Natalie M. Leon

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's negligence action arising from a fire that originated in the defendants' vacant industrial building and destroyed the plaintiff's adjacent property.

The court granted partial summary judgment, dismissing the claims related to the origin and cause of the fire because the specific cause could not be determined, rendering it an 'accidental fire' under s. 76 of the Fire Protection and Prevention Act.

However, the court dismissed the motion regarding the defendants' alleged negligence in failing to take reasonable precautions to prevent the spread of the fire, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding the applicable standard of care for a vacant industrial property owner.

The moving parties, professional engineers and engineering firms involved in the design and construction of the Nipigon River Bridge, brought a motion to stay disciplinary proceedings against them on the basis of delay.

The Discipline Committee found that the Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario (PEO) was responsible for approximately 36 months of inordinate delay in its investigation.

However, the Committee dismissed the motion, concluding that the moving parties failed to establish significant prejudice that would compromise hearing fairness or amount to an abuse of process.

The Committee further held that the public interest in holding a hearing on the merits regarding the failure of major public infrastructure outweighed any disrepute caused by the delay.

The defendants brought a second motion to strike the plaintiff's re-amended statement of claim in an action arising from a Ponzi scheme.

The court found that the plaintiff had addressed the deficiencies identified in a previous decision regarding the damages claimed against most defendants.

However, the court struck the claim against two defendants (the McKillips) without leave to amend, finding no material facts were pleaded to establish a duty of care.

The court also held that the defendants were precluded from raising new arguments about the duty of care that they could have raised on their first motion to strike, as serial attacks on a pleading constitute an abuse of process.

The defendants sought over $300,000 in substantial indemnity costs following partial success on a motion to strike the plaintiff's pleadings.

The plaintiff, acting as trustee in bankruptcy for a company involved in a Ponzi scheme, opposed the costs request and argued that costs should be reserved.

The court declined to fix costs immediately, finding it more just to reserve the costs of the initial motions pending the outcome of further motions to strike the reamended statement of claim.

The defendants brought motions to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim, which sought contribution and indemnity, damages, and disgorgement arising from the defendants' alleged involvement in a Ponzi scheme operated by Golden Oaks.

The court struck the claims for contribution and indemnity without leave to amend, finding no common liability to third parties and no viable duty of care owed to the unsecured creditors.

The claims for damages were struck with leave to amend to properly plead the losses suffered by the company.

The claims for disgorgement and accounting were permitted to proceed.

The applicant, a dissident member of a not-for-profit corporation, sought access to the corporation's membership list, including electronic addresses, to requisition a meeting.

The corporation had withheld email addresses, citing privacy concerns.

The court found the corporation's refusal was intended to frustrate the dissident members and ordered the corporation to provide the electronic list, including email addresses.

The court also awarded $20,000 in costs to the applicant, noting that the corporation should not use its resources to place roadblocks in the way of corporate democracy.

The appellant, a member of a not-for-profit corporation, challenged a bylaw that rendered members involved in litigation with the Board ineligible for nomination, election, or appointment to the Board.

The appellant had unsuccessfully campaigned for election in 2013 and subsequently engaged in litigation with the respondent.

The application judge dismissed the application under section 253 of the Canada Not-For-Profit Corporations Act, finding that the Limitations Act, 2002 applied and that the application was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the application judge's procedural approach and determining that the application was properly time-barred.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's application, the successful respondent sought costs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $16,009.85.

The court considered the urgency of the application, the service of a Notice of Constitutional Question, and the principles of fair and reasonable costs.

The court fixed the respondent's costs at $13,500 on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicant, a member of the respondent not-for-profit corporation, brought an application for an oppression remedy under the Canada Not-For-Profit Corporation Act, challenging by-laws that prevented him from running for the board of directors.

The respondent moved to dismiss the application as statute-barred under the provincial Limitations Act.

The applicant argued that the doctrine of inter-jurisdictional immunity prevented the provincial limitation period from applying to a federal corporate statute.

The court rejected the constitutional argument, finding the Limitations Act did not impair any core federal competence.

The court further held that the applicant had discovered the material facts of his claim more than two years prior to commencing the application.

The application was dismissed as statute-barred.

The plaintiff, having been entirely successful on a motion, sought partial indemnity costs of $14,338.80.

The defendants argued costs should be in the cause or parties should bear their own costs.

The court rejected the defendants' position, finding the plaintiff was the clear winner.

Applying the principles of reasonableness and proportionality under Rule 57.01, the court reduced the claimed amount and awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs fixed at $8,400.00 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, payable forthwith.

The defendant fuel oil distributor was sued after a fuel oil tank it sold leaked, causing property damage.

The defendant brought a third-party action against its insurers seeking a declaration of a duty to defend.

One insurer argued the claim was barred by a one-year contractual limitation period incorporated from statutory fire conditions.

The court held that the fire statutory conditions could not be applied to third-party liability coverage without anomalous consequences, meaning the general two-year statutory limitation period applied and the claim was not barred.

The court found the first insurer had a duty to defend as there was a mere possibility the damage occurred during its policy period.

However, the court dismissed the claims against the other insurers, finding that pollution exclusions and specific policy definitions precluded coverage.

The applicant sought reimbursement of defence costs and a declaration that the respondent insurers owed a duty to defend an underlying action alleging damages from an oil spill at a residence.

The dispute turned on the interpretation of a contractors’ pollution liability policy requiring that covered operations commence on or after the retroactive date to trigger coverage.

The court held that the policy language unambiguously tied coverage to the timing of the insured’s operations rather than the pollution incident.

Because the alleged operations occurred before the retroactive date, the insured failed to establish that the claim fell within the grant of coverage.

The application was dismissed and the insurers were found to have no duty to defend.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her claim against the respondents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's conclusion that there was no air of reality to the appellant's assertion that she believed the respondent was pursuing her tort claim.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident and retained a paralegal to negotiate a settlement with the tortfeasors' insurer.

The plaintiff later sued the tortfeasors and the paralegal, alleging the paralegal was negligent and the settlement was invalid.

The paralegal cross-claimed against the tortfeasors, arguing their insurer owed a duty of care to the plaintiff not to negotiate with an unauthorized paralegal.

The Divisional Court allowed the tortfeasors' appeal and struck the cross-claim, holding that a liability insurer owes no duty of care to a plaintiff making a claim against its insured, as this would create an impossible conflict of interest.

The moving parties (the Balsdons and their insurer) brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion to strike a crossclaim.

The crossclaim alleged that the insureds were vicariously liable for the actions of their insurer in negotiating a settlement with the plaintiff.

The court granted leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4)(b), finding that the issues of whether an insured is vicariously liable for its insurer's actions and whether an insurer owes an independent common law duty to third parties are of significant importance to the insurance industry.