Bhavini Lekhi

The moving party sought to review the Court of Appeal's dismissal of her appeal from a Superior Court order that struck her claim as an abuse of process.

The original claim arose from a 2018 administrative error by Service Ontario that erroneously transferred registered vehicle ownership.

The moving party's motion under Rule 59.06 alleged that the panel made false statements and that one panel member was biased.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, noting that the moving party had already unsuccessfully sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Tanya Rebello’s appeal from the order of Justice Robert Centa, which struck her statement of claim and dismissed her action regarding the erroneous transfer of her vehicle’s registration by ServiceOntario.

The court found no error in the motion judge’s findings that the claims were duplicative, constituted an abuse of process, and disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court also upheld the costs award against Ms. Rebello and declined to grant leave to appeal the costs order.

The moving party sought a panel review of a single judge's order dismissing her motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal.

The Court of Appeal, acting on its own initiative under Rule 2.1.02, dismissed the motion for panel review as an abuse of process.

The court noted the moving party's history of bringing meritless motions and attempting to re-litigate settled issues, concluding this was the clearest of cases warranting a Rule 2.1 dismissal.

The moving party was also prohibited from bringing further motions in the proceeding without leave.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her claims related to a mistaken Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) transfer in 2018 and a medical driver's license suspension in 2016, along with a substantial indemnity costs order of $100,000.

The trial judge had dismissed the claims as statute-barred and found the appellant lacked credibility regarding her parking tickets.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding there was no palpable and overriding error in the determination that the claims were statute-barred, as the appellant was aware of the facts giving rise to the claims well outside the limitation periods.

The Court also affirmed the costs award, noting the appellant's unreasonable conduct, failure to accept a Rule 49 offer, and history as an experienced litigant.

The defendant Crown moved to strike out the plaintiff's statement of claim and dismiss the action.

The court found that the allegations against Crown counsel, the Premier, the Attorney General, and the judiciary disclosed no reasonable cause of action, as they were protected by absolute privilege, lacked a private law duty of care, or were barred by statutory immunity.

The court also found that the remaining allegations were an abuse of process, as they attempted to relitigate issues already decided in multiple prior proceedings commenced by the plaintiff.

The statement of claim was struck out without leave to amend, and the action was dismissed with costs awarded to the Crown.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her lawsuit against the Ontario Provincial Police, alleging breaches of common law and statutory duties, mental anguish, privacy violations, defamation, and Charter rights violations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's reasoning regarding the claims, the decision to proceed without further discovery or summary trial, or the conduct of the hearing, including the order for an in-person attendance and the denial of an adjournment.

The court also upheld the costs award against the self-represented appellant.

The applicants sought judicial review to quash O. Reg. 382/19, which amended transitional rules for planning appeals before the Ontario Land Tribunal, arguing it was ultra vires its enabling statute.

The regulation reimposed a more restrictive procedural regime on third-party appeals of municipal planning decisions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Attorney General had broad, express statutory authority under s. 43.1 of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal Act, 2017 to make the transitional regulation.

The court held the regulation was consistent with the enabling statute and did not improperly deprive the applicants of vested substantive rights.

The court also declined to address procedural fairness issues, finding them premature as they should be raised in the applicants' pending motion for leave to appeal.

The Crown brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's class action statement of claim, which alleged de facto expropriation by the Crown due to delays at the Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) and the Residential Tenancies Act.

The Crown argued the claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action, was a nullity due to the plaintiff's failure to provide statutory notice under the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, and failed to specify the nature of relief claimed.

The court granted the motion, finding that the claim failed to plead the essential elements of de facto expropriation (no beneficial interest acquired by the Crown and no state action removing all reasonable uses of property).

The court also determined that the Crown could not be vicariously liable for the independent LTB's actions and that the proceeding was a nullity due to the plaintiff's admitted failure to provide the required 60-day notice to the Crown, rejecting the plaintiff's constitutional challenge to the notice requirement.

Leave to amend the statement of claim was denied as the defects were deemed incurable.

The plaintiffs' counsel, Rochon Genova LLP, sought an order to retain costs awarded by various courts, including post-judgment interest, as part of their contingency fee agreement.

The total amount of costs sought was over $5.6 million, bringing their total compensation to over $7.4 million.

The defendants took no position as the costs had already been paid.

The court approved the request, finding the contingency fee agreements fair and reasonable given the exceptional circumstances, high risk, complexity, and two-decade duration of the litigation, which involved novel claims and a protracted procedural history.

The court confirmed the request complied with section 28.1(8) of the Solicitors Act, noting no excessive fees or 'double-dipping.'

The plaintiff brought a $17 million action against the Crown, alleging negligent investigation, intentional infliction of mental suffering, breach of privacy, defamation, and Charter breaches arising from the OPP's response to her complaints about suspicious vehicles and trespassers.

The Crown moved for summary judgment.

The court found that the OPP investigated the complaints thoroughly and reasonably concluded no criminal activity occurred.

The court held that the police do not owe a private law duty of care to victims of crime for negligent investigation, and the plaintiff failed to provide evidence supporting her other claims.

The action was dismissed with costs awarded to the Crown on a partial indemnity scale.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal regarding the interest payable on compensation for expropriated land.

The appellant argued that interest should run from an earlier date based on a redevelopment use and at a higher rate of 12% due to delay.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Tribunal's factual findings that the productive use of the land was as a rental building and ceased only upon formal expropriation.

The Court also upheld the Tribunal's discretionary refusal to award a higher interest rate, as it had not been pleaded, and declined to consider a new claim for compound interest.

The defendant successfully dismissed the plaintiff's $15 million action after a three-day trial.

The plaintiff's claim stemmed from a mistaken vehicle permit transfer, but the court found her losses were due to her refusal to pay parking tickets.

The defendant sought substantial indemnity costs, citing a reasonable offer to settle that the self-represented plaintiff rejected.

The court awarded the defendant $100,000 in costs, finding the plaintiff's arguments obstructive and her decision to proceed to trial futile despite her experience as a litigant.

The self-represented plaintiff, Tanya Rebello, brought a motion seeking the recusal of Justice Robert Centa from hearing a summary judgment motion and her cross-motion, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court dismissed the recusal motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias, emphasizing the high threshold required to establish judicial impartiality, especially in the context of case management functions.

The judge addressed and rejected several grounds for recusal, including a prior decision involving the same Crown counsel, a complaint filed with the Canadian Judicial Council, procedural directions regarding reply factums and case conference scheduling, and issues concerning redacted police notes.

The plaintiff sued the Crown for damages arising from ServiceOntario's erroneous transfer of her vehicle's VIN and subsequent refusal to re-validate her license plates due to outstanding parking fines.

The court dismissed the claim, finding it entirely time-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and that any alleged harm was caused by the plaintiff's failure to pay her parking tickets, not the defendant's actions.

The court also found the plaintiff's testimony regarding the parking tickets and her representative's authority lacked credibility.

The applicants sought judicial review of two decisions by the Animal Care Review Board regarding their sled dog business.

The Board had confirmed orders requiring the applicants to improve living conditions for their dogs, including lengthening tethers and remediating doghouses.

When the applicants failed to comply, animal welfare inspectors removed approximately 230 dogs.

The Board subsequently ordered that most of the dogs not be returned until the applicants complied with the orders.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications for judicial review, finding the Board's interpretation of the tethering requirements reasonable and concluding that the removal and retention of the dogs were justified due to the applicants' ongoing non-compliance with the minimum standards of care.