Clinton Harrison Culic

This endorsement addresses a last-minute motion by counsel, Clinton Culic, to be removed as lawyer of record for the respondent, Lee Aubin, which necessitated an adjournment of the main application.

The court granted the adjournment, ordered the respondent, Ms. Aubin, to pay $7,500 in costs thrown away to the applicant, BMO Trust Company.

The court also directed Mr. Culic to appear at a later date to show cause why he should not be personally liable for reimbursing Ms. Aubin for these costs due to his conduct in delaying the motion to withdraw.

The parties separated when their child was 10 months old, and the mother unilaterally retained the child in Alberta while the father returned to Ontario.

The mother sought sole decision-making and supervised parenting time for the father, alleging he posed a risk of sexual harm to the child.

Following a 4-day trial and expert psychiatric evidence concluding the father posed no risk, the court dismissed the mother's claims of abuse.

The court ordered joint decision-making with divided tie-breaking authority, terminated the supervision requirement, and ordered that the child reside in Ontario with the father to maximize contact with both parents.

The applicant sought a declaration that a retaining wall was on the property line between his property and the respondent's, and an order for the respondent to be partially responsible for its repairs.

The court found that the applicant's cited case law did not support a general principle of equal responsibility for retaining walls on property lines.

The court also rejected the applicant's argument for equitable relief, holding that preventing damage to a lower property from a neighbour's collapsing property is not a "benefit" to the lower property owner that would warrant contribution to the retaining wall's reconstruction.

The application was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment enforcing a construction lien against them.

The trial judge had applied the 'special circumstances' doctrine to extend the limitation period to add a tenant corporation as a defendant, and pierced the corporate veil to find the landlord corporation was an 'owner' under the Construction Lien Act due to common ownership.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the 'special circumstances' doctrine does not apply to the mandatory statutory deadlines in the Construction Lien Act, and that the corporate veil cannot be pierced absent conduct akin to fraud.

The plaintiff, Pryers Construction Ltd., sought to enforce a construction lien for $34,601.66 against MVMB Holdings Inc., Scott Birnie, and Riverside Ford Sales Limited for renovation work.

Key issues included the applicability of the old Construction Lien Act versus the new Construction Act, the addition of Riverside as a party despite the Limitations Act, and the personal liability of Scott Birnie.

The court found the old Construction Lien Act applied, allowed the addition of Riverside as a party under the doctrine of special circumstances, and determined that both corporate defendants were "owners" under the Act.

However, the court declined to pierce the corporate veil to hold Scott Birnie personally liable.

Judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff against the corporate defendants for the claimed amount.

An appeal from a trial judgment concerning a construction contract dispute.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's findings regarding responsibility for drywall deficiencies and the labour rate credited to the appellant.

The appellate court found the trial judge's determination that the appellant assumed responsibility for drywall installed by third parties was fully supported by evidence.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the labour rate issue.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The applicant brought a motion to change child support and arrears.

A trial of an issue was ordered to determine where the parties' son was living between September 2010 and September 2013.

The court heard evidence from several witnesses and concluded that the son lived primarily with the respondent mother from September 2010 to November 2011, spent equal time with both parents from November 2011 to April 2012, and resided with his sister and the applicant from April 2012 to September 2013.

These findings will form the factual basis for the motion to change.

This application concerned the respondent's claims for an interest in two properties registered solely in the applicant's name, a division of RRSP assets, and spousal support, alongside the applicant's counter-claims for occupancy rent and specific household items.

The court found no evidence of a joint family venture, largely due to the parties' segregation of assets and financial responsibilities.

The respondent's claims for property interest, RRSPs, and spousal support were dismissed, with the court noting his lack of credible evidence, failure to disclose income, and "unclean hands" in attempting to shelter assets from child support obligations.

The applicant was awarded a net monetary sum for occupancy rent and personal property.

The plaintiff successfully brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement after the defendants resiled from it due to 'buyer's remorse'.

The plaintiff sought costs of the motion on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court reviewed the factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, noting the defendants' conduct unnecessarily lengthened the proceeding and the motion was entirely unnecessary but for their actions.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs fixed at $21,260.74, representing full indemnity.

The respondent on appeal brought a motion for security for costs under Rule 61.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The underlying dispute involved a claim by the appellant that he had an ownership interest in a property purchased by his former mother-in-law.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's claim, finding his evidence not credible.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion for security for costs, finding good reason to believe the appeal was frivolous and vexatious and that the appellant had insufficient assets in Ontario to pay the costs of the appeal.

The appellant was ordered to post $15,000 as security.

Following dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim asserting a compensable interest in property owned by the defendant, the court determined the defendant’s entitlement to costs.

The defendant relied on two offers to settle, including one that remained open until trial and was more favourable than the final result, entitling her to enhanced cost recovery.

The court considered the Rules of Civil Procedure factors, the reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rate, and the lack of clear separation between partial and substantial indemnity claims.

Balancing these considerations, the court fixed costs at a reduced amount from what was sought.

The plaintiff sought a declaration of ownership interest in a house legally owned by his former mother-in-law, arguing either an express agreement that title would transfer after the mortgage was paid or, alternatively, proprietary estoppel.

The court rejected the plaintiff's account of any promise to gift the down payment or transfer the property, preferring the evidence that the arrangement was a rental investment intended to provide favourable housing to family members.

Applying the elements of proprietary estoppel, the court found no inducement or encouragement by the owner, insufficient proof of detriment in light of below-market rent and other countervailing benefits, and no unconscionable conduct.

The action was dismissed, the parties were declared to stand in a landlord-tenant relationship, and judgment for unpaid rent was granted to the defendant.

The plaintiff moved under Rule 49.09 to enforce Minutes of Settlement signed at a pre-trial conference in a land ownership dispute over a disputed parcel described as a cattle path.

The defendants conceded a binding agreement existed but argued it should not be enforced because of alleged duress, mistake about the land to be conveyed, and misunderstanding as to finality.

The court rejected the allegations of duress and mistake, found the defendants were represented by independent counsel and later experienced buyer's remorse, and held the settlement was reasonable and would not work an injustice.

A final order was directed to issue on the Minutes of Settlement, and the defendants were ordered to remove vehicles or chattels from the parcel within seven days.

Following prior reasons for judgment on a summary judgment motion limited to the issue of possession, the court convened to settle the form of order and address case management issues.

The court clarified that the plaintiff’s claim relating to contaminated soil and debris had not been dismissed and ordered that the reference in the draft order suggesting otherwise be deleted.

The plaintiff was directed to serve an amended statement of claim clearly articulating the causes of action, material facts, and relief sought against each defendant, with corresponding timelines for amended defences and related pleadings.

The court also scheduled completion of remaining discoveries, struck the jury notice by consent, adjourned the previously scheduled trial date, and set a new trial date.

A mortgagee brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a writ of possession of a farm property following the mortgagor’s default under a second mortgage.

The mortgagor opposed the motion, asserting equitable set‑off based on alleged misrepresentations regarding a wood furnace and environmental contamination on the property.

The court held that the mortgagor failed to provide sufficient evidence to support the contamination claim or establish a triable issue preventing possession.

However, the court found the furnace claim had potential merit and structured an interim remedy allowing the mortgagor time to pay part of the mortgage principal to delay enforcement pending trial.

Conditional orders were issued governing possession, payment into court, and scheduling of discoveries and trial.

The appellant registered a construction lien on a property owned by his estranged wife, which was subject to mortgages held by the respondents.

The respondent mortgagees successfully moved to discharge the lien under section 47 of the Construction Lien Act on the basis that it was registered in bad faith.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge erred by not applying the summary judgment test under Rule 20.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge properly exercised his broad discretion under section 47 and was not required to apply Rule 20 since the motion did not seek to dismiss the action.

Following a family law trial in which custody of two children was varied in favour of the applicant, the court addressed costs.

The successful applicant sought over $23,000 in costs, including full indemnity from the date of a written settlement offer under the Family Law Rules.

While the court acknowledged the presumption that costs follow the event and the enhanced costs consequences of an offer to settle, it found that both parties contributed significantly to the conflict leading to the litigation.

Taking into account the respondent’s limited financial means and the impact of a costs order on her ability to pay child support, the court exercised its discretion to significantly reduce the costs award.

The applicant father sought to vary a prior joint custody order to obtain sole custody and child support.

The court considered whether there had been a material change in circumstances under the Children’s Law Reform Act and whether the proposed variation was in the best interests of the children.

Evidence addressed school attendance, hygiene concerns, medical care, and parental communication failures while the children resided primarily with the respondent mother.

The court found a material change in circumstances and concluded that the children’s educational, medical, and developmental needs were being better met while residing with the father.

Sole custody was granted to the father with liberal access to the mother, and income was imputed to the mother for child support purposes.

Following a motion for spousal support and a cross‑motion regarding the release of proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home, the court determined the issue of costs.

Both parties had served Offers to Settle addressing different aspects of the dispute, but neither offer was accepted.

The applicant sought substantial indemnity costs on the basis that the court’s decision matched her offer.

The court held that the applicant was not entitled to elevated costs because she could have resolved the cross‑motion by accepting the respondent’s offer and because portions of her offer addressed relief not sought in her motion.

Costs were fixed in a reduced amount after considering the Family Law Rules.

The respondents failed to pay property taxes on their family farm, leading the appellant township to initiate a tax sale under the Municipal Tax Sales Act.

After tenders were opened but before the tax deed was registered, the respondents offered to pay the full cancellation price.

The municipal treasurer refused, believing she had no discretion to cancel the sale once tenders were opened.

The application judge cancelled the tax sale, finding the treasurer failed to exercise her discretion under s. 12(6) of the Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that a municipal treasurer retains the discretion to cancel a tax sale at any time up to the registration of the tax deed.