and lacked the requisite intent.

The court found Rafin to be a credible witness, accepting his testimony that he displayed a knife to deter an angry, armed, and numerically superior crowd while attempting to retreat.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Rafin committed an unlawful act causing Dosani's death, leading to an acquittal.

James Bay Resources Limited, having been awarded damages for breach of contract and defamation in a prior decision, sought costs of $607,759.

The court awarded costs of $309,401.91 inclusive of HST against Mak Mera Limited only, making no costs award against Adewale Olorunsola due to divided success.

The court significantly reduced the requested costs, citing over-lawyering, lack of detail in the bill of costs, the applicant's conduct unnecessarily increasing litigation costs (e.g., late document production, issues with counsel retention leading to trial adjournment), and the disproportionality of the claimed costs to the damages awarded.

The court applied a 30% reduction to account for these factors and specific deductions for certain claimed expenses.

The plaintiff corporation sued its former Nigerian business partner and its principal arising from failed oil and gas ventures and a letter sent to Nigerian regulators and Shell after the relationship collapsed.

The court held that the parties’ written agreements made compensation contingent on successful acquisition and completion of an oil and gas asset, and implied a term requiring repayment of $405,000 advanced when no qualifying acquisition was completed.

The court further found the July 2014 letter defamatory, rejected the defences of justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege, and held that malice was established through knowing or reckless misstatements made to exert commercial pressure.

Contractual repayment was ordered against the corporate defendant alone, while defamation damages of $200,000 were awarded jointly and severally against both defendants.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by granting only a 20-minute adjournment after the Crown made late disclosure of a photograph and text messages during the complainant's cross-examination.

The Superior Court found that while the trial judge's adjournment decision was based on improper principles and a faulty factual foundation, the defence was not prejudiced.

The defence was able to fully cross-examine the complainant on the new evidence, meaning no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred.

The appeal was dismissed under the curative proviso.

The plaintiff sought leave to amend her Statement of Claim to particularize allegations of sexual assault and to plead similar fact evidence against a former pediatric doctor.

The court granted leave for the particularization of the assault but dismissed the motion to plead similar facts.

The dismissal was based on Section 36(3) of the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, which prohibits the admissibility of records from disciplinary proceedings in civil actions, and the principle that pleadings should contain material facts, not evidence.

The court also addressed the plaintiff's use of initials and awarded costs to the defendants.

This decision addresses a motion concerning the authenticity of a photocopied letter that the defendants sought to introduce as an exhibit during cross-examination.

The plaintiff objected, arguing insufficient authentication.

The court, after a voir dire, clarified the low evidentiary threshold for admissibility, ruling that the witness's initial statement that the signature "appeared to be his" was sufficient to mark the document as an exhibit.

The ultimate determination of the letter's authenticity and weight was reserved for the trier of fact at the conclusion of the trial, emphasizing that authenticity disputes are best resolved at the case's end.

The plaintiff, James Bay Resources Limited, brought a motion for leave to introduce three previously undisclosed documents at trial, pursuant to Rule 53.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendants opposed the admission.

The court applied the updated discretionary Rule 53.08(1) test, which requires a reasonable explanation for the failure to disclose, no uncompensable prejudice to the opposing party, and no undue delay.

While the explanation of inadvertence was considered weak, the documents were highly relevant, and the defendants had conducted discovery on them without demonstrating actual prejudice or requesting an adjournment.

The court granted leave to admit the documents and awarded the defendants costs on a substantial indemnity basis.