Dena Oberman

The plaintiff sought leave to amend her Statement of Claim to particularize allegations of sexual assault and to plead similar fact evidence against a former pediatric doctor.

The court granted leave for the particularization of the assault but dismissed the motion to plead similar facts.

The dismissal was based on Section 36(3) of the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, which prohibits the admissibility of records from disciplinary proceedings in civil actions, and the principle that pleadings should contain material facts, not evidence.

The court also addressed the plaintiff's use of initials and awarded costs to the defendants.

The appellant tenant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing his unjust enrichment claim for yard maintenance and snow removal on the basis that the Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) had exclusive jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court found the deputy judge erred by deciding the case on a jurisdictional issue that was never pleaded or raised, denying procedural fairness.

Furthermore, the Court held that the Small Claims Court did have jurisdiction because the parties had previously reached a mediated settlement before the LTB that expressly permitted the tenant to pursue this specific claim in Small Claims Court, triggering the exception under s. 194(2) of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The matter was remitted to the deputy judge for a decision on the merits.

The Graywood defendants brought a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action in tort, arguing it was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiffs claimed property damage to their restaurant, Kit Kat Bar & Grill, caused by the adjacent construction of a high-rise condominium by the Graywood defendants.

The court found that the plaintiffs had discovered their claim by March 11, 2014, at the latest, when they reported significant damage to their insurer and believed the construction was the cause.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that ongoing settlement discussions or the lack of an expert report postponed the limitation period.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the action against the Graywood defendants.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 37.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside an administrative dismissal order for abandonment and sought leave to amend the statement of claim to add the plaintiff’s insurer as a defendant under uninsured motorist coverage.

The court applied the factors governing relief from administrative dismissal, including the explanation for delay, inadvertence, delay in bringing the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

Although the motion to set aside was not brought promptly, the court found the delay was not inordinate, the missed deadline resulted from inadvertence, and no actual prejudice was demonstrated.

The court emphasized the preference for resolving disputes on their merits.

The dismissal order was set aside and the plaintiff was granted leave to amend the claim to add the insurer.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision finding it had a duty to defend its insured under a homeowner policy against a counterclaim for negligent supervision.

The insured's child was struck by a vehicle, and the driver counterclaimed against the insured parent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the policy's exclusion for claims 'arising from' bodily injury to a household resident unambiguously applied to the counterclaim, following its previous decision in Quick v. MacKenzie and distinguishing Bawden v. Wawanesa.

An elderly condominium unit owner was allegedly injured when an unleashed dog owned by other residents attacked her on the condominium’s common elements.

The plaintiff sued the dog owners under the Dog Owners' Liability Act and the condominium corporation for negligence and under the Occupiers’ Liability Act.

The condominium corporation brought a Rule 21 motion to dismiss the action, arguing that the Dog Owners’ Liability Act exclusively governed liability and that it was not a dog owner or harbourer.

The court held that the Act does not preclude negligence or occupiers’ liability claims against a non‑owner of the dog and that it was not plain and obvious the claim against the condominium corporation could not succeed.

The motion to dismiss was therefore refused.

The defendant appealed a jury verdict finding it 100% liable for a slip and fall that injured the 96-year-old plaintiff.

The appeal was dismissed by the Registrar for delay after the defendant failed to perfect it within the required timeframes.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside the dismissal.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the failure to perfect was inadvertent, the defendant had dragged its feet, the delay prejudiced the elderly plaintiff, and the defendant failed to demonstrate any merit to the appeal.

The appellants' vehicles were towed to the respondent's repair shop after being involved in accidents.

The respondent refused to release the vehicles until its charges were paid.

The appellants' insurers disputed the charges and brought an application under s. 23 of the Repair and Storage Liens Act for a determination of the lien's propriety and amount.

The application judge dismissed the application, holding that the appellants were required to proceed under s. 24, which mandates payment of the lien amount into court.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that s. 23 and s. 24 provide mutually exclusive alternative procedures, and an owner is entitled to seek a determination under s. 23 without first paying the disputed amount into court.