Teresa James

The offender pleaded guilty to breaching probation and failing to appear in court, stemming from a 2008 theft conviction for which she had repeatedly failed to pay full restitution over 14 years.

Despite multiple prior breaches and probationary sentences aimed at facilitating repayment, the offender continued to delay and evade payment.

The court found that further probation or conditional sentences were inappropriate given the exhaustion of the court's patience and tools.

The offender was sentenced to 30 days' incarceration concurrent on each charge, and a stand-alone restitution order of $3,520 was issued.

The accused was sentenced after conviction for sexual interference involving digital penetration of a child family member, and after a guilty plea to distributing cannabis to minors.

Applying the proportionality principle and the sentencing objectives in ss. 718 to 718.3 of the Criminal Code, the court held that denunciation and deterrence were paramount given the victim's age, the breach of trust, the family relationship, and the lasting harm described in victim impact statements.

The court treated the offender's lack of remorse as an absence of mitigation, not an aggravating factor, and weighed his status as a first offender and some treatment amenability as mitigating considerations.

A penitentiary sentence of three years was imposed for the s. 151 offence, together with a concurrent 30-day sentence on the Cannabis Act offence and ancillary DNA, SOIRA, weapons, and s. 161 orders.

After a lengthy judge-alone criminal trial, the court considered charges that the accused gave a teenage complainant a THC gummy to overcome resistance and sexually touched her by digital penetration.

The case turned on witness credibility and forensic DNA evidence, including expert testimony from the Centre of Forensic Sciences and a defence expert on DNA transfer.

The judge accepted the complainant’s core account, found the accused not credible on key points, and held that the DNA evidence strongly corroborated the sexual touching allegation.

The court convicted the accused of sexual interference under s. 151 of the Criminal Code and acquitted him on the charge of administering an overpowering drug under s. 246(b).

AL pleaded guilty to one count of sexual interference against a child (KB, aged 9-11).

The offence involved over-the-clothes touching, inviting the victim to touch his penis, and masturbating in her presence.

The court considered significant aggravating factors, including the nature of the offence against a child, abuse of trust, and AL's high risk of reoffence due to diagnosed pedophilia, fetishism, hypersexuality, cannabis use disorder, borderline personality disorder, and anger issues.

Mitigating factors included his early guilty plea, remorse, lack of prior record, military service with PTSD, intellectual disability, and adverse childhood experiences.

While acknowledging diminished moral blameworthiness due to his background, the court prioritized public protection and found a conditional sentence insufficient.

AL was sentenced to two years in the penitentiary followed by three years of probation, along with ancillary orders including DNA, firearms prohibition, a 20-year SOIRA order, and a no-contact order with the victim.

The accused, a member of the military, was charged with sexual assault and unlawful confinement of a fellow military member following an evening of drinking and drug use at a mutual friend's home.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess the credibility and reliability of the complainant and the accused.

The court found significant inconsistencies and reliability issues with both the complainant's and the accused's testimonies.

Ultimately, the court was left with a reasonable doubt regarding both charges and acquitted the accused.

This sentencing decision concerns an individual found guilty of historical sexual assault and gross indecency against two young relatives.

The offences occurred between 1979 and 1985, involving a significant breach of trust.

The court applied the sentencing principles from the Criminal Code, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence as primary objectives for child abuse cases, in line with the Supreme Court of Canada's guidance in R. v. Friesen.

Aggravating factors included the multiple victims, the extended duration and invasive nature of the abuse, the perpetrator's position of trust, and the profound impact on the victims.

The court also considered the perpetrator's personal circumstances and the limited applicability of Gladue factors.

A global sentence of six years imprisonment was imposed, along with various ancillary orders, while a victim fine surcharge was waived due to undue hardship.

The accused, A.R.-P., was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault, touching for a sexual purpose, exposing genitals, and inviting sexual touching against his stepdaughter, E.E., spanning from 2014 to 2018.

The key issues involved assessing the credibility and reliability of the witnesses, particularly the child victim.

The court applied the principles for assessing child witness testimony, including the W.(D.) framework.

The court found the victim's testimony credible and reliable, rejecting the accused's explanations as preposterous and self-serving.

The accused was convicted on all counts, with further submissions to be heard regarding the application of the Kienapple rule and potential overcharging.

The accused, D.G., a young person, was charged with sexual assault, sexual intercourse with a female under 14, and incest, relating to alleged acts against his half-sister, S.G., between 1984 and 1985.

The trial focused on the credibility and reliability of S.G. and D.G. The court applied the W.(D.) analysis.

While the court found D.G.'s denial not credible, particularly regarding a meeting where S.G. claimed D.G. apologized and mentioned Tourette's, the lack of corroborating evidence from an independent witness (F.G.) regarding S.G.'s early disclosure of abuse created a reasonable doubt.

The court found S.G.'s account of writing a letter to F.G. and a subsequent conversation about the abuse to be inconsistent with F.G.'s testimony, leading to a reasonable doubt about the entire account.

D.G. was found not guilty.

The court considered the appropriate sentence for T.A., a 70-year-old offender who pleaded guilty to sexual interference against his step-granddaughter, involving over-the-clothes touching.

T.A. had a prior sexual assault conviction and was assessed as low risk to reoffend.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence (3 years), while the Defence argued for a maximum reformatory sentence (2 years less a day) followed by maximum probation (3 years) to allow T.A. to access treatment at the Ontario Correctional Institute (OCI), which is unavailable in federal penitentiaries for low-risk offenders.

The court, applying the principles from R. v. Friesen regarding increased sentences for child sexual offenses, ultimately imposed the reformatory sentence to prioritize rehabilitation and a longer period of supervision, finding it equivalent in protective effect to a mid-single digit penitentiary term.

The offender, G.T., was found guilty of sexual assault.

This decision outlines the reasons for sentencing.

The Crown sought 18-24 months incarceration, while the defence proposed a conditional discharge or a 3-6 month conditional sentence.

The court rejected a conditional discharge due to the offender's lack of genuine remorse and insight.

Ultimately, the court imposed a 12-month conditional sentence followed by an 18-month probation order, citing mitigating factors such as the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, and significant procedural delays, and the constitutional ruling that allowed for conditional sentences for sexual assault.

The case concerns the sentencing of Tyson Kennedy for multiple offences, including fraud over $5000, possession of fentanyl for trafficking, impaired driving, and breach of release orders.

The primary issue was the calculation of pre-sentence custody credit, specifically the application of "Duncan credit" for harsh conditions due to COVID-19 lockdowns.

The court reviewed the joint submission for a 42-month sentence, finding it lenient but acceptable, and then determined the appropriate credit, granting 0.5 days Duncan credit for each of the 73 lockdown days, in addition to the standard 1.5:1 Summers credit.

The 73-year-old accused was convicted of sexually assaulting a 16-year-old victim who was sleeping at his home after consuming alcohol.

The Crown sought a sentence of two to three years' incarceration, while the accused sought a conditional sentence, relying on his Indigenous heritage and Gladue factors.

The court found insufficient evidence of Gladue factors to warrant an alternative sanction and emphasized the need for denunciation and deterrence for sexual offences against adolescents, applying the principles from Friesen.

The accused was sentenced to 12 months' incarceration, less pre-sentence custody credit, followed by 12 months' probation.

Following separate sexual assault convictions and before sentencing, the applicants brought joined constitutional applications challenging the prohibition on conditional sentence orders for indictable sexual assault under s. 742.1(f)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the provision was overbroad under s. 7 of the Charter because sexual assault encompasses a broad spectrum of conduct, including cases not so serious as to require imprisonment to maintain the integrity of the justice system.

Relying on the reasoning in Sharma and a prior superior court decision extending that analysis to sexual assault, the court rejected the Crown's mootness argument and granted both applications.

The court found no cogent reason, under principles of judicial comity, to depart from the earlier decision.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of fraud, conspiracy, forgery, and public mischief arising from two schemes.

In the first, he conspired to sell a wood processor and falsely reported it stolen to police and his insurer to claim the insurance proceeds.

In the second, he forged a bill of sale for a non-existent wood processor to obtain financing from a leasing company.

The court rejected the accused's statement to police as incredible and accepted the evidence of his accomplices, which was corroborated by independent witnesses and documentary evidence.

The accused was found guilty on 11 counts and acquitted on one count of possessing proceeds of crime.

The accused, a self-represented inmate, brought multiple Charter applications seeking a stay of proceedings on grounds of alleged violations of his rights to privacy, full answer and defence, and a fair trial.

The accused alleged privacy violations arising from exposure of his genitals during medical treatment and use of washroom facilities while under video surveillance at the Ottawa Carleton Detention Centre.

He also alleged that disclosure was not provided in a timely manner and that his incarceration without access to counsel, the internet, or adequate telephone access compromised his ability to prepare his defence.

The court dismissed all applications, finding no Charter breaches that would warrant a stay of proceedings.

The accused was tried on an indictment alleging multiple historical sexual offences against the complainant during her childhood and adolescence.

The court reviewed the complainant’s evidence, corroborative contextual evidence from her mother, and the accused’s denial.

While the court found the complainant testified in a straightforward manner and accepted that delayed disclosure was not unusual, reliability concerns remained regarding chronology, opportunity, and the mechanics of certain alleged incidents.

Applying the criminal standard of proof, the court concluded the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and entered acquittals on all counts.

The accused, P.L., was charged with sexual exploitation and sexual assault involving his 16-year-old great-niece, G.F. The incident occurred at P.L.'s home after G.F. had consumed alcohol.

The court found P.L. not guilty of sexual exploitation, as the Crown failed to prove a position of trust or authority or dependency.

However, P.L. was found guilty of sexual assault based on G.F.'s credible testimony, corroborated by DNA evidence and physical bruising, establishing that sexual activity occurred without G.F.'s consent while she was intoxicated and vulnerable.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his right to trial within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial completion was approximately 25.75 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

However, after deducting defence-caused delay (12.1 months) and exceptional circumstances related to a Rowbotham application (5.75 months), the resulting delay was 7.9 months, falling well below the ceiling.

The court found no violation of the accused's section 11(b) Charter right and dismissed the application.

Four co-accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on all charges, alleging violation of their right to trial within a reasonable time.

The charges included numerous break and enter offences and drug offences.

The court found that the total delay from October 18, 2017 (date charges laid) to the anticipated completion of trial in April 2020 was 30 months.

After deducting defence-caused delay (7 months and 25 days), waiver (1 day), discrete events (5 days), and case complexity (3 months), the net delay was 19 months, exceeding the Jordan ceiling of 18 months for provincial court trials.

The court granted the stay of proceedings, finding that the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay through exceptional circumstances.

Key issues included late and disorganized disclosure from police and Crown, inadequate trial time allocation, and the departure of the case manager from the police investigation without replacement.

The accused was charged with assault contrary to section 266 of the Criminal Code for pushing his estranged wife during a domestic dispute over a malfunctioning washing machine.

The accused claimed he was acting in self-defence and that the complainant initiated the physical altercation by throwing frozen meat at him and attempting to damage his property.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as incredible, finding that his size and strength made it implausible that the much smaller complainant could have prevented him from leaving, and that his failure to mention a purported kick to his genitals during his audio recording undermined his credibility.

The court found the accused guilty of a minor assault, having pushed the complainant without her consent as the first act of violence.