John A. Ryder-Burbidge

The plaintiff, Robert Horne Halliday, brought a contested motion for a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) over eleven lots on Wolfe Island, alleging that the defendants, Mike Bromley and The Wolfe Island Trust Inc., held these properties in a secret express, constructive, resulting, or implied trust for him.

Halliday claimed he provided the funds for the "purchase" of the properties and for their expenses, and that Bromley agreed to transfer them back.

The defendants denied any trust, asserting outright ownership and arguing Halliday's claims were fabricated and unsupported by written evidence or financial resources.

The court found that Halliday had established a triable issue of a reasonable claim to an interest in land, supported by affidavit evidence of cash transactions, witness testimony, and email correspondence from Bromley that appeared to acknowledge a trust.

The motion for a CPL was granted, and the defendants were ordered to pay costs.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following a failed motion by Queen's University to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The court found that while the plaintiff's pleading was poorly drafted, the defendant's motion to strike entirely failed.

Consequently, the plaintiff was entitled to partial indemnity costs.

The court adjusted the plaintiff's claimed costs, reducing the hourly rate for senior counsel and applying a partial indemnity rate to the fees of an outsourced research lawyer, ultimately fixing costs at $6,950.00 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

This endorsement from a Trial Management Conference outlines the procedural orders made to schedule the trial and subsequent pre-trial steps.

The trial is scheduled for October 16, 2017, for six to eight weeks.

Orders include deadlines for circulating a draft Statement of Defence, cross-examination of a witness, a further mediation, and the delivery of expert reports on solicitor negligence and damages by both the plaintiff and defendants.

A further Trial Management Conference is adjourned to April 10, 2017, to review the status.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their statement of claim to add allegations that the defendants’ litigation conduct, including alleged delay in producing privileged documents, constituted a breach of fiduciary duty and warranted punitive damages.

The court applied Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the test for allowing amendments, including whether the proposed claims were tenable at law.

The court held that no fiduciary duty exists between opposing parties during the conduct of litigation in the adversarial system and that litigation conduct alone cannot constitute an independent actionable wrong supporting punitive damages.

Alleged delay in document production is addressed through costs, not substantive claims.

The proposed amendments were therefore not legally tenable and were refused, though certain limited trial questions concerning knowledge of competing intellectual property claims were permitted.

The defendant fuel oil distributor was sued after a fuel oil tank it sold leaked, causing property damage.

The defendant brought a third-party action against its insurers seeking a declaration of a duty to defend.

One insurer argued the claim was barred by a one-year contractual limitation period incorporated from statutory fire conditions.

The court held that the fire statutory conditions could not be applied to third-party liability coverage without anomalous consequences, meaning the general two-year statutory limitation period applied and the claim was not barred.

The court found the first insurer had a duty to defend as there was a mere possibility the damage occurred during its policy period.

However, the court dismissed the claims against the other insurers, finding that pollution exclusions and specific policy definitions precluded coverage.

At a status hearing under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff was required to show cause why its negligence action should not be dismissed for delay after more than two years of inactivity.

The plaintiff attributed the delay to severe financial hardship caused by the alleged environmental remediation failures of the defendant, which rendered the business insolvent and unable to fund litigation steps or financial statements until late 2013.

The court accepted the explanation as an acceptable reason for delay and found that the defendant had not demonstrated actual non-compensable prejudice.

The court also declined to determine a contested limitations defence at the status hearing on the limited evidentiary record.

The action was permitted to proceed subject to a strict timetable requiring the matter to be set down for trial by June 30, 2015.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their amended Statement of Claim to increase damages and extend the time period over which the defendants allegedly removed and converted sand from the plaintiffs’ property.

The defendant contractor opposed the amendment, arguing that claims relating to sand removal prior to 2007 were statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that whether the claims were discoverable earlier was a factual issue unsuitable for determination on a motion.

Because the limitation issue was disputed and the amendments did not introduce a new tort, the court held that Rule 26.01 required the amendment to be permitted absent non-compensable prejudice.

The motion to amend was therefore granted, with procedural directions for further discoveries and expert reports.