Mark A. De Sanctis

The applicant, founder of a carpentry business, sought an oppression remedy against the respondent, the younger active manager and 49% shareholder.

The parties had entered into a unanimous shareholders' agreement to transition the business to the respondent while completing existing projects.

The respondent breached the agreement and his fiduciary duties by usurping the company's employees for his new competing business, failing to maintain proper financial records, and causing the original company to fail.

The court found the respondent liable for oppression and ordered him and his new company to jointly and severally disgorge $2,248,328 in profits.

The appellants challenged summary judgment enforcing a $2.1 million promissory note, arguing procedural unfairness, evidentiary error, and lack of consideration.

The court rejected all grounds and upheld enforceability against both appellants.

The plaintiff brought a motion for judgment pursuant to written Minutes of Settlement in a construction lien action.

The defendant disputed the plaintiff's claim for interest on outstanding invoices and argued the parties were not ad idem on essential terms.

The court found that a valid settlement agreement existed and that the parties had agreed to payment of $593,522.93 due on September 30, 2024.

The court granted judgment for the outstanding amount plus contractual interest from the due date, rejecting the defendant's argument that the Full and Final Mutual Release precluded interest accrual.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal and a related costs decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the City of Vaughan and $5,000 to the other responding parties.

The applicants sought judicial review to quash O. Reg. 382/19, which amended transitional rules for planning appeals before the Ontario Land Tribunal, arguing it was ultra vires its enabling statute.

The regulation reimposed a more restrictive procedural regime on third-party appeals of municipal planning decisions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Attorney General had broad, express statutory authority under s. 43.1 of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal Act, 2017 to make the transitional regulation.

The court held the regulation was consistent with the enabling statute and did not improperly deprive the applicants of vested substantive rights.

The court also declined to address procedural fairness issues, finding them premature as they should be raised in the applicants' pending motion for leave to appeal.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding it liable in nuisance and negligence for the migration of chemical contaminants from its property to the respondent's property.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to assess incremental damage caused after the appellant had knowledge of the migration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant could not advance a fundamentally new theory of defence that was neither pleaded nor supported by evidence at trial.

The court also upheld the trial judge's discretionary award of prejudgment interest.

Following a judgment awarding the plaintiff approximately $174,000 in damages for a failed real estate transaction, the court determined the issue of costs.

The plaintiff had served an offer to settle for $135,000 plus costs, which the defendants did not accept.

Because the final judgment was considerably more favourable than the plaintiff's offer, the court awarded partial indemnity costs up to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

Costs were fixed at $18,000 all inclusive, and prejudgment interest of $7,099.57 was also awarded.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment after the defendant failed to close on an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a residential property.

The defendant had struck out the financing condition but was ultimately unable to obtain a mortgage.

The plaintiff re-listed and sold the property for a lower price.

The court found the defendant in breach of the agreement and awarded the plaintiff damages for the difference in purchase price and carrying costs, less the deposit already paid.

The appellant purchaser appealed a summary judgment decision finding he unjustifiably repudiated an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property.

The purchaser argued the vendors failed to provide a survey complying with the agreement, rendering it null and void.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the survey was not essential to the transaction or the purchaser's ability to close, and dismissed the appeal.

Following a successful motion for summary judgment regarding a failed real estate transaction, the plaintiffs sought costs.

The plaintiffs had made a Rule 49 offer to settle for less than the judgment amount.

The court awarded elevated costs of $80,000 to the plaintiffs, citing the defendant's inappropriate conduct, which included making unfounded allegations of fraud and deceit against the plaintiffs' counsel.

The plaintiffs, Paul J. Hannivan and Pamela J. Hannivan, sued the defendant, Muhammad Wasi, for breach of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) after Wasi repudiated the deal, alleging the Hannivans failed to provide a proper survey.

The Hannivans moved for summary judgment on their claim for damages and on Wasi's counterclaim for the return of his deposit.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the Hannivans, finding that the survey issue was not essential to the transaction and did not entitle Wasi to repudiate the agreement.

The plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident case brought a motion to exclude potential jurors who pay auto insurance premiums, arguing they have an inherent conflict of interest.

The plaintiff sought to introduce survey evidence suggesting residents would limit damages to lower their premiums.

The court excluded the survey evidence as inadmissible hearsay that failed the threshold test for expert evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no statutory basis in the Juries Act to exclude such jurors or permit a broad challenge for cause, and no evidence of widespread bias to justify striking the jury notice.

The appellant, a plaintiff and defendant by counterclaim in a motor vehicle accident action, appealed a Master's order dismissing his motion to remove the plaintiffs' counsel of record due to an alleged conflict of interest.

The appellant argued that because he was counterclaimed against for contribution and indemnity regarding his co-plaintiff daughter's damages, their joint counsel was in a disqualifying conflict.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Master's conclusions that the risk of conflict was remote, that the clients had provided fully informed consent to waive any potential conflict, and that the risk of improper disclosure of confidential information was speculative.

The plaintiff brought a motion to exclude potential jurors or permit challenges for cause in a civil motor vehicle accident case, arguing that jurors who pay automobile insurance premiums have an inherent conflict of interest.

The court adjourned the motion, directing the plaintiff to serve the Attorney General and inviting The Advocates' Society to intervene as a friend of the court, recognizing the novel and broad implications of the issues raised regarding civil jury selection and impartiality.