Bruce Engel

The accused was charged with 27 counts of fraud over $5,000 and obtaining money by false pretences.

He solicited $30,000 loans from multiple lenders for a real estate development, falsely promising them a security interest in specific townhouse units.

The accused misappropriated the funds to pay himself a salary and cover personal expenses, and the development failed, resulting in the loss of the lenders' investments.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts, concluding he knowingly made false representations and committed dishonest acts that put the lenders' economic interests at risk.

The appellant, N.S., appealed his conviction for sexually assaulting two complainants, C.C. and R.Z., raising multiple grounds of appeal.

These grounds included alleged errors by the trial judge in dismissing a directed verdict motion, admitting similar fact evidence, failing to consider innocent collusion, applying different standards of scrutiny, creating a reasonable apprehension of bias, improperly applying the R. v. W.(D.) test, and imposing an excessive sentence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the conviction and the 15-month incarceration sentence.

Mark Godwin pleaded not guilty to impaired operation and over 80 mg.

The defence sought to exclude breath test results, alleging violations of Charter sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found that the police fulfilled their s. 10(b) obligations to facilitate access to counsel, the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable (no s. 8 breach), and the continued detention was lawful (no s. 9 breach) given the accused's high blood alcohol readings.

The court found the accused guilty of both charges, concluding that the breath test results were admissible and that there was ample evidence of impairment even without the readings.

This case involves an appeal by the accused against a finding of guilt and a Crown appeal against the sentence imposed for a sexual offense against a minor.

The Superior Court of Justice examined the trial judge's application of credibility assessment principles, particularly the R. v. W.(D.) and R. v. D.(J.J.R.) frameworks, in rejecting the accused's denial based on the compelling evidence of the complainant.

The court affirmed the trial judge's reasoning, finding it consistent with established jurisprudence.

Regarding the sentence appeal, the court acknowledged the trial judge's error in dismissing general deterrence but ultimately upheld the conditional discharge with probation, finding it within the range of appropriate dispositions given the specific circumstances of the offender and the successful completion of the sentence.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, Bradley Priestap, appealed his convictions for multiple counts of voyeurism, break and enter to commit voyeurism, possession of instruments for break and enter, and prowling.

He abandoned his sentence appeal.

The grounds of appeal were: the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons, erred by summarily dismissing an alternate suspect theory, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, no error in limiting evidence on an alternate suspect due to lack of connection, and no demonstration of prejudice from alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.

Four appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that their Charter s. 11(b) rights to be tried within a reasonable time were violated due to unreasonable delay.

The application judges had dismissed their s. 11(b) applications, finding that despite delays exceeding the Jordan ceiling (18 months), the Crown had demonstrated the cases were complex and had a concrete plan to minimize delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judges' decisions, finding no reversible error in their assessment of the Crown's plan and the complexity of the cases.

The applicants brought a motion challenging the validity of three general warrants (dated June 30, August 13, and October 8, 2015) authorizing video surveillance and covert entries at 691 Bank Street in Ottawa as part of Project Step, a drug trafficking investigation.

The central issue was whether an Ontario Court of Justice judge had jurisdiction to authorize video surveillance under section 487.01(4) of the Criminal Code, or whether such authorization required a Superior Court of Justice judge.

The court found that the applicants had standing to challenge the warrants based on a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallway, albeit attenuated.

The court determined that video surveillance warrants must be signed by a Superior Court judge, not an Ontario Court of Justice judge, rendering the June 30 warrant invalid.

However, the court severed the covert entry portion of the June 30 warrant, which remained valid.

The court also quashed the portions of the August 13 and October 8 warrants authorizing entries into unit C, as the information supporting those entries was derived from the unlawful hallway surveillance.

Despite these findings, the court admitted all evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute given the good faith conduct of police and the attenuated privacy interests involved.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 milliliters of blood.

The trial judge found multiple Charter violations: the accused was detained for investigative purposes without being informed of the reason for detention or his right to counsel; he was not advised of his right to counsel immediately upon arrest; and he was unlawfully over-held in custody for approximately four hours following the breath testing procedure.

The trial judge excluded the breath sample readings and observations of impairment under section 24(2) of the Charter due to the cumulative effect of these breaches.

The over 80 charge was dismissed.

On the impaired driving charge, the trial judge found the evidence of impairment insufficient to meet the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol per hundred milliliters of blood and an open liquor charge under the Liquor Licence Act.

The accused pleaded guilty to the liquor charge and proceeded to trial on the impaired driving charge with a concurrent Charter application alleging six violations.

The court found two Charter breaches: an unlawful search of the accused's backpack at an impound yard and an arbitrary detention resulting from over-holding the accused in custody beyond the time he should have been released.

Applying the Grant analysis under section 24(2), the court excluded the breath sample evidence and acquitted the accused on the impaired driving charge.

The defendant was charged with possessing child pornography found on three devices: a desktop computer, an iPad, and a laptop computer, all seized on March 11, 2015.

A total of 1,288 images and 196 videos constituting child pornography were located across the devices.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence and the assertion that the defendant was the only person with access to the devices.

The trial judge found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the child pornography, as multiple other individuals had access to the devices and the investigating officer failed to investigate alternative suspects.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused, B.R., was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault against his four-year-old daughter, B.A.R., involving digital stimulation and a vibrator.

The Crown's case relied heavily on B.A.R.'s evidence, including a videotaped statement and trial testimony, and sexually explicit Facebook messages between the accused and a family friend, J.T., which mentioned B.A.R. The court found B.A.R.'s evidence credible and reliable despite minor inconsistencies, applying a common-sense approach to child testimony.

The accused's denial of the allegations and authorship of the Facebook messages was rejected as not credible, particularly given the content of the messages and corroborating evidence.

The court found the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all charges.

The accused pleaded guilty to fraud under $5,000 contrary to s.380(b) of the Criminal Code, covering fraudulent transactions totalling $47,045.41 committed over approximately six years (January 2010 to April 2016) against a developmentally disabled adult.

The accused, employed as a support worker, exploited her position of trust to make 871 fraudulent transactions using the victim's debit card for personal luxuries while the victim lived in poverty.

The Crown sought 15 months incarceration plus probation and a 10-year prohibition order.

Defence argued for a conditional sentence.

The court imposed 12 months incarceration followed by 24 months probation, finding that while full restitution was paid and mitigating factors existed, the egregious breach of trust, vulnerability of the victim, and need for general deterrence and denunciation required a custodial sentence.

This is a preliminary inquiry decision determining whether there is sufficient evidence to commit seven accused persons to stand trial on charges of attempted murder, aggravated assault, unlawful confinement, and unlawful entry arising from a brutal attack on the victim in the early morning hours of November 17, 2013.

The Crown's theory is that the attack was undertaken in retaliation for an assault on the brother of one of the accused the previous day.

The court applies the prima facie case standard, examining whether there is evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on each element of each charge.

The decision addresses complex issues regarding the mens rea of attempted murder, the admissibility of hearsay statements, the evaluation of circumstantial identification evidence, and the requirements for party liability.

The Crown brought a section 540(7) application seeking to admit witness statements as evidence at a preliminary inquiry without requiring the witnesses to testify.

The application involved four key witnesses: Jessica Walker, Samantha Daoust, Mark Sudiacal, and Jason Klein.

The Crown sought to admit their statements under the Criminal Code provision that permits justices to receive evidence that would not otherwise be admissible if the justice considers it credible or trustworthy.

The court admitted the statements of Daoust, Sudiacal, and Klein, as well as the videotaped statements of Walker, but excluded Walker's off-camera statement recorded in police notes.

The decision provides comprehensive guidance on the interpretation and application of section 540(7).

The Crown sought reconsideration of a preliminary inquiry judge's ruling denying a section 540(7) application to file transcripts of witness statements.

The initial judge had rejected the application as inadequately presented and lacking sufficient grounding.

The Crown subsequently renewed the application with a fuller record.

The presiding judge ruled that reconsideration was permissible, finding that the initial ruling was not a final determination on the merits of section 540(7) admissibility but rather a rejection of the application as presented.

The judge held that interlocutory evidentiary rulings can be reconsidered where there is no prejudice to the defence and where the interests of justice support reconsideration, particularly in preliminary inquiries where evidentiary errors cannot be appealed.

The accused was charged with failing or refusing to comply with a demand to provide breath samples for an approved screening device (ASD) contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged the accused was observed drinking from a wine bottle in a McDonald's drive-thru and subsequently failed to provide suitable breath samples during ten attempts at roadside testing.

The accused claimed she was unable to provide samples due to anxiety and a pre-existing lung condition.

The court addressed a late challenge to the sufficiency of the charge, finding it was not a nullity but amending it to conform to the evidence presented.

On the merits, the court found the accused guilty, determining that she intentionally failed to provide samples rather than being incapable of doing so.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting the complainant after a night of drinking among friends where the complainant became severely intoxicated and ill.

The complainant testified that she lost consciousness intermittently and awoke to the accused engaging in sexual activity without her consent, repeatedly telling him to stop.

The court rejected the accused’s evidence due to numerous deliberate lies and inconsistencies, finding his testimony wholly unreliable.

The complainant’s evidence was accepted as credible and corroborated by medical evidence, witness testimony, and surrounding circumstances.

The court held that the complainant lacked the capacity to provide ongoing consent due to intoxication and illness, and that the accused took no reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

The defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent was found to have no air of reality.

During a criminal trial involving allegations of sexual assault, the Crown sought to qualify a police detective as an expert in the operation of Facebook features and Microsoft Word functions relevant to the creation of a document allegedly copied from a Facebook News Feed.

The defence challenged the scope and usefulness of the proposed expert evidence, arguing that the detective lacked sufficient expertise regarding Facebook’s technical coding in 2009 and could not conclusively authenticate the document.

Applying the criteria for admissibility of expert evidence from R. v. Mohan, the court found the proposed testimony relevant and necessary to assist the trier of fact in understanding technical aspects of copying, pasting, hyperlinks, and auto-correct features.

The court concluded the detective possessed specialized knowledge through training and investigative experience and that any limitations in his expertise affected weight rather than admissibility.

The detective was therefore qualified to provide expert opinion within the proposed areas.

During a criminal trial for sexual assault, the accused challenged the admissibility of a videotaped police interview, alleging a breach of his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The accused argued he felt compelled to attend the police station and was not informed of free legal advice.

The court found the accused was not detained when he attended the voluntary interview and therefore his s. 10(b) rights were not triggered.

Applying the voluntariness framework from R. v. Oickle, the court concluded the statement was voluntary and not obtained through threats, oppression, trickery, or impairment of the accused’s operating mind.

The videotaped interview was ruled admissible at trial.