Diana M. Edmonds

The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident and suffered a spinal fracture.

Liability was admitted by the defendant.

The court had to determine whether the plaintiff met the statutory threshold for permanent and serious impairment under the Insurance Act, and assess damages.

The court found significant credibility issues with the plaintiff's evidence, noting he had concealed pre-existing conditions and post-accident activities from his assessors.

Despite these credibility issues, the court accepted expert evidence that the plaintiff suffered a permanent serious impairment consisting of chronic left torso/rib pain and an adjustment disorder.

The court awarded $1,067,647 in total damages, applying substantial percentage reductions to the claimed amounts for loss of earning capacity and future care costs due to the unreliability of the plaintiff's self-reported limitations.

The plaintiff passenger sued the defendant driver for negligence after their motorcycle collided with a deer in Wisconsin.

The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the collision was an inevitable accident.

The court dismissed the motion, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding the defendant's negligence due to his speed, lack of proper eyewear in the rain, and distraction.

Using its expanded fact-finding powers under Rule 20.04(2.1), the court determined the defendant was negligent, leaving damages to be assessed at trial.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss claims by Albair William Faltas and Royal Arts Pharmaceutical Inc. Mr. Faltas's claim was challenged on the basis that he was an excluded driver and the vehicle was "operated" while uninsured.

Royal Arts Pharmaceutical Inc.'s claim was an "action per quod servitium amisit" for loss of services.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial regarding the interpretation of "operate" under the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act when a vehicle is inoperable, and affirming that per quod claims remain a valid cause of action in Ontario.

The defendant moved to dismiss or stay the action due to the plaintiff's failure to pay $33,000 in costs thrown away from a mistrial.

The plaintiff cross-moved to set aside, suspend, or vary the costs order, claiming impecuniosity.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's cross-motion, finding no basis to vary the agreed-upon costs.

The court granted the defendant's motion for a stay, but not dismissal, conditional on the plaintiff paying the costs within 60 days, failing which the action would be dismissed.

The defendant estate moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' medical malpractice action for delay.

The action was commenced in 2008 regarding treatment provided in 2006.

The plaintiffs failed to answer undertakings for years and did not move the action forward.

The defendant doctor died in 2015.

The court found the delay of almost nine years to be inordinate and inexcusable, rejecting the plaintiffs' explanation that family stress prevented them from pursuing the litigation.

The court concluded that the defendant would suffer substantial prejudice due to the doctor's death, as discovery transcripts could not adequately replace his viva voce evidence on the key issues of informed consent and negligence.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiffs moved for an order to transfer a Small Claims Court action to the Superior Court and to consolidate or try together four related actions.

By consent, the Small Claims Court action and a line of credit action were ordered to be tried together with the main action.

The contested part of the motion concerned the consolidation of the "Envirotech action" with the other three.

The court dismissed the motion to consolidate the Envirotech action, finding that it did not meet the "gateway" criteria under Rule 6.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as there were no common questions of law or fact, the relief did not arise from the same transactions, and no other compelling reason for consolidation was presented.

The court noted that the Envirotech action was a straightforward claim for services rendered, distinct from the complex main action.

This decision addresses three evidentiary issues raised at the commencement of a personal injury trial following jury selection.

The court considered the plaintiff's right to introduce expert opinion on pension loss, a family doctor's opinion on causation of a pre-existing back condition, and a treating psychiatrist's reports.

The court allowed the pension loss expert evidence, subject to an adjournment and potential costs, and the psychiatrist's reports, also necessitating an adjournment.

However, the family doctor's causation opinion was deemed to exceed the scope of a participant expert and was excluded due to non-compliance with Rule 53.03.

The plaintiffs sought compensation for historical SRED tax consulting services allegedly provided to a family-owned manufacturing business, advancing claims in contract, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment.

The court found no contract was proven with either plaintiff, rejected the corporate plaintiff’s attempt to recover for services personally supplied by the individual plaintiff, and held that although the defendant benefited from the work, its retention of that benefit was not unjust given the parties’ reasonable expectations in a non-arm’s length family-business context.

The court further held that the claims were, in any event, largely statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and rejected the plaintiffs’ promissory estoppel argument.

Both actions were dismissed, with costs presumptively payable to the defendant.

The moving parties, construction lien creditors of the Mady Group of Companies, brought a motion seeking to lift a CCAA stay of proceedings, amend their statements of claim, and obtain a Mareva injunction against several individuals and corporations.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving parties failed to make full and fair disclosure, failed to establish a strong prima facie case of fraud or breach of trust, and provided no evidence of a risk of dissipation or removal of assets from the jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her claim against the respondents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's conclusion that there was no air of reality to the appellant's assertion that she believed the respondent was pursuing her tort claim.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to grant relief from ex-parte foreclosure judgments obtained by the respondents.

The Court of Appeal found that the respondents failed to make full, fair, and frank disclosure when obtaining the ex-parte orders, specifically by failing to properly account for monies paid by the appellants under minutes of settlement.

The appeal was allowed, and the ex-parte foreclosure orders were set aside.

The appellants, an investment firm and its employee, appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for breach of fiduciary duty and awarding $288,846 in damages to an elderly client.

The employee had executed 68 unauthorized trades in the client's non-discretionary account, contrary to her investment objectives and professional rules.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the employee's assumption of total control over the account created a fiduciary relationship, that the client did not ratify the trades due to the employee's reassurances, and that restitutionary damages were appropriate.

The appellant, an unsecured creditor in a bankruptcy, obtained an order under s. 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to recover $100,000 US paid by the bankrupt to the respondent after the bankruptcy.

The application judge allowed the respondent to retain a portion of the funds on the basis of an implied trust and s. 99(1) of the BIA.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the three certainties of a trust were not met and that s. 99(1) did not apply.

The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant the $100,000 US.

The appellants' vehicles were towed to the respondent's repair shop after being involved in accidents.

The respondent refused to release the vehicles until its charges were paid.

The appellants' insurers disputed the charges and brought an application under s. 23 of the Repair and Storage Liens Act for a determination of the lien's propriety and amount.

The application judge dismissed the application, holding that the appellants were required to proceed under s. 24, which mandates payment of the lien amount into court.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that s. 23 and s. 24 provide mutually exclusive alternative procedures, and an owner is entitled to seek a determination under s. 23 without first paying the disputed amount into court.