Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: CV-19-00618436-0000

DATE: 2024-11-01

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

RE: Tanya Rebello, Plaintiff

-and-

His Majesty the King in right of Ontario as represented by the Attorney General for Ontario, the Premier of Ontario, and The Ministry of Attorney General Counsel Joanna Chan, Defendants

BEFORE: Robert Centa J.

COUNSEL: Tanya Rebello, self-represented litigant, plaintiff/responding party Adam Mortimer and Bhavini Lekhi, for His Majesty the King in right of Ontario, defendant/moving party

HEARD: October 21, 2024

ENDORSEMENT

[1] The defendant, His Majesty the King in right of Ontario, moves to strike out Tanya Rebello’s statement of claim in its entirety and for an order dismissing the action. The Crown makes three principal submissions.

[2] First, the Crown submits that although the statement of claim makes a series of allegations against counsel acting against Ms. Rebello’s interests, the Premier of Ontario, the Attorney General, and various members of the judiciary, the statement of claim does not disclose any reasonable causes of action. I agree with the Crown that these portions of the statement of claim are fatally flawed.

[3] Second, the Crown submits that the remaining allegations in the statement of claim should be dismissed because Ms. Rebello is seeking to relitigate issues that have been previously raised or decided in other actions and applications. I agree.

[4] Third, the Crown submits that the defects identified above are fatal and cannot be remedied through amendments. The Crown submits that the claim should be struck out without leave to amend and the action should be dismissed. I agree.

[5] For the reasons that follow, the statement of claim is struck out without leave to amend. The action is dismissed with costs payable by Ms. Rebello to the Crown on a partial indemnity scale, fixed in the amount of $6,243.55.

A. Preliminary matters

[6] At the beginning of the motion, Ms. Rebello raised two preliminary objections to the motion proceeding as scheduled.

No reasonable apprehension of bias

[7] First, Ms. Rebello requested that I recuse myself on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias. I declined to do so.

[8] In 2023, Ms. Rebello brought a motion in a different proceeding that asked for me to recuse myself because of a reasonable apprehension of bias. I dismissed that motion.[^1] I will not repeat the legal principles set out in paragraphs 22 to 28 of my reasons for decision in that other proceeding, but those principles apply with equal force to this motion, and I rely on them.

[9] In her current motion, Ms. Rebello repeats many of the allegations she made in her first motion. I do not accept her submissions and rely on paragraphs 29 to 72 of my earlier reasons for decision.[^2]

[10] In addition, Ms. Rebello submits that I demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias at the subsequent hearing of the Crown’s motion for summary judgment. She submits that I demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias by ordering that she attend the hearing in person and then by holding the hearing in her absence, by denying her an adjournment request, and by ordering her to pay costs of $24,247.69.

[11] I note that Ms. Rebello appealed my decision unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, which held that I exercised my discretion reasonably, that there was no breach of natural justice, and that the costs order was reasonable.[^3]

[12] I find that an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, and having thought the matter through, would not think that it is more likely than not that I, whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide this case fairly. Therefore, I dismiss Ms. Rebello’s motion.

[13] Finally, I repeat the concerns that I previously expressed regarding how frequently Ms. Rebello alleges that judicial officers have demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias against her. As I noted, Ms. Rebello had previously raised allegations of bias against Masters Short and Sugunasiri (as she then was) and Dow, Myers, Dunphy, Papageorgiou, and Pinto JJ.[^4] Subsequent to my previous decision, Ms. Rebello brought a motion asking Associate Justice Frank to recuse himself due to a reasonable apprehension of bias.[^5] None of these motions were found to have any merit.

[14] As the Court of Appeal for Ontario has observed, unfounded claims of bias cause delay and impose added cost to other litigants and the court system.[^6]

No basis for an adjournment

[15] Second, Ms. Rebello requested that I adjourn this motion because deciding it could adversely affect her outstanding appeals or applications for leave to appeal certain decisions referenced in her statement of claim, and because those appeals or applications for leave to appeal could affect the issues raised in this motion.

[16] I disagreed with Ms. Rebello’s submissions and dismissed her motion for an adjournment. It will be convenient to explain why I do not accept Ms. Rebello’s submissions at the end of these reasons for decision.

B. The statement of claim

[17] Ms. Rebello commenced this action on April 18, 2019. She named the Premier of Ontario, the Attorney General of Ontario, and Joanna Chan, counsel for the Crown, as defendants. On July 13, 2022, the plaintiff received leave to add the Crown as a defendant.

[18] On August 11, 2022, Ms. Rebello amended her claim. She abandoned the action against the Premier, the Attorney General, and Ms. Chan. The newly constituted action named the Crown as the sole defendant.

[19] On March 30, 2023, Ms. Rebello amended her claim again and added pleadings about her prior dealings with the Ministry of Transportation (“MTO”) and the Ontario Provincial Police. In the current version of the statement of claim, which spans 202 paragraphs, Ms. Rebello seeks a range of declarations, and $9.8 million for negligence, gross negligence, intrusion upon seclusion, breach of contract, breach of confidence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and breach of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act.[^7]

C. No reasonable cause of action

[20] The proper approach on a rule 21.01(1)(b) motion is well settled.[^8] I am to take the facts asserted in the statement of claim as true unless they are patently incapable of proof or are merely bald conclusory statements of fact, unsupported by material facts.[^9] I am to read the statement of claim generously. The ultimate question is whether it is plain and obvious, assuming the facts pleaded to be true, that each of the pleaded claims discloses no reasonable cause of action. This is true where:

a. the allegations do not give rise to a cause of action;

b. the plaintiff fails to plead a necessary element of a cause of action; or

c. the allegations in the pleading are conjecture, assumptions, or speculation unsupported by material facts.

[21] This is a stringent test, and the moving party must satisfy a very high threshold.[^10] However, if the claim has no reasonable prospect of success, where it is plain and obvious that the action cannot succeed, it should not be allowed to proceed to trial. Plaintiffs may not plead bald conclusions. If plaintiffs lack knowledge of the facts necessary to support the causes of action, they ought not to make the allegation in the statement of claim.

[22] I find that there are four sets of allegations that do not disclose a reasonable cause of action against the Crown. Specifically, the allegations against Crown counsel, the Premier, the Attorney General, and the judiciary should be struck out because they do not disclose a reasonable cause of action.

[23] First, Ms. Rebello pleads that the three Crown counsel, Adam Mortimer, Bhavini Lekhi, and Joanna Chan:

a. negligently over-charged their fees and fabricated the hours of work performed in bills of costs submitted to the court;

b. breached duties of care owed to Ms. Rebello to provide full disclosure of their bills of costs and to comply with the provisions of the Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S. 15;

c. negligently provided a judge with a false draft order; and

d. negligently informed the court about the status of a motion to strike an action.

[24] None of these allegations disclose a reasonable cause of action. Statements made by counsel in a legal proceeding are subject to an absolute privilege and cannot form the basis of a cause of action. This immunity extends to any action, however framed.[^11] Lawyers owe fiduciary duties to their own clients, they do not owe duties of care to opposing parties in litigation.[^12] The Crown cannot be vicariously liable for the conduct of Crown counsel because Crown counsel themselves owed no duties in tort to Ms. Rebello.[^13] For these reasons, I strike out the allegations in paragraphs 44, 47-51, 57, 70-78, 92-93, 152-153, and 193 of the statement of claim.

[25] Second, Ms. Rebello pleads that the Premier and the Attorney General are vicariously liable for misconduct of Crown employees and agents and that, in turn, the Crown is vicariously liable for the Premier and the Attorney General. These allegations do not disclose a reasonable cause of action because Ministers are not liable for the tortious conduct of other Crown servants or agents.[^14] A claim against a Minister of the Crown is a claim against the Minister personally and the Crown may be held vicariously liable for torts committed personally by Ministers. I agree with the Crown that the statement of claim discloses few allegations against the Premier and the Attorney General personally. In its factum, the Crown identified seven allegations that, if the statement of claim is read in the most generous way, could be about the Premier and the Attorney General personally:

a. The Premier and/or the Attorney General failed to put policies, procedures and systems in place with the Ministry of Transportation and the Ministry of Government and Consumer Services to prevent the transfer of Ms. Rebello’s VIN and providing funding to those ministries;

b. The Premier negligently failed to put and ensure policies, procedures, and systems in place before funding the OPP;

c. The Premier and the Attorney General denied the Plaintiff access to justice and right to be heard by failing to put policies, procedures, and systems in place with the Ontario Superior Court;

d. The Premier and the Attorney General are responsible for inaction and reckless conduct in other proceedings to which they were not parties;

e. The Attorney General is negligent for not supervising his counsel;

f. The Premier and the Attorney General breached Ms. Rebello’s confidence and trust by allowing the Ontario Superior Court of Justice to knowingly and deliberately sign a false draft order;

g. All of the Premier’s and Attorney General’s conduct as described in the statement of claim was intentional, outrageous, degrading, cruel, intimidating, bullying, harassment, stalking, and unlawful causing harm to Ms. Rebello.

[26] None of the pleaded actions are of the sort to give rise to a private law duty of care owed by the Premier and the Attorney General to Ms. Rebello. Ms. Rebello’s pleadings are bald and conclusory and contain no material facts or particulars sufficient to survive a motion to strike.[^15] For these reasons, I strike out the allegations in paragraphs 1(c), 52-56, 63-64, 67, 69, 74, 76-82, 86, 88, 90-93, 97-98, 100, 102, 122, 125-133, 143, 154-155, 159-165, 168, 170, 173, 177, 179, 188, and 193 of the statement of claim.

[27] Third, Ms. Rebello pleads that the Crown is vicariously liable for the actions of members of the judiciary in other actions and applications that she initiated. Ms. Rebello alleges that she has suffered harms at the hands of Dunphy, Myers, O’Brien, Sugunasiri JJ., and Master Short. This portion of Ms. Rebello’s pleading has several fatal flaws. It is an abuse of process because it represents a collateral attack on the prior decisions of judicial officers.[^16] In addition, pursuant to s. 9(2)(b) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, the Crown cannot be subject to a proceeding in respect of anything done by a person discharging judicial responsibilities.[^17] For these reasons, I strike out the allegations in paragraphs 56, 82-91, 94-97, 131-143, and 154-165 of the statement of claim.

C. Attempts to relitigate prior actions and applications

[28] The Crown submits that the balance of the allegations in the statement of claim are an attempt to relitigate issues that have already been decided by the court in other actions and applications commenced by Ms. Rebello. The Crown submits that the balance of the claim should be dismissed pursuant to rules 21.01(c) and (d) as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process. I agree.

[29] The Court of Appeal for Ontario described the abuse of process doctrine this way:

Abuse of process is a broad, flexible doctrine. It serves as an adaptable judicial tool to address circumstances that threaten the fairness and integrity of the court’s process and the administration of justice. It is not restricted to preventing the re-litigation of issues or addressing issues that could have been raised in previous proceedings. Rather, it becomes engaged “to prevent the misuse of [the court’s] procedure, in a way that would be manifestly unfair to a party to the litigation before it or would in some other way bring the administration of justice into disrepute.”[^18]

[30] In the current statement of claim, Ms. Rebello makes a series of allegations related to her treatment by counter staff at Service Ontario and by MTO staff. Ms. Rebello raised all these allegations in a proceeding bearing court file No. CV-21-00674538-0000. Justice Morgan dismissed that action in reasons for decision dated January 30, 2023.[^19] Justice Morgan described the dispute as follows:

On April 16, 2018, ServiceOntario mistakenly transferred the Plaintiff’s Vehicle Identification Number (“VIN”) from her name to the name of Hollywood North Auto Parts Inc. (“Hollywood North”), a third party unrelated in any way to the Plaintiff or her vehicle. At the same time, ServiceOntario apparently recorded her car as being in “wrecked” condition and detached, or invalidated, the vehicle’s license plate.

No one seems to know how this could have happened. But it was clearly a mistake.

The erroneous transfer was brought to the attention of ServiceOntario on May 16, 2018. The Plaintiff had apparently reported the matter to the police. Two weeks later, on June 1, 2018, following confirmation by Hollywood North and the Toronto Police Service that Hollywood North did not own or possess the Plaintiff’s vehicle and that the transfer was in error, the MTO transferred the VIN back to the Plaintiff’s name.

The MTO also acknowledged that the car was not wrecked, and it began the process of re-attaching, or re-associating, the license plate with the Plaintiff’s vehicle. The plates were in any case due for renewal, and the MTO went through its usual renewal process. In doing so, it then discovered that the Plaintiff had numerous outstanding parking tickets registered against her in the Defaulted Fines Control Centre of the Ontario Court of Justice.

Pursuant to Part II of the Highway Traffic Act, RSO 1990, c. H.8, s. 7(10) and Parking Infractions, RRO 1990, Reg. 949, s. 9(2), the supervisor of the Defaulted Fines Control Centre “shall direct that any permit issued to the person in default under Part II of the Highway Traffic Act not be validated and no new permit be issued to that person until the fine is paid.” The MTO therefore applied this mandatory policy to the Plaintiff and refrained from issuing new plates or renewing the previous plates and re-associating them with the Plaintiff’s vehicle until such time as the outstanding fines relating to her parking tickets were paid.

The Plaintiff has objected to this course of action by the Defendant. She claims that she had received no parking tickets and that she owed no fines for any parking infractions. In pursuing this position, she refused to pay what the MTO said was owing, and has sued the government of Ontario claiming damages for the ongoing harm she says the government has caused her.[^20]

[31] After a multi-day trial, Morgan J. held that Ms. Rebello’s statement of claim was commenced more than two years after the date that she could have discovered any of the causes of action contained within it; accordingly, it was barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B.

[32] Ms. Rebello has appealed the decision of Morgan J. to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, and I was advised that the appeal was to be argued on October 25, 2024. Ms. Rebello may succeed on her appeal. If she does, she may continue to prosecute that action in whatever way the Court of Appeal permits. However, what she may not do, is include those allegations in this statement of claim.

[33] I find that the allegations at paragraphs 1(a)-(b), (d), 5-43, 45-46, 59-62, 64-66, 68, 103-125, 149, 169, 172, 183, and 187 of the statement of claim are duplicative of the matters raised in the proceeding bearing court file No. CV-21-00674538-0000. I dismiss those allegations as an abuse of process.

[34] Ms. Rebello also makes allegations in this statement of claim related to the dismissal of a different action involving the MTO bearing court file No. CV-18-5999902. Justice Dunphy dismissed that action in an unreported endorsement dated March 29, 2019, but granted leave to Ms. Rebello to commence a fresh action. Instead, Ms. Rebello pursued motions for leave to appeal that were dismissed by the Divisional Court, the Court of Appeal for Ontario, and the Supreme Court of Canada.

[35] I find that the allegations at paragraphs 70-73, and 87 of the statement of claim are duplicative of the matters raised in the proceeding bearing court file No. CV-18-5999902. I dismiss those allegations as an abuse of process.

[36] Ms. Rebello makes a series of allegations in this statement of claim related to her treatment by the Ontario Provincial Police. Ms. Rebello raised all these allegations in a proceeding bearing court file No. CV-17-569102-0000. I dismissed that action on a motion for summary judgment in reasons for decision dated June 13, 2023.[^21] I described the dispute as follows:

On November 25, 2015, Tanya Rebello contacted the Ontario Provincial Police to complain about a car that frequently drove by her house, most often between 4:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. The OPP investigated, identified the car, spoke to the driver, and learned that the driver was delivering the Toronto Star newspaper to Ms. Rebello’s neighbour. The police concluded that there was no criminal activity afoot and told Ms. Rebello what they had learned. Ms. Rebello did not accept this explanation.

On April 23, 2018, Ms. Rebello contacted the OPP to complain that a woman was trespassing on her property and appeared to be digging holes or burying objects in her yard. The OPP investigated and spoke with Ms. Rebello’s neighbour, who apologized profusely, and explained that his wife suffered from dementia and severe mental health issues, and sometimes wandered off. The police concluded that there was no criminal activity and told Ms. Rebello what they learned. Ms. Rebello did not accept this explanation. Instead, she stated that it “is very clear that there was criminal intent and [the OPP officer] failed to perform his duties and arrest this woman trying to harm” Ms. Rebello.

Rather than accept the results of the police investigation, Ms. Rebello issued a $17 million claim against the defendant His Majesty The King in Right of Ontario as represented by the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services (Ontario Provincial Police). She summarizes her claim as follows:

The plaintiff Ms. Tanya Rebello filed numerous complaints and police reports with the defendant The Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) to which the OPP failed to prevent crimes from being committed against the plaintiff who was a victim of crimes of stalking, trespassing, intimidation, threatening and voyeurisms. The OPP failed to assist and the plaintiff's who was a victim of crimes against her, by failing to laid [sic] charges and stop this person from terrorizing almost every night as per their duty and responsibility.

The defendant (OPP) allowed the person driving the white Mitsubishi with licence plate [omitted], to stalk harass and terrorize the plaintiff numerous times at irregular hours at night (12:00am-5:00am), for a number of years, and did not even charge this person for these criminal actions.

The plaintiff Ms. Tanya Rebello was and still is continually being stalked, harassed and violated by this person driving the white Mitsubishi with licence plate [omitted], on her street and property at [omitted] making it impossible for her to live there on her property for no justifiable reason, to which the OPP did nothing to protect her and was negligent in their actions and inactions.

The plaintiff was and is still being denied her Charter of rights and freedom section 7 by the defendant.

[37] Ms. Rebello’s appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario was dismissed.[^22] Ms. Rebello advised that she intends to seek leave to appeal this decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario to the Supreme Court of Canada. She is free to do so and, if she is ultimately successful, to prosecute that action in whatever way the Supreme Court of Canada allows. However, what she may not do, is include those same allegations in a subsequent action.

[38] I find that the allegations at paragraphs 1(d), 101, 166-167, 169, 172, 177, 179, 182, and 184 of the statement of claim are duplicative of the matters raised in the proceeding bearing court file No. CV-17-569102-0000. I dismiss those allegations as an abuse of process.

[39] Ms. Rebello makes a series of Charter allegations related to her treatment in the court system. Ms. Rebello raised all of these allegations in a proceeding bearing court file No. CV-23-00700679-0000. Justice Merritt described the dispute as follows:

On June 7, 2023, the Applicant Tanya Rebello (Ms. Rebello) issued an Application against the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of Ontario seeking decelerations that the Respondents have created a justice system which is in disrepute and have breached ss. 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. She also seeks decelerations that the Respondents have obligations to implement a court system that prevents breaches of Charter rights and denials of access to justice and an order requiring the Respondents to implement an effective justice system.

[40] In an unreported decision dated June 20, 2023, Merritt J. dismissed the application as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process. On July 17, 2023, Ms. Rebello appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal for Ontario. The Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal.[^23] Ms. Rebello may not advance these claims in this proceeding.

[41] I find that the allegations at paragraphs 144-147, 150-151 and 198 of the statement of claim are duplicative of the matters raised in the proceeding bearing court file number No. CV- 23-00700679-0000. I dismiss those allegations as an abuse of process.

[42] Having now explained the overlap between this statement of claim and the earlier actions, let me return to the two grounds advanced by Ms. Rebello in support of her request that I adjourn this motion.

[43] First, Ms. Rebello argued that this motion should be adjourned because a decision on the merits could prejudice her outstanding appeals or applications for leave to appeal in the earlier proceedings. There is no merit to this submission. My decision to strike out her duplicative claims as an abuse of process will not impair Ms. Rebello’s ability to pursue those avenues of appeal. My decision on this motion is entirely irrelevant to Ms. Rebello’s appeals or applications for leave to appeal in other proceedings.

[44] Second, Ms. Rebello submits that the outcome of her appeals or applications for leave to appeal will affect the correct disposition of this motion. I disagree. If she is successful on those appeals, she will be able to pursue those claims as directed and permitted by the appellate court. Even if her appeals are all successful, that success will not permit her to advance those claims in this litigation.

[45] I concluded, therefore, that neither of Ms. Rebello’s submissions justified adjourning this motion and I dismissed her motion for an adjournment.

D. No leave to amend

[46] I exercise my discretion and do not grant Ms. Rebello leave to amend again the statement of claim.

[47] The statement of claim before me is the second version of the claim and it contains radical defects that are incapable of being cured.

[48] I was not provided with a draft amended statement of claim or any proposed language that would solve the defects that I have identified. In these circumstances, I would not grant leave to amend the statement of claim for a third time.[^24]

E. Costs

[49] I have reviewed the bill of costs submitted by Ontario and the written submissions on costs delivered by Ms. Rebello.

[50] In my view, it is appropriate to fix costs on a partial indemnity scale as opposed to a substantial indemnity scale.

[51] The Crown was successful on this motion, which resulted in the entire action being dismissed. The importance of these issues to the Crown is obvious, given the wide-ranging and serious allegations made by Ms. Rebello. The costs claimed by the Crown for this motion are objectively reasonable for this proceeding.

[52] The rate for salaried Crown counsel is to be determined based on a reasonable rate for independent counsel of comparable experience. Costs are not to be disallowed or reduced merely because they relate to a lawyer who is a salaried officer of the Crown.[^25]

[53] Ms. Rebello, although self-represented, is an experienced litigant.[^26] She should reasonably have expected to pay a costs order on the scale of the one sought by the Crown if she was not successful.

[54] I order that Ms. Rebello pay the costs of this motion on a partial indemnity scale, fixed in the amount of $6,243.55, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, to the Minister of Finance for Ontario within 30 days of this decision.

Robert Centa J.

Date: November 1, 2024

[^1]: Rebello v. Ontario, 2023 ONSC 1544. [^2]: Rebello v. Ontario, 2023 ONSC 1544, at paragraphs 29 to 72. [^3]: Rebello v. Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2024 ONCA 718, at paras. 6 to 17. [^4]: Rebello v. Ontario, 2023 ONSC 1544, at paras. 3-10. [^5]: Rebello v. Del Property Management et al, 2024 ONSC 573. [^6]: Miracle v. Maracle III, 2017 ONCA 195, at para. 6. [^7]: Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31. [^8]: R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2011 SCC 42, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 45, at para. 22; Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, 1985 CanLII 74 (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, at p. 455; Atlantic Lottery Corp. Inc. v. Babstock, 2020 SCC 19, [2020] 2 S.C.R. 420, at para. 14; FNF Enterprises Inc. v. Wag and Train Inc., 2023 ONCA 92, 165 O.R. (3d) 401, at para. 12; Fernandez Leon v. Bayer Inc., 2023 ONCA 629, at para. 8; Asghar v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2019 ONCA 479; MacKinnon v. Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement Board, 2007 ONCA 874, 88 O.R. (3d) 269; Tran v. University of Western Ontario, 2015 ONCA 295; Stronach v. York Region, 2023 ONSC 1264, at para. 12; MacLean v. National CarWash Solutions, 2020 ONSC 6032, at para. 22; and Region Plaza Inc. v Hamilton-Wentworth (Regional Municipality) (1990), 1990 CanLII 6761 (ON SC), 12 O.R. (3d) 750 (Ont. S.C.). [^9]: Trillium Power Wind Corp. v. Ontario (Ministry of Natural Resources), 2013 ONCA 683, 117 O.R. (3d) 721, at para. 31; Balanyk v. University of Toronto (1999), 1999 CanLII 14918 (ON SC), 1 C.P.R. (4th) 300 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 29. [^10]: PMC York Properties Inc. v. Siudak, 2022 ONCA 635, 473 D.L.R. (4th) 136, at para. 30. [^11]: Samuel Manu-Tech Inc. v. Redipac Recycling Corporation (1999), 1999 CanLII 3776 (ON CA), 124 O.A.C. 125 (Ont. C.A.); Amato v. Welsh, 2013 ONCA 258, 362 D.L.R. (4th) 38, at para 34. [^12]: Curtis v. McCague Borlack LLP, 2024 ONCA 729, at para. 8. [^13]: Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 7, Sched. 17, at s. 8(2). [^14]: Deep v. Ontario (2004), [2004] O.T.C. 541, at para. 83. [^15]: Andrin Hillsborough Limited v. Eliaszadeh, 2021 ONSC 3229, at para 23. [^16]: Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 SCR 77, at para. 33 ff. [^17]: Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019, at s. 9(2)(b). [^18]: La Française IC 2 v. Wires, 2024 ONCA 171, at para 8, citing: Behn v. Moulton Contracting Ltd., 2013 SCC 26, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 227, at paras. 39-41, citing Canam Enterprises Inc. v. Coles (2000), 2000 CanLII 8514 (ON CA), 51 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 55, per Goudge J.A. (dissenting), rev’d 2002 SCC 63, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 307, and R. v. Scott, 1990 CanLII 27 (SCC), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 979, at p. 1007, per McLachlin J. (dissenting) and Law Society of Saskatchewan v. Abrametz, 2022 SCC 29, 470 D.L.R. (4th), at paras. 34-35. [^19]: Rebello v. Ontario, 2023 ONSC 601. [^20]: Rebello v. Ontario, 2023 ONSC 601, at paras. 1-6. [^21]: Rebello v Ontario, 2023 ONSC 3574. [^22]: Rebello v. Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2024 ONCA 718. [^23]: Rebello v. Canada (Attorney General), 2024 ONCA 112. [^24]: Grigonis v. Toronto Boardsailing Club, 2010 ONCA 651; Furney v. Staples, 2022 ONSC 6951, at paras. 22-25; 9383859 Canada Ltd. v. Saeed, 2020 ONSC 4883, at paras 54-59. [^25]: Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, at s. 36; Ontario v. Rothmans Inc., 2012 ONSC 1804, 28 C.P.C. (7th) 103, aff’d 2013 ONCA 353, 115 O.R. (3d) 561, leave to appeal refused [2013] S.C.C.A. No. 327; and Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, at s. 131(2). [^26]: See, in addition to the other cases cited in these reasons for decision, Rebello v. The Bank of Nova Scotia, 2018 ONSC 7127, Rebello v. Paragon Security et al., 2020 ONSC 2303, Rebello v. Del Property Management, 2021 ONSC 7888, Rebello v. The Bank of Nova Scotia, 2018 ONSC 4776, Rebello v. The Bank of Nova Scotia, 2017 ONSC 6586, Rebello v. Attorney General for Ontario, 2021 ONSC 6502, Rebello v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario, 2021 ONSC 3752.