Bruce Engel

The accused, previously found not criminally responsible for various offences, was subject to an annual review by the Ontario Review Board.

Despite some stability and community support, the accused had two hospital admissions during the reporting year and continued to use substances, including cocaine and cannabis, which correlated with manic episodes.

The Board applied the Winko test and found that the accused continues to pose a significant threat to public safety.

A conditional discharge was ordered as the least onerous and restrictive disposition to manage the risk.

The applicant appealed the City of Brampton Committee of Adjustment's denial of a minor variance to permit an increased driveway width.

The variance was sought to accommodate a third parking space required for two proposed additional residential units.

Prior to the hearing, the parties reached a settlement.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal and authorized the variance, finding that the amended application was minor and that the settlement proposal was consistent with the Provincial Policy Statement and represented good planning.

The court sentenced the offender after convictions for multiple sexual offences against two children and child pornography offences involving both known and unknown children.

The judge found the offending extremely serious because it involved grooming, repeated abuse, abuse of trust, severe harm to the children and families, and a large volume of child pornography.

The court stayed the accessing-child-pornography count under the Kienapple principle, granted pre-sentence credit including a limited Duncan credit for triple bunking, and imposed a global sentence of 16 years’ imprisonment less credit for time served.

The court also made ancillary orders including DNA, lifetime sex offender registration, weapons prohibition, no-contact, and lifetime child-contact restrictions.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal and a related costs decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the City of Vaughan and $5,000 to the other responding parties.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial involving allegations of grooming, repeated sexual abuse of two child complainants, and child pornography offences, the court rejected the accused’s testimony as illogical, evasive, and inconsistent with the surrounding evidence.

Applying the W. (D.) framework and relying on corroborative text messages, forensic device evidence, sex toys containing DNA that could not exclude the complainant, and credible child-witness evidence, the court found the Crown proved the sexual offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also found the digital evidence established the accused made, accessed, and possessed child pornography on multiple devices, rejecting speculation that the material had been placed there by others.

Guilty verdicts were entered on all eight counts.

The appellant appealed the Township's failure to approve a site plan application for a six-storey retirement home within the legislated timeframe.

The primary issue was the Township's insistence on including a condition requiring the appellant to enter into a cost-sharing agreement with a neighbouring landowner for future permanent services.

The Tribunal found that cost-sharing is not an authorized condition under s. 41(7) of the Planning Act.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal and approved the site plan without the disputed cost-sharing condition, noting the development could be serviced independently.

The Township of Oro-Medonte and a ratepayers' alliance appealed an Ontario Land Tribunal decision that repealed a zoning by-law amendment aimed at regulating short-term rentals.

The Tribunal had found the by-law created a new land use prohibition that was overbroad and not in the public interest.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal afforded procedural fairness, correctly interpreted the existing zoning by-law, and made no error of law in concluding the amendment did not represent good planning.

The accused was charged with 27 counts of fraud over $5,000 and obtaining money by false pretences.

He solicited $30,000 loans from multiple lenders for a real estate development, falsely promising them a security interest in specific townhouse units.

The accused misappropriated the funds to pay himself a salary and cover personal expenses, and the development failed, resulting in the loss of the lenders' investments.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts, concluding he knowingly made false representations and committed dishonest acts that put the lenders' economic interests at risk.

The appellant, N.S., appealed his conviction for sexually assaulting two complainants, C.C. and R.Z., raising multiple grounds of appeal.

These grounds included alleged errors by the trial judge in dismissing a directed verdict motion, admitting similar fact evidence, failing to consider innocent collusion, applying different standards of scrutiny, creating a reasonable apprehension of bias, improperly applying the R. v. W.(D.) test, and imposing an excessive sentence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the conviction and the 15-month incarceration sentence.

Mark Godwin pleaded not guilty to impaired operation and over 80 mg.

The defence sought to exclude breath test results, alleging violations of Charter sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found that the police fulfilled their s. 10(b) obligations to facilitate access to counsel, the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable (no s. 8 breach), and the continued detention was lawful (no s. 9 breach) given the accused's high blood alcohol readings.

The court found the accused guilty of both charges, concluding that the breath test results were admissible and that there was ample evidence of impairment even without the readings.

This case involves an appeal by the accused against a finding of guilt and a Crown appeal against the sentence imposed for a sexual offense against a minor.

The Superior Court of Justice examined the trial judge's application of credibility assessment principles, particularly the R. v. W.(D.) and R. v. D.(J.J.R.) frameworks, in rejecting the accused's denial based on the compelling evidence of the complainant.

The court affirmed the trial judge's reasoning, finding it consistent with established jurisprudence.

Regarding the sentence appeal, the court acknowledged the trial judge's error in dismissing general deterrence but ultimately upheld the conditional discharge with probation, finding it within the range of appropriate dispositions given the specific circumstances of the offender and the successful completion of the sentence.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, Bradley Priestap, appealed his convictions for multiple counts of voyeurism, break and enter to commit voyeurism, possession of instruments for break and enter, and prowling.

He abandoned his sentence appeal.

The grounds of appeal were: the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons, erred by summarily dismissing an alternate suspect theory, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, no error in limiting evidence on an alternate suspect due to lack of connection, and no demonstration of prejudice from alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.

Four appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that their Charter s. 11(b) rights to be tried within a reasonable time were violated due to unreasonable delay.

The application judges had dismissed their s. 11(b) applications, finding that despite delays exceeding the Jordan ceiling (18 months), the Crown had demonstrated the cases were complex and had a concrete plan to minimize delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judges' decisions, finding no reversible error in their assessment of the Crown's plan and the complexity of the cases.

The accused was tried on historical sexual exploitation, sexual assault, and assault charges arising from his conduct toward teenage staff members at an after-school program and summer camp where he held supervisory authority.

The court found a strong pattern of predatorial grooming behaviour, including favoritism, underage drinking at staff gatherings, sexualized conversations, invitations to private sexual encounters, and exploitation of relationships of trust, authority, and dependency.

Applying the credibility framework in W. (D.) and the flexible approach to historical testimony from W. (R.), the court accepted the complainants' evidence and rejected the accused's evidence as not credible or reliable.

The Crown failed on one sexual exploitation count because it did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt the complainant's age at the time of one incident, but succeeded on the remaining counts.

Findings of guilt were entered on sexual exploitation, sexual assault, and assault offences as set out in the reasons.

The accused was tried on an indictment alleging multiple historical sexual offences against the complainant during her childhood and adolescence.

The court reviewed the complainant’s evidence, corroborative contextual evidence from her mother, and the accused’s denial.

While the court found the complainant testified in a straightforward manner and accepted that delayed disclosure was not unusual, reliability concerns remained regarding chronology, opportunity, and the mechanics of certain alleged incidents.

Applying the criminal standard of proof, the court concluded the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and entered acquittals on all counts.

On a Crown application in a judge-alone sexual offence trial, the court considered whether count-to-count evidence from two complainants and voir dire evidence from a third witness were admissible as similar fact and discreditable conduct evidence.

Applying the governing balancing framework, the court held the evidence was reasonably capable of belief, there was no evidence of actual collusion, and the surrounding circumstances demonstrated a sufficiently connected pattern of conduct relevant to actus reus, the accused's position of trust or authority, and the mens rea for sexual exploitation.

The court found the potential for moral and reasoning prejudice was reduced in the judge-alone, multi-count context and that the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect.

The evidence was admitted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application arguing that his rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b) were infringed and that evidence should be excluded under section 24(2).

The court found no breach of section 10(a) but found a three-minute delay in informing the accused of his right to counsel constituted a breach of section 10(b).

However, the court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) analysis, finding the breach was not serious enough to exclude the evidence.

The court also addressed the availability of the presumption of identity under transitional provisions and found it remained available for legacy cases.

The accused was found guilty.

The applicants, five co-accused in a complex drug trafficking prosecution, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable trial delay.

The anticipated delay was approximately 26 months, exceeding the 18-month ceiling for provincial court trials.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the case was 'particularly complex' under the Jordan framework due to voluminous disclosure (over 75,000 pages), multiple judicial authorizations, and the nature of the joint prosecution.

The court also found that the Crown had developed and followed a concrete plan to minimize delay.

The applicants brought a motion challenging the validity of three general warrants (dated June 30, August 13, and October 8, 2015) authorizing video surveillance and covert entries at 691 Bank Street in Ottawa as part of Project Step, a drug trafficking investigation.

The central issue was whether an Ontario Court of Justice judge had jurisdiction to authorize video surveillance under section 487.01(4) of the Criminal Code, or whether such authorization required a Superior Court of Justice judge.

The court found that the applicants had standing to challenge the warrants based on a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallway, albeit attenuated.

The court determined that video surveillance warrants must be signed by a Superior Court judge, not an Ontario Court of Justice judge, rendering the June 30 warrant invalid.

However, the court severed the covert entry portion of the June 30 warrant, which remained valid.

The court also quashed the portions of the August 13 and October 8 warrants authorizing entries into unit C, as the information supporting those entries was derived from the unlawful hallway surveillance.

Despite these findings, the court admitted all evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute given the good faith conduct of police and the attenuated privacy interests involved.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 milliliters of blood.

The trial judge found multiple Charter violations: the accused was detained for investigative purposes without being informed of the reason for detention or his right to counsel; he was not advised of his right to counsel immediately upon arrest; and he was unlawfully over-held in custody for approximately four hours following the breath testing procedure.

The trial judge excluded the breath sample readings and observations of impairment under section 24(2) of the Charter due to the cumulative effect of these breaches.

The over 80 charge was dismissed.

On the impaired driving charge, the trial judge found the evidence of impairment insufficient to meet the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.