Cheryl Robertson

The father brought a motion to change a 2014 joint custody order, seeking to remove the mother's tie-breaking authority for major decisions and establish an equal parenting time schedule.

The court applied the Gordon v. Goertz test for material change in circumstances.

While acknowledging ongoing parental conflict, the court found that the father failed to meet the threshold for a material change regarding decision-making authority, dismissing his request to remove the mother's tie-breaking power.

The court emphasized the importance of a clear decision-maker in high-conflict situations to prevent further power struggles and delays detrimental to the child's best interests.

However, the court did order a revised parenting schedule, transitioning to equal time sharing by summer 2024, and addressed other practical parenting issues.

The court rendered a costs endorsement following a trial where the Respondent was the successful party on the main issues.

Both parties filed written costs submissions.

The court considered the reasonableness of the parties' offers to settle, the complexity of the income determination issue, and the financial positions of the parties.

The Respondent sought $46,000 in costs, including legal and accounting fees.

The Applicant argued for lower costs due to her financial situation and care of children with exceptional needs.

Applying the Family Law Rules and principles from relevant case law, the court fixed costs at $26,000, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, payable by the Applicant to the Respondent.

The applicant mother sought retroactive child support and section 7 expenses for the period prior to giving effective notice in October 2019.

The parties had a 2010 separation agreement that included provisions for annual review and disclosure upon request, which neither party utilized until 2019.

The court found the mother's delay in seeking disclosure was not adequately explained and dismissed her claim for retroactive section 7 expenses because she failed to follow the agreement's protocol.

However, noting the father's significant, albeit unrealized, increase in income, the court ordered a lump sum of $8,500 in retroactive child support for the period prior to November 2019 to ensure a fair standard of support.

The applicant father brought a Rule 14B motion seeking an order to seal the entire court record of his application to vary a custody and access order.

The original custody order was granted as a disposition in a child protection case, and the father was concerned that filing his materials, which included the original order identifying the children and sensitive facts, would violate the Child, Youth and Family Services Act's prohibition on publishing identifying information from child protection proceedings.

The court granted the sealing order, finding that the privacy protections for children in child protection matters, combined with the children's best interests, outweighed the open court principle at this preliminary stage.

The applicant sought a divorce on grounds of cruelty or one-year separation.

The application was procedurally deficient due to unsworn and unwitnessed affidavits, highlighting an access to justice barrier for self-represented litigants of modest means, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court was prepared to grant the divorce on the separation ground but required properly commissioned affidavits or a hearing to swear them.

The judge directed court staff to assist the applicant in commissioning the affidavits, or offered to conduct a Zoom hearing herself to overcome this barrier.

The applicant mother, residing in Pennsylvania, brought an application under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act for current and retroactive child support.

The respondent father, residing in Ontario, had been paying support pursuant to a separation agreement that provided for less than the table amount due to access travel costs.

During a telephone conference, the parties reached a consent resolution.

The court ordered the father to pay the full table amount of child support, 60% of section 7 expenses, and $1,000 in arrears, along with updated access travel arrangements.

The applicant sought costs following the dismissal of the respondent's motion for leave to appeal regarding child support.

The respondent argued the court lacked jurisdiction to award costs because the initial endorsement was silent on the issue and the applicant delayed in seeking them.

The court found that the applicant's counsel had promptly notified the court and the respondent of the intention to seek costs, satisfying the requirements of the Family Law Rules.

The court awarded the applicant costs fixed at $7,500.

The applicant mother sought sole custody and specific child support orders, including arrears, for her two children from the respondent father.

The respondent father opposed the variation and sought sole custody for himself.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to chronic parental conflict, communication issues, and the children's evolving needs, particularly Dante's ADHD.

The court granted sole custody to the mother, finding her parenting plan more child-focused and her communication more effective.

The father's access was set to alternate weekends, with potential for mid-week access contingent on his participation in counselling.

Child support and special expenses were adjusted and arrears confirmed.

This is a costs ruling following a family law trial that primarily focused on financial issues.

Both self-represented parties sought full recovery of their legal costs, alleging bad faith by the other.

The court found that neither party acted in bad faith, though both exhibited unreasonable behaviour at times.

Success on the trial issues was divided, with the Applicant being more successful on spousal support and property issues, and the Respondent being reasonable on custody/access offers and successful on certain financial points.

Considering the "divided failure" of the litigation, the financial reality of the parties, and the principle of proportionality, the court awarded the Applicant very modest fixed costs of $1,000.00, inclusive of HST and disbursements, to be paid by the Respondent.

Following a family law trial addressing custody, residence, access, and income determination, the court considered liability and quantum of costs.

The father had been largely successful at trial on the primary parenting issues and his settlement offers exceeded the final outcome.

The court reviewed the principles governing costs under the Family Law Rules, including proportionality, settlement offers, conduct of the parties, and the financial means of the parties.

Although the mother argued that a prior “costs in the cause” endorsement prevented recovery of earlier motion costs and raised her limited financial means, the court rejected those arguments.

Exercising discretion, the court awarded the father global costs of $26,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, HST, and the earlier motion.

In a child protection proceeding, the mother brought a motion seeking an order dispensing with service of a society wardship application on the child’s father, citing serious safety concerns and the father’s history of sexual offences and absence from the child’s life.

The court considered the statutory framework under the Child and Family Services Act governing notice to parents in wardship proceedings.

The court held that the legislation strictly limits the circumstances in which service on a parent may be dispensed with and generally requires notice before a wardship order exceeding thirty days can be made.

While sympathetic to the mother’s concerns, the court concluded it lacked authority to fully dispense with service.

Service was temporarily dispensed with for thirty days under s. 39(7) of the Act pending further review after the Office of the Children’s Lawyer considered the matter.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, sexual touching, and committing an indecent act, arguing that the trial judge misapplied the framework from R. v. W.(D.) and failed to properly consider whether the accused’s evidence, even if disbelieved, could raise a reasonable doubt.

The appellant contended that the trial judge’s language suggested the burden shifted to the accused to raise a defence.

The appellate court reviewed the reasons as a whole and concluded that the trial judge understood and correctly applied the W.(D.) framework and the reasonable doubt standard.

Any problematic wording was characterized as a language issue rather than a legal error.

Deference was owed to the trial judge’s credibility findings on a summary conviction appeal.

Child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act where the applicant society sought a Crown wardship order with a view to adoption for a young child who had been in foster care with paternal relatives for more than two years.

The court found the child to be in need of protection due to earlier neglect, poor parental decision‑making, and developmental concerns.

However, the evidence showed significant improvement by the mother, including stable housing, consistent participation in services, and successful unsupervised access visits.

Applying the CFSA principle that the least intrusive order consistent with the child’s best interests must be made, the court concluded Crown wardship was premature.

The child was returned to the mother’s care under a 12‑month supervision order with detailed conditions and continued oversight by the society.

Former unmarried partners disputed beneficial ownership of a house and family farm that had been transferred into joint title during their relationship.

The applicant argued the respondent held her registered interest in trust and that title had been transferred only to protect her anticipated financial contributions.

The court applied resulting trust, constructive trust, and unjust enrichment principles following Kerr v. Baranow and Pecore v. Pecore.

It concluded the transfers were not intended as a gift of beneficial ownership and that the respondent held title in trust for the applicant subject to compensation for her financial and labour contributions.

Title was ordered vested in the applicant upon payment of a monetary award reflecting the respondent’s contributions.