Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: CV-18-00607758-0000 MOTION HEARD: 2023-12-06

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: TANYA REBELLO, plaintiff AND: DEL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT et al, defendants

BEFORE: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE R. FRANK

COUNSEL: Eric Turkienicz and Winona Fitch for the defendants Paragon Security, Sam Reza, and Ronald Crabb Tanya Rebello, self-represented plaintiff

HEARD: December 6, 2023

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1] This is a motion by the defendants Paragon Security, Sam Reza, and Ronald Crabb (the “Paragon Defendants”) for an order dismissing this action as against them (the “Dismissal Motion”) on the basis that the plaintiff is in default of: (a) a security for costs order dated April 27, 2020 (the “Security for Costs Order”); and (b) various costs orders relating to the Paragon Defendants’ motion that resulted in the Security for Costs Order and appeals therefrom (the “Costs Orders”), as detailed below. [1]

[2] The plaintiff brings a cross-motion (the “Cross-motion”) seeking:

1. An order that I recuse myself from hearing the Dismissal Motion (the “Recusal Motion”).
2. An order staying the Dismissal Motion until the Certificate of Stay issued on September 20, 2022 by the Court of Appeal in Court of Appeal File No. C-70156 (the “Certificate of Stay”) has been removed and set aside.
3. An order staying the Dismissal Motion until the completion of the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada dismissing the plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada in Court File No. 40644 (the “Reconsideration Motion”).
4. An order staying the Dismissal Motion until: (i) the completion of the plaintiff’s motion to have all of the Paragon Defendants’ costs assessed under Rule 58 and requiring production of all the docket entries of the per hour work done for each date of the costs claimed; and (ii) completion of the plaintiff’s cross-examination on the affidavit of Winona Fitch sworn January 16, 2023 (the “Fitch Affidavit”) and the affidavit of Theresa Hartley sworn June 29, 2023 (the “Hartley Affidavit”).
5. In the alternative, an order striking out the Fitch Affidavit and the Hartley Affidavit, and ordering that the evidence in those affidavits cannot be used or relied on by the Paragon Defendants in respect of the Dismissal Motion.
6. An order to vary the amount of security costs to be posted by the plaintiff to a lower amount and to extend the time to post the security.
7. An order that the costs for the Dismissal Motion and of this action be assessed under Rule 58 once the stay for all the above orders has expired.

[3] At the hearing of the Dismissal Motion and Cross-motion, I dismissed Ms. Rebello’s motion for an order that I recuse myself from hearing those motions with reasons to follow. I also dismissed Ms. Rebello’s motion to stay or adjourn the Dismissal Motion on the basis of the Certificate of Stay or the Reconsideration Motion, with reasons to follow. Those reasons are outlined in these Reasons for Decision.

[4] I then heard submissions from the parties with respect to Ms. Rebello’s Cross-motion for an order:

(a) staying the Dismissal Motion until: (i) completion of the plaintiff’s motion to have all of the Paragon Defendants’ costs assessed under Rule 58 and production of all the docket entries of the per hour work done for each date of the costs claimed; and (ii) completion of the plaintiff’s cross-examination on the Fitch Affidavit and Hartley Affidavit; or (b) in the alternative, striking out the Fitch Affidavit and the Hartley Affidavit.

I dismissed those parts of the Cross-motion with reasons to follow. Those reasons are outlined in these Reasons for Decision.

[5] I then heard submissions from the parties with respect to:

(a) the Dismissal Motion; and (b) those aspects of the Cross-motion seeking: (i) an order to vary the Security for Costs Order by lowering the amount of security for costs to be posted by the plaintiff and extending the time to post the security; and (ii) an order that the costs for this motion and of this action be assessed under Rule 58.

[6] For the reasons that follow:

(a) the plaintiff’s Cross-motion is dismissed; and (b) the Paragon Defendants’ Dismissal Motion is granted and the action is dismissed as against the Paragon Defendants.

A. BACKGROUND AND LITIGATION HISTORY

(i) Security for Costs Motion – procedural history

[7] The plaintiff commenced this action by Statement of Claim issued on October 29, 2018. The plaintiff’s claim named a condominium corporation, its property manager, the Paragon Defendants (the security company hired by the property manager and various security guards it employed), and others.

[8] The claim alleges, among other things, that the Paragon Defendants, in concert and in conspiracy with the other defendants, worked with the Toronto Police Service to harass and surveil the plaintiff, plant listening devices in her condominium unit, allow occupants of other condominium units to monitor and harass the plaintiff, manufacture false fire inspection notices to gain access to the plaintiff’s unit, and to have the plaintiff arrested for a crime she did not commit. In her claim, the plaintiff is seeking $35 million in damages, $10 million in punitive damages and $5 million in aggravated or exemplary damages.

[9] The Paragon Defendants brought a motion for security for costs (the “Security for Costs Motion”). The lengthy procedural history of the Security for Costs Motion includes the following: [2]

(a) the Security for Costs Motion was originally returnable on December 19, 2019. The motion was brought under Rule 56.01(1)(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure alleging that there is good reason to believe that the plaintiff’s action is frivolous and vexatious and that the plaintiff has insufficient assets in Ontario to pay the defendants’ costs. (b) On November 26, 2019, the plaintiff brought an “urgent” motion seeking to adjourn the defendants’ motion from December 19, 2019 to a date in May 2020. Master Sugunasiri (as she then was) adjourned the motion from December 19, 2019 until January 27, 2020, in order to give the plaintiff further time to prepare her response to the motion but did so on a peremptory basis. (c) On December 6, 2020, the plaintiff appeared in Civil Practice Court – also on an urgent basis – seeking to schedule an appeal of the adjournment decision. Myers J. scheduled the requested appeal for a hearing on January 22, 2020 noting that he was scheduling the appeal on that date in order to allow it to be heard without disrupting the peremptory adjournment order being appealed from. A further appearance attempting to vary the terms of the adjournment followed on December 20, 2019, again in Civil Practice Court, but this time before Dow J. This second effort was not successful. (d) On January 22, 2020, O’Brien J. dismissed the appeal of the adjournment order with costs but granted the plaintiff further time to late-file her responding material to the Security for Costs Motion. O’Brien J. ordered the plaintiff to pay the Paragon Defendants costs of that appeal in the amount $2,000 (the “January 22, 2020 Costs Order”). (e) The Security for Costs Motion was heard on January 27, 2020 by Master Sugunasiri (as she then was). The matter was taken under reserve. By written reasons released on April 27, 2020, the motion was granted. [3] Pursuant to the Security for Costs Order, the plaintiff was ordered to post security for costs in the amount of $23,713.93 within sixty days that order. (f) Following written costs submissions, Master Sugunasiri (as she then was) ordered the plaintiff to pay to the Paragon Defendants costs in the amount of $12,037.71 (the “June 4, 2020 Costs Order”). [4]

[10] The plaintiff appealed the Security for Costs Order and the January 22, 2020 Costs Order to a single judge. That appeal was heard on November 29, 2021 by Justice Dunphy. The appeal was dismissed from the bench and formal reasons followed on December 14, 2021. [5] Dunphy J. awarded costs of the appeal to the Paragon Defendants on a substantial indemnity basis in the amount of $16,969.63 (the “December 14, 2021 Costs Order”).

[11] The plaintiff appealed Dunphy J.’s dismissal of her appeal. Initially, Ms. Rebello sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court, but she ultimately abandoned that appeal. Ms. Rebello also brought an appeal to the Court of Appeal.

[12] On October 14, 2022, the Paragon Defendants brought a motion before the Court of Appeal to quash the plaintiff’s appeal on jurisdictional grounds. Ms. Rebello brought a cross-motion seeking leave to appeal the Security for Costs Order and the June 4, 2020 Costs Order. On October 21, 2022, the Court of Appeal granted the Paragon Defendants’ motion to quash and dismissed Ms. Rebello’s appeal and cross‑motion. [6] The Court of Appeal awarded the Paragon Defendants costs of the appeal in the amount of $4,187.83 (the “Court of Appeal Costs Order”).

[13] The plaintiff subsequently brought an application for leave to appeal the October 21, 2022 order of the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. The application for leave to appeal was denied. The plaintiff then filed a motion for reconsideration of her application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

(ii) Dismissal Motion and Cross-motion – procedural history

[14] The Paragon Defendants’ Dismissal Motion was originally scheduled to be heard on February 22, 2023. The plaintiff requested an attendance in Civil Practice Court to seek an adjournment of the Dismissal Motion. The plaintiff disputed the return date and advised that she intended to bring a cross-motion to stay the Dismissal Motion and cross-examine the affiant who had sworn an affidavit in support of the motion.

[15] On January 17, 2023, the parties appeared in Civil Practice Court before Ramsay J. who dismissed the plaintiff’s adjournment request because it related to a motion to be heard by an associate judge and should have been made to an associate judge. The plaintiff then requested a case conference before an associate judge. At a February 7, 2023 case conference, Associate Justice Brott adjourned the Dismissal Motion to July 12, 2023.

[16] At the return of the Dismissal Motion on July 12, 2023, the plaintiff sought a further adjournment of the motion on several grounds, including that: (1) she had brought an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada with respect to the dismissal of her appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal relating to the Security for Costs Order, which application for leave to appeal remained pending; and (2) the issues before the court, including issues involved in the Cross-motion brought by the plaintiff required a lengthy hearing such that the Dismissal Motion and Cross‑motion should be heard together as a long motion. The Paragon Defendants opposed the adjournment request. As outlined in my July 12, 2023 endorsement, I reluctantly adjourned the Dismissal Motion and Cross-motion to December 6, 2023, peremptory on the plaintiff.

[17] As noted above, by way of the Cross-motion, the plaintiff seeks an order that I recuse myself from the Dismissal Motion and the Cross-motion, a stay of the Dismissal Motion, an order requiring production from the Paragon Defendants and an order requiring continued cross‑examinations, or alternatively an order striking certain affidavits from the record. In the further alternative, the plaintiff seeks an order varying the amount of security for costs ordered to be paid and an extension of time to pay such costs.

B. ISSUES

[18] The issues on the Dismissal Motion and Cross-motion are as follows:

1. Should I recuse myself from hearing the Dismissal Motion and the Cross-motion?
2. Should the Dismissal Motion be stayed on the basis of the Certificate of Stay?
3. Should the Dismissal Motion be stayed on the basis of the Reconsideration Motion?
4. Should the Dismissal Motion be stayed pending: (a) completion of an assessment of the Paragon Defendants’ costs under Rule 58, and (b) pending production of dockets and correspondence with respect to such costs and continued cross-examination of Ms. Fitch and Ms. Hartley with respect to such production?
5. Should the Fitch Affidavit and Hartley Affidavit be struck out?
6. Should the Security for Costs Order be varied to decrease the amount of security for costs to be posted by the plaintiff and to extend the time to post the security?
7. Should this action be dismissed as against the Paragon Defendants on the basis that the plaintiff is in default of the Security for Costs Order and the Costs Orders?
8. Should the costs for the Dismissal Motion and this action be assessed under Rule 58?

C. ANALYSIS

Issue #1: Should I recuse myself from hearing the Dismissal Motion and the Cross-motion?

[19] Ms. Rebello’s position is that I should recuse myself from the Dismissal Motion and the Cross-motion (other than with respect to the recusal issue). Ms. Rebello did not outline the test applied on a recusal motion or cite any case law in her factum or oral argument. However, she submits that I should recuse myself because of certain aspects of the initial hearing of the motions on July 12, 2023 that she submits were to her prejudice. In particular, Ms. Rebello submits that I acted unfairly at the July 12, 2023 hearing and she does not believe that I will act fairly on these motions because:

(a) I should have granted a longer adjournment of the Dismissal Motion and the Cross‑motion and should not have made them returnable on December 6, 2023. (b) I made the December 6, 2023 return date peremptory on her and not the Paragon Defendants. (c) I limited the submissions she could make on certain points at the July 12, 2023 hearing. (d) I asked her to provide medical information that she considers private. (e) My order provided that she was to deliver a compendium whereas she had not been required to do so by any other judicial officer, and she does not have the software to prepare one.

[20] She also submits that I should recuse myself because there is an active complaint against me with Chief Justice Morawetz, and therefore that I should not be hearing these motions because there is a reasonable apprehension of bias that I will not be an impartial decision-maker.

[21] In oral argument, Ms. Rebello submitted that she had spoken to someone in Chief Justice Morawetz’s office and was advised that I should not hear the Dismissal Motion until her complaint is resolved. She also submitted that she spoke with someone at the Canadian Judicial Council and was advised that I should not hear the Dismissal Motion until her complaint to Chief Justice Morawetz is resolved. Ms. Rebello did not identify the persons who she says made these statements, and there is no evidence in the record to support those submissions.

(i) Applicable legal principles with respect to a recusal motion

[22] In a recent decision in a separate action involving Ms. Rebello, Centa J. considered a recusal motion brought by Ms. Rebello and summarized the test for reasonable apprehension of bias as follows:

22 The test for reasonable apprehension of bias is as follows:

what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically--and having thought the matter through-- conclude. Would she think that it is more likely than not that [the judge], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly?

23 The test for bias contains a twofold objective standard: the person considering the alleged bias must be reasonable and informed; and the apprehension of bias must itself be reasonable. The reasonable observer is not a person with a very sensitive or scrupulous conscience. She is the sort of person who always reserves judgment on every point until she has seen and fully understood both sides of the argument and “who takes the trouble to read the text of an article as well as the headlines.”

24 As the Supreme Court of Canada has held, an allegation of a reasonable apprehension of bias must overcome the strong presumption of judicial impartiality:

The basic framework for assessing a claim that the judge failed to decide the case independently and impartially may be summarized as follows. The claim is procedural, focussing on whether the litigant’s right to an impartial and independent trial of the issues has been violated. There is a presumption of judicial integrity and impartiality. It is a high presumption, not easily displaced. The onus is on the person challenging the judgment to rebut the presumption with cogent evidence showing that a reasonable person apprised of all the relevant circumstances would conclude that the judge failed to come to grips with the issues and decide them impartially and independently.

25 That presumption reflects the long history of judicial independence and integrity in this country. Impatience or even rudeness, while regrettable, is not enough to displace the presumption.

28 While judges should recuse themselves when there is a reasonable apprehension of bias, they should not recuse themselves in response to a specious claim:

It is important that justice be administered impartially. A judge must give careful consideration to any claim that he should disqualify himself on account of bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias. In my view, a judge is best advised to remove himself if there is any air of reality to a bias claim. That said, judges do the administration of justice a disservice by simply yielding to entirely unreasonable and unsubstantiated recusal demands. Litigants are not entitled to pick their judge. They are not entitled to effectively eliminate judges randomly assigned to their case by raising specious partiality claims against those judges. To step aside in the face of a specious bias claim is to give credence to a most objectionable tactic. [7]

(ii) Analysis

[23] I do not accept that the existence of a complaint against me with Chief Justice Morawetz creates a reasonable apprehension of bias. A similar issue was raised by Ms. Rebello in Rebello v. Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Co), 2023 ONSC 1544 (“Rebello v. Ontario”), a case in which Ms. Rebello had made a complaint about Centa J. to the Canadian Judicial Council. [8] With respect to Ms. Rebello’s complaint, Centa J. held as follows:

41 On February 13, 2023, Ms. Rebello filed a complaint about me to the Canadian Judicial Council. I did not know about this complaint until she told me of it. She submits that because she has filed this complaint, I must recuse myself from hearing any further steps in this proceeding.

42 Litigants have the right to file complaints with the Canadian Judicial Council over the conduct of a federally-appointed judge. In this case, Ms. Rebello first indicated that she wished to bring a recusal motion on January 26, 2023. She filed her complaint to the CJC over two weeks later. Presumably, filing a complaint to the CJC demonstrates that the litigant has a subjective belief that they have been treated unfairly or that the judge is biased. It is not evidence, however, that the litigant’s allegations meet the twofold objective standard to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias.

43 Given the presumption of judicial impartiality, there is no basis to infer that a judge will treat a litigant unfairly because the litigant has filed a complaint about that judge to the CJC. If it were otherwise, a litigant could effectively judge-shop simply by filing one or more complaints to the CJC until they obtained a hearing before a judge of their liking.

44 I note that this is not the first time that Ms. Rebello has made a complaint about a judicial officer and then expected that officer to recuse themselves because of her complaints. She made similar arguments about Master Short, Master Sugunasiri, and Myers J. None of those arguments was successful.

45 I do not accept Ms. Rebello's submissions that her complaint about me to the CJC creates a reasonable apprehension of bias. [9]

[24] For the reasons outlined by Centa J., I do not accept that Ms. Rebello’s complaint against me to the Chief Justice creates a reasonable apprehension of bias.

[25] With respect to the adjournment ordered at the July 12, 2023 hearing, it was Ms. Rebello who requested the adjournment of the Dismissal Motion and the Cross-motion, which I granted on terms. One of the terms imposed was that the December 6, 2023 return date was peremptory on Ms. Rebello. The reasons for granting the adjournment and the terms imposed are outlined in my July 12, 2023 endorsement. Ms. Rebello submits that I should have granted a longer adjournment rather than making the motions returnable on December 6, 2023. While Ms. Rebello is entitled to disagree with my decision, the fact that I did not accept Ms. Rebello’s submissions with respect to the length of the adjournment does not demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias. In this regard, I note that Ms. Rebello has demonstrated a pattern of requesting adjournments and then complaining about the length or terms even when the adjournment is granted. Ms. Rebello appears to use adjournment requests as part of a delay strategy. The examples of Ms. Rebello’s requests for adjournments and tactics employed both when successful or unsuccessful at obtaining the requested adjournment have been noted in various decisions in this action, including the Reasons for Decision of Master Sugunasiri (as she then was) on the Security for Costs Motion and the Reasons for Decision on Costs with respect to that motion, Rebello v. Paragon Security et al., 2020 ONSC 2303 at para 16; Rebello v Paragon Security et al., 2020 ONSC 3520 at para 11, Dunphy J.’s Reasons for Decision in dismissing Ms. Rebello’s appeal of the Security for Costs Order, Rebello v. Del Property Management, 2021 ONSC 7888 at paras 5-7, 16, 36 and 39-45, and in Associate Justice Brott’s February 7, 2023 case conference endorsement. [12]

[26] Ms. Rebello also submits that the December 6, 2023 return date should have been made peremptory on the Paragon Defendants and not just peremptory on her. In this regard, I note that it was Ms. Rebello who had requested and obtained an adjournment of the Dismissal Motion at a case conference convened before Associate Justice Brott on February 7, 2023. Ms. Rebello is also the party who requested and obtained an adjournment of the Dismissal Motion at the July 12, 2023 return date before me. The Paragon Defendants opposed the adjournment request on July 12, 2023. In the circumstances, I did not exercise my discretion to make the December 6, 2023 return date for the Dismissal Motion and the Cross-motion peremptory on the Paragon Defendants. Again, while Ms. Rebello is entitled to disagree with my decision, the fact that I did not accept her submissions with respect to making the adjournment peremptory on the Paragon Defendants does not demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias.

[27] Ms. Rebello also submits that I acted unfairly on July 12, 2023 because I placed some limitations on the submissions she was permitted to make on that day. I do not consider this to demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court must control its own process, including by limiting the length of the submissions made by the parties and requiring a party to limit their submissions to the issues to be determined at that hearing. Further, bias is not demonstrated when a judicial officer cautions a party to be mindful that in making submissions that an opposite party or their lawyer are lying to or misleading the court, the court will expect the party alleging such misconduct to provide the court with evidence in support of such allegations.

[28] Ms. Rebello also submits that I demonstrated bias by asking her to provide medical information that she considers private. My July 12, 2023 endorsement includes the following on this issue:

With respect to the mode of hearing on December 6, 2023, the moving defendants requested that the motion and cross-motion proceed in person. Ms. Rebello did not agree. She appeared today by Zoom but did not have an operational camera, such that her appearance was by audio-only. She also wishes to appear on December 6, 2023 by audio-only. She objected to an in-person appearance on December 6, 2023 citing, among other reasons, health concerns. When asked if she is prepared to confirm by affidavit the specifics of the health reasons as to why she is not able to attend in person and whether she would obtain a note from a doctor confirming any health issues that preclude her from attending in person, she objected for reasons of “privacy”.

I do not consider the requirement that a party provide evidence in support of a claimed inability to appear in person to demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias. In any event, my order provided Ms. Rebello with the option of appearing in person on the December 6, 2023 return date or taking steps to appear virtually by Zoom with a stable internet connection and functioning video and audio, as required by the Virtual Courtroom Etiquette Rules. [13]

[29] Ms. Rebello also submits that I demonstrated bias by requiring both her and the Paragon Defendants to deliver a compendium. She submits that she had never been required to deliver a compendium by any other judicial officer and she does not have the software to prepare a compendium with hyperlinks and bookmarks. I note that at the July 12, 2023 hearing, counsel for the Paragon Defendants offered to assist Ms. Rebello with adding bookmarks to her compendium. Ms. Rebello expressed concern that opposing counsel would make unacceptable changes to the document. In a further effort to accommodate Ms. Rebello, she was advised that she was permitted to prepare a compendium without bookmarks, that counsel for the Paragon Defendants would then prepare a version of her compendium with bookmarks, and that Ms. Rebello could advise the court if she found anything in the bookmarked version objectionable. Notwithstanding these attempts to accommodate Ms. Rebello, she did not prepare or file a compendium in any format for the December 6, 2023 hearing, and the Dismissal Motion and the Cross-motion were heard even though Ms. Rebello did not file a compendium. In any event, with respect to the recusal issue, I do not consider that requiring Ms. Rebello to deliver a compendium demonstrates a reasonable apprehension of bias.

(iii) Conclusion regarding recusal motion

[30] In summary, Ms. Rebello has failed to demonstrate bias or any other basis to her recusal motion. Rather, I find that an informed person, having thought the matter through and viewing the matter realistically and practically, would not think that it is more likely than not that I would not decide the Dismissal Motion and Cross-motion fairly. In this regard, I note that that in Rebello v. Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Co), 2023 ONSC 1544, Centa J. observed that Ms. Rebello had made claims in numerous proceedings that at least seven judicial officers had demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias toward her. [14] That total rises to nine judicial officers when Centa J. and I are added to the count.

[31] In the result, Ms. Rebello’s motion for an order that I recuse myself from hearing the Dismissal Motion and Cross-motion was dismissed at the hearing of those motions.

Issue #2: Should the Dismissal Motion be stayed on the basis of the Certificate of Stay?

[32] Ms. Rebello submitted that the Dismissal Motion should be stayed on the basis of the Certificate of Stay. She submitted that there is no evidence that the certificate has been set aside and that the stay has been lifted.

[33] The Certificate of Stay was issued by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in connection with Ms. Rebello’s appeal of Dunphy J.’s order dismissing her appeal of the Security for Costs Order. The Certificate of Stay was issued under subrule 63.03(4). That subrule provides for the issuance of the Certificate “[w]here an order is stayed”. Subrule 63.01 provides as follows:

63.01 (1) The delivery of a notice of appeal from an interlocutory or final order stays, until the disposition of the appeal, any provision of the order for the payment of money, except a provision that awards support or enforces a support order.

[34] Reading subrules 63.01 and 63.03 together, it is clear that a certificate of stay is only operative while the stay itself is operative. An automatic stay under subrule 63.01 is only operative “until the disposition of the appeal”. Therefore, once there has been a disposition of the appeal, there is no longer a stay under subrule 63.01 and the certificate of stay is no longer operative.

[35] Here, the Court of Appeal disposed of the appeal in issue by order dated October 21, 2022. No stay of the order of the Court of Appeal has been sought or granted. Therefore, there is no longer a stay pursuant to subrule 63.01 and the Certificate of Stay is no longer operative. In the result, the Certificate of Stay is not a basis to stay the Dismissal Motion.

Issue #3: Should the Dismissal Motion be stayed on the basis of the Reconsideration Motion?

[36] Ms. Rebello submitted that the Dismissal Motion must be stayed in view of her Reconsideration Motion to the Supreme Court of Canada.

[37] The following principles apply with respect to the impact of a motion for reconsideration before the Supreme Court of Canada:

The case law which addresses the impact of a denial of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada and effect of any request for reconsideration was raised before Master Hawkins by Respondents’ counsel and is likewise referred to in the Respondents’ Factum filed on this appeal. The analysis applied in those cases supports a conclusion that a pending motion for reconsideration to the Supreme Court of Canada does not constitute a further appeal or prevent the court from making decisions affecting the rights of the parties in proceedings before them (see: Padelt v. 638506 Ontario Inc., 2010 Carswell Ont 10711 (ONCA); Hundley v. Garnier, 2013 BCSC 380).

[38] There is no automatic stay of the order of the Court of Appeal that is the subject of the Reconsideration Motion, and Ms. Rebello did not obtain a stay by way of motion to the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court of Canada. Ms. Rebello’s Reconsideration Motion does not constitute a further appeal or prevent me from making a decision affecting the rights of the parties in this action. In the result, the Dismissal Motion is not stayed as a result of the Reconsideration Motion.

Issue #4: Should the Dismissal Motion be stayed to allow the plaintiff to have certain costs assessed and pending production of documents and continued cross-examinations?

[39] Ms. Rebello submits that the Dismissal Motion should be stayed: (a) to allow the plaintiff to have costs assessed with respect to the Costs Orders, and (b) pending (i) production of dockets (the “Dockets”) and correspondence with respect to such costs and (ii) continued cross‑examination of Ms. Fitch and Ms. Hartley with respect to such production.

[40] In this regard, Ms. Rebello relies on section 2(1) of the Solicitor’s Act, which provides as follows:

2 (1) No action shall be brought for the recovery of fees, charges or disbursements for business done by a solicitor as such until one month after a bill thereof, subscribed with the proper hand of the solicitor, his or her executor, administrator or assignee or, in the case of a partnership, by one of the partners, either with his or her own name, or with the name of the partnership, has been delivered to the person to be charged therewith, or sent by post to, or left for the person at the person’s office or place of abode, or has been enclosed in or accompanied by a letter subscribed in like manner, referring to such bill. [15]

[41] The premise of Ms. Rebello’s argument is that she is entitled to an assessment of the costs relating to the Costs Orders. She is not. The Costs Orders are court orders that fixed the costs of various proceedings in accordance with Rule 57 and s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act. The same would be the case for any costs that may be ordered relating to the Dismissal Motion. Ms. Rebello’s arguments appear to relate to a client’s rights to assess their own lawyer’s account. However, the current circumstances do not involve a lawyer-client relationship with respect to which assessment may be available. The Paragon Defendants’ lawyers do not have the obligations of a solicitor to Ms. Rebello as a client, and Ms. Rebello does not have the rights of a client under s. 2(1) of the Solicitor’s Act.

[42] Ms. Rebello’s position essentially seeks a review of the Costs Orders and production of bills of costs and the Dockets in connection with such a review. There is no basis for Ms. Rebello’s claim to be entitled to such a review, which would be a collateral attack on the Costs Orders. In the result, there is no basis to stay the Dismissal Motion to allow Ms. Rebello to an assessment of costs with respect to the Costs Orders. There is also no basis to stay the Dismissal Motion pending production by the Paragon Defendants of their lawyers’ Dockets with respect to such costs and to allow the continued cross-examination of Ms. Fitch and Ms. Hartley with respect to such production.

Issue #5: Should the Fitch Affidavit and the Hartley Affidavit be struck out?

[43] As alternative relief, Ms. Rebello seeks an order pursuant to Rule 34.15(1)(c) striking out the Fitch Affidavit and the Hartley Affidavit on the basis that: (i) the plaintiff served notices of examination with respect to the cross-examination of both affiants that required each of them to bring certain documents to their respective examinations; (ii) contrary to their obligations under the notices of examination, both affiants failed to bring the required documents to their respective examinations; and (iii) when asked at the cross-examinations to produce the requested documents, both affiants refused to produce them resulting in the suspension of the cross-examinations.

[44] Ms. Rebello submits that the failure to produce the documents effectively denied her of the right to cross-examine the affiants. She relies on Fuss v. Fidelity Electronics of Canada Ltd., 1998 ONCA 2341 and 1649050 Ontario Ltd v. Hargardon, 2023 ONSC 1898 in support of her submission that the Fitch Affidavit and the Hartley Affidavit permit her to cross‑examine the affiants in the manner outlined above. In my view, neither case is applicable.

[45] Pursuant to Rule 34.10(2)(b), a person to be examined shall produce for inspection at the examination “all documents and things in his or her possession, control or power that are not privileged and that the notice of examination or summons to witness requires the person to produce.” Rule 34.10(3) provides as follows:

(3) Unless the court orders otherwise, the notice of examination or summons to witness may require the person to be examined to produce for inspection at the examination,

(a) all documents and things relevant to any matter in issue in the proceeding that are in his or her possession, control or power and are not privileged; or (b) such documents or things described in clause (a) as are specified in the notice or summons.

[46] Rule 34.10 therefore places limits on the documents that a party is required to produce at an examination. Privileged documents need not be produced, and the documents listed in a notice of examination may only include “documents and things relevant to any matter in issue in the proceeding”. In the context of this motion, the Dockets are not relevant to any matter in issue in the proceeding. The Dockets are not referenced in either of the affidavits, and they are not relevant to the Dismissal Motion because the amounts specified in the Costs Orders have already been fixed by the court.

[47] As noted, Ms. Rebello appears to believe that she is entitled to an assessment of certain costs. For the reasons outlined above, she is not. The mere fact that Ms. Rebello views the Dockets as relevant and includes them in notices of examination does not create an obligation on the party being examined to produce them. There is no basis to strike the Fitch Affidavit and the Hartley Affidavit on the grounds that the Paragon Defendants refused to produce the Dockets.

Issues #6 and #7: Should the Security for Costs Order be varied and should the action be dismissed because the plaintiff is in default of the Security for Costs Order and the Costs Orders?

[48] The Paragon Defendants’ Dismissal Motion seeks a dismissal of the action as against them on the basis that the plaintiff is in default of the Security for Costs Order and the Costs Orders. Ms. Rebello’s only substantive response to the Dismissal Motion is her cross-motion seeking an order varying the Security for Costs Order in two ways. First, she submits that the amount she is required to post should be lowered to $3,000 or $4,000. She also submits that the time for payment should be extended to 30 days before the confirmed dates for the examinations for discovery.

[49] For the reasons that follow: (1) there are no grounds to vary the quantum of security under the Security for Costs Order or the timing for payment of security pursuant to that order, and that aspect of the Cross-motion is dismissed; and (2) the action is dismissed due to the plaintiff’s breaches of the Security for Costs Order and the Costs Orders.

Should the Security for Costs Order be varied?

[50] With respect to the Cross-motion to vary the Security for Costs Order, Ms. Rebello submits that she has assets valued at more than $650,000 which are sufficient to cover any costs order that may be made against her. She also submits that she has substantial evidence to prove her claims against the Paragon Defendants as pleaded, and that she has a meritorious claim. Ms. Rebello does not cite any case law in support of the Cross-motion to vary the Security for Costs Order.

[51] While I accept that pursuant to Rule 56.07 the court retains a discretion to vary the amount of security ordered under the Security for Costs Order, “…the jurisdiction to increase or diminish the amount of security already ordered ought not be exercised lightly and ought not to be used to second guess the Court that made the original order.” [16]

[52] In this case, the evidence in support of Ms. Rebello’s requested relief is insufficient or improper. In this regard, Ms. Rebello relies on: (1) a Purview report indicating that she is a 98% owner of certain real estate at 395 Norham Road, Warkworth (the “Norham Road Property”) that she submits is valued at $651,540 (the “Purview Report”); and (2) certain purported “bank statements” which she submits show that she had available funds in the amount of $28,709.06 as at January 6, 2020 and $23,268.51 as at October 22, 2021. Leaving aside other evidentiary issues, the “statements” attached as exhibits to Ms. Rebello’s June 22, 2023 affidavit do not name the bank or other institution at which the purported funds were being held. Further, the “statements” have no information about the bank account number or deposit information, all of which appears to have been redacted. Even if the statements were not deficient for the above reasons, they do not provide sufficiently current information. They are dated January 6, 2020 and October 22, 2021, and there is no evidence that the purported funds remain available.

[53] With respect to the Purview Report, there are a host of evidentiary problems, including the following:

• The Purview Report indicates that it was prepared by Gary Curtis, someone who is not arm’s‑length of Ms. Rebello. At the hearing of the Cross-motion, Ms. Rebello acknowledged that Mr. Curtis swore an affidavit in support of her opposition to the Security for Costs Motion. [17]
• In numerous decisions in actions involving Ms. Rebello, including in this action, Mr. Curtis is referenced as an affiant or someone otherwise involved and taking a role in the proceedings, including as an agent or representative of Ms. Rebello. [18]
• The Purview Report does not outline the basis on which the Norham Road Property was valued and does not provide any basis to assess Gary Curtis’s expertise at valuing real estate. Ms. Rebello’s evidence does not include a title abstract confirming ownership of the Norham Road Property or whether there are any charges or other encumbrances against it.

[54] Leaving aside that the plaintiff made an unsuccessful argument about the sufficiency of her assets at the Security for Costs Motion before the Master Sugunasiri (as she then was) and on her appeal to Dunphy J., [19] and the risk that the cross-motion to vary the Security for Costs Order is an improper collateral attack on that order, the evidence presented by the plaintiff on this cross-motion is wholly insufficient to support the plaintiff’s request for an order varying the Security for Costs Order.

[55] In the result, Ms. Rebello has not demonstrated that she has liquid or other sufficient assets to satisfy costs orders in this action, nor has she shown that there has been any material change in circumstances since the Security for Costs Order that would merit its variance. [20] The plaintiff’s Cross-motion to vary the Security for Costs Order is dismissed.

Should the action be dismissed because the plaintiff is in default of the Security for Costs Order and the Costs Orders?

(i) Applicable legal principles regarding default of an order for security for costs

[56] A security for costs order is “designed to protect defendants from the possibility that they will be unable to recover their costs if they are successful in defending the action”. [21]

[57] Rule 56.06 provides:

Where a plaintiff or applicant defaults in giving the security required by an order, the court on motion may dismiss the proceeding against the defendant or respondent who obtained the order, and the stay imposed by rule 56.05 no longer applies unless another defendant or respondent has obtained an order for security for costs.

[58] On a motion seeking an order dismissing a claim due to a plaintiff’s failure to post security for costs, the applicable legal principles include the following:

• The plaintiff has the onus of explaining the default. To do so, the plaintiff must “bring forward persuasive evidence to move the court to relieve against a breach of the order ... The plaintiffs must put ‘their best foot forward’…”. [22]
• “The court is not to perform a review of the decision to order that security be paid into court, nor to review the quantum or type of security that was ordered. Instead, the court must confine its focus to the efforts made by the plaintiff to meet the obligations imposed in the order for security for costs.” [23]
• In exercising its discretion, the court should confine its focus to the efforts, stated to be made by the plaintiff, to meet the obligations imposed by the order. [24]
• When faced with dismissing an action without any disposition of its merits, the court must always proceed with caution. [25]
• Any relief granted under Rule 56.06 is discretionary. [26]

(ii) Analysis regarding default of an order for security for costs

[59] The Paragon Defendants submit that Ms. Rebello has not demonstrated an intention to comply with the Security for Costs Order, nor has she provided any persuasive evidence to relieve against her breach of the order. The Paragon Defendants also submit that Ms. Rebello’s conduct since the Security for Costs Order has heightened the risk they will incur significant costs. They argue that a failure to enforce the Security for Costs Order would defeat the purpose of that order and expose them to the risk associated with the action that the order was designed to protect against. They assert this risk is increased given the conclusions reached by Master Sugunasiri (as she then was) on the Security for Costs Motion that “the incredulity of the [plaintiff’s] allegations coupled with Ms. Rebello’s conduct thus far puts the Paragon Defendants at serious risk of incurring unnecessary and heightened costs that will be unrecoverable”. [27]

[60] Ms. Rebello denies that she has taken the position that she will not pay the security required by the Security for Costs Order. She submits that she has advised the Paragon Defendants that she has no issue with paying the required security once the Paragon Defendants serve her with “a bill of costs and docket entries to support each bill” and that she would then “make arrangements to make payments at a future date or future dates”.

[61] I do not accept Ms. Rebello’s assertion that she has demonstrated an intention to comply with the Security for Costs Order. Ms. Rebello has had ample time to comply with that order but has taken no steps to do so. Further, her stated position is that she is only prepared to make payment after the Paragon Defendants fulfil various conditions she purports to impose unilaterally. Like other examples of her conduct in this action and on this motion, Ms. Rebello seeks to impose conditions that suit her rather than complying with enforceable court orders and the Rules of Civil Procedure.

[62] I am mindful of the need to proceed with caution in considering a dismissal of an action without a disposition on its merits. I am also mindful of Ms. Rebello’s self-represented status. Against that I have considered Ms. Rebello’s conduct to date in this action and on this motion, as outlined above. The record demonstrates that Ms. Rebello has a pattern of drawing out proceedings, including through meritless appeals, and taking steps that lead to unnecessary and heightened costs that may never be recoverable. In this regard, I note that the aggregate amounts payable under the existing Costs Orders against Ms. Rebello already exceed the quantum of security she was ordered to pay pursuant to the Security for Costs Order.

[63] In balancing the interests of the parties and considering what would be just in the circumstances, I adopt the following conclusion of Braid J. in DeMarco, which I find to be applicable in the circumstances of this case:

If the plaintiff wanted this action to proceed, he should have paid the money into court and he has not done so. Instead, he has come before the court seeking to revisit the [security for costs order]. I find that, in fact, it would not be unjust to dismiss the action in the circumstances of this case, in which the plaintiff has made no effort to pay security for costs… On the contrary, the plaintiff has failed to comply with costs orders and security for costs orders previously imposed on him and has essentially asked this court that he be entitled to run this litigation on his own terms. In my view, it would be unfair to permit the action to proceed in these circumstances. [28]

[64] In this case, dismissal of the plaintiff’s action will protect the Paragon Defendants from incurring further costs without the protection this court has determined should be in place via the Security for Costs Order. Further, in view of the plaintiff’s litigation strategy that includes tactical and meritless appeals and dilatory conduct with respect to such appeals, it will also protect the integrity of the civil justice system. Considering all of the circumstances, I am of the view that, as a result of the plaintiff’s failure to pay the Security for Costs Order, it would be unfair to permit the action to proceed as against the Paragon Defendants, and it is appropriate to exercise my discretion to dismiss this action as against the Paragon Defendants.

(iii) Applicable legal principles regarding default of costs orders

[65] Pursuant to subrule 57.03(2) and Rule 60.12, the court has broad discretion to sanction non-compliance with a costs order or an interlocutory order generally by dismissing or staying a proceeding, striking out the defaulting party’s defence, or making such other order as is just. Rule 60.12 applies to costs orders of the Court of Appeal. [29]

[66] In Rana v Unifund Assurance Company, 2016 ONSC 2502 (“Rana”), Dunphy J. outlined the following principles, among others, that the court applies under Rule 57.03(2) and Rule 60.12:

[50] I have carefully reviewed the authorities cited to me and the following principles would appear to be relevant guides to the exercise of my discretion:

a. Where there has been non-compliance with an order of the court, the court should be alive to the possibility that its process is being abused; failing to act may deprive the moving party of justice according to law and risks rendering the court a paper tiger: Bottan v. Vroom, [2001] O.J. No. 2737, at para. 24-25; c. The court ought not to sit in appeal of the prior costs awards – the respondent will have had the opportunity to make submissions about impecuniosity at the prior hearings that resulted in the costs orders and seeking to relieve against prior costs orders constitutes a collateral attack on orders previously made: Bottan v Vroom, [2001] O.J. No. 2737, at para. 23; Visic v. University of Windsor, 2013 ONSC 2063 at para. 36 and 66; Trewin v. MacDonald, [2008] O.J. No. 2821 (ONSC) at para. 26; d. The court may have regard to a pattern of unnecessary and unreasonable steps taken in the proceeding, including appealing numerous orders without chance of success or knowing the risk thereby imposing costs upon the other party: Visic v. University of Windsor, 2013 ONSC 2063 at para. 68; e. If the orders of the court are “cavalierly ignored” and if a litigant “continuously fails to comply with her obligations as a litigant and then fails to abide by the costs consequences attendant upon that behavior, the court is justified in bringing some finality to the action” (per Master Dash in Burrell v Peel (Regional Municipality) Police Services Board, 2007 ONSC 46173 at para 63; aff’d 2010 ONSC 1387); g. Self-represented litigants, while entitled to some accommodation and assistance to ensure a fair hearing, are not entitled to abuse the system or the party opposite and failure to enforce orders once made against self-represented parties is unfair to the parties opposite and undermines respect for the court and the civil justice system: per Myers J. in Baradaran v. Tarion Corp., 2015 ONSC 7892; Bilich v. Toronto (City) Police Services Board, 2014 ONSC 6765; h. “Courts usually talk in terms of prejudice that cannot be compensated for by costs. But, at some point, costs themselves become an inadequate form of compensation for prejudice, especially where the party on whom they are imposed refuses to pay them”: per D.M. Brown J.A. in Schwilgin v. Szivy, 2015 ONCA 816 at para. 23. [31]

[67] Other applicable principles under subrule 57.03(2) and Rule 60.12 with respect to non‑payment of costs orders include the following:

• the rationale for subrule 57.03 and 60.12 is “predicated on the fact that there will be situations where a party’s position ought to be determined for procedural reasons arising from the failure of the party to abide by orders made by the court. If it was the case that the merits of the matter always had to be determined before such remedies could be imposed, there would be little room for the effective application of either of these rules.” [32]
• “when costs orders are made, they must be complied with or orders of the court lose their legitimacy”. [33]
• “when a claim is pursued it also puts the other party to expense. It would be unfair to relieve the financial pressure of litigation on only one party. Failure to enforce an order of costs has the effect of shifting the financial burden to the other party.” [34]

[68] Applying the above principles to the circumstances of this action and the evidence on the Dismissal Motion and the Cross-motion, I find that:

(a) the plaintiff is abusing the court process; (b) relieving against the prior Costs Orders would constitute a collateral attack on them; (c) the plaintiff has demonstrated a pattern of unnecessary and unreasonable steps taken in the proceeding, including appealing numerous orders without chance of success or knowing the risk, thereby imposing costs upon the Paragon Defendants; (d) orders of the court are being ignored, and the plaintiff has continuously failed to comply with her obligations as a litigant and then failed to abide by the costs consequences attendant upon that behavior; (e) although the plaintiff is a self-represented litigant and therefore entitled to some accommodation and assistance to ensure a fair hearing, she is not entitled to abuse the system or the defendants in this action. Failure to enforce the Costs Orders made against the plaintiff would be unfair to the Paragon Defendants and undermine respect for the court and the civil justice system; and (f) the overall circumstances have reached the point where costs have become an inadequate form of compensation for the prejudice faced by the Paragon Defendants, particularly given the plaintiff’s refusal to pay the Costs Orders.

[69] For the above reasons, I am of the view that the just sanction under subrule 57.03(2) and Rule 60.12 is an order dismissing the plaintiff’s action.

Issue #8: Should the costs for the Dismissal Motion and action be assessed under Rule 58?

[70] Section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act provides that “the costs of and incidental to a proceeding or a step in a proceeding are in the discretion of the court, and the court may determine by whom and to what extent the costs shall be paid”. The applicable rules with respect to costs include the following:

Rule 57.01(3): “When the court awards costs, it shall fix them in accordance with subrule (1) and the Tariffs.” Rule 57.01(3.1): “Despite subrule (3), in an exceptional case the court may refer costs for assessment under Rule 58.” Rule 57.01(7): “The court shall devise and adopt the simplest, least expensive and most expeditious process for fixing costs and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, costs may be fixed after receiving written submissions, without the attendance of the parties.”

[71] In my view, this is not an exceptional case that requires an assessment of costs under Rule 58. Pursuant to Rule 57, the costs of the Dismissal Motion and action shall be fixed by me based on written submissions from the parties. Cost of the Cross-motion will be fixed by me in the same manner.

D. DISPOSITION

[72] For the reasons outlined above, I order as follows:

1. the plaintiff’s Cross-motion is dismissed.
2. the plaintiff’s action is hereby dismissed as against the Paragon Defendants.
3. the costs of the Paragon Defendants’ Dismissal Motion, the plaintiff’s Cross‑motion, and the Paragon Defendants’ costs of the action, shall be fixed following written costs submissions from the parties.

[73] The Paragon Defendants are directed to prepare a formal order dismissing the Cross‑motion and dismissing the action as against the Paragon Defendants with costs to be fixed. The draft order shall be forwarded by email to Ms. Rebello and to my Assistant Trial Coordinator Kimi Sharma by email to Kimi.Sharma@ontario.ca, and then uploaded to Caselines. If Ms. Rebello has any comments regarding the form of the order, she may provide those comments in writing (not to exceed 2 pages) by emailing them to counsel for the Paragon Defendants and Ms. Sharma, and then uploading the comments to Caselines within three days of receipt of the draft order from the Paragon Defendants. I will review the draft order, Ms. Rebello’s comments, if any, and make any necessary revisions to the formal order prior to signing it. A Word version of the order shall be provided by email to Ms. Sharma so that I can make revisions, if necessary.

E. COSTS

[74] The Paragon Defendants shall deliver their costs outline and written costs submissions not exceeding three pages by February 8, 2024 by email to Ms. Sharma and Ms. Rebello. Ms. Rebello shall email her costs outline and responding cost submissions not to exceed three pages by February 22, 2024 by email to Ms. Sharma and counsel for the Paragon Defendants. Both parties’ costs submissions shall be filed through the online portal and uploaded to CaseLines.

DATE: January 25, 2024 R. Frank Associate J.

[1] The Costs Orders are, collectively, the January 22, 2020 Costs Order in the amount $2,000, the June 4, 2020 Costs Order in the amount of $12,037.71, the December 14, 2021 Costs Order in the amount of $16,969.63, and the Court of Appeal Costs Order in the amount of $4,187.83, all as described and defined below. [2] The lengthy procedural history of the Security for Costs Motion is set out in more detail in Rebello v. Del Property Management, 2021 ONSC 7888 at paras 11-37 [3] Rebello v. Paragon Security et al., 2020 ONSC 2303 [4] This was a net costs order. Master Sugunasiri (as she then was) awarded Ms. Rebello costs in the amount of $2,000 for her adjournment motion on November 26, 2019 and awarded $14,037.71 to the Paragon Defendants for costs of the substantive Security for Costs Motion, leaving a net amount payable by Ms. Rebello to the Paragon Defendants in the amount of $12,037.71. [5] Rebello v. Del Property Management, 2021 ONSC 7888 [6] Rebello v. Del Property Management, 2022 ONCA 720 [7] Rebello v. Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Co), 2023 ONSC 1544 (“Rebello v. Ontario”) at paras 22‑25 and 28 (footnotes omitted) [8] In that case, Centa J. noted that Ms. Rebello had made claims in numerous proceedings that at least seven judicial officers had demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias toward her. That total rises to nine judicial officers when Justice Centa and I are added to the count; see Rebello v. Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Co), 2023 ONSC 1544 at paras 3-10 [9] Rebello v. Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Co), 2023 ONSC 1544 at paras 41-45 (footnotes omitted) [10] Rebello v. Paragon Security et al., 2020 ONSC 2303 at para 16; Rebello v Paragon Security et al., 2020 ONSC 3520 at para 11 [11] Rebello v. Del Property Management, 2021 ONSC 7888 at paras 5-7, 16, 36 and 39-45 [12] Rebello v. Paragon Security et al., CV-18-607758 (unreported), included in Ms. Rebello’s Supplementary and Responding Cross-motion Record. Further adjournment requests by Ms. Rebello in other actions are detailed at paragraphs 8 and 13 of the affidavit of Theresa Hartley sworn June 29, 2023. [13] https://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/notices-and-orders-covid-19/virtual-courtroometiquette-rules/. Although Ms. Rebello opted not to appear in person for the hearing of the Dismissal Motion and Cross-motion on December 6, 2023, she appeared by Zoom without functioning video, which was not in compliance with my July 12, 2023 order. [14] See Rebello v. Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Co), 2023 ONSC 1544 at paras 3-10 [15] Solicitor’s Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15 (the “Solicitor’s Act”) [16] DeMarco v. Nicoletti Estate and Daboll, 2015 ONSC 8155 (“DeMarco”) at p 10, citing and adopting Novarode NV/SA v. Nova Coated Products Ltd, [1987] O.J. No. 2327 [17] I also note that two of the listed owners of the Norham Road Property are Glenice Curtis and Basil Curtis. [18] See, for example, Rebello v. The Bank of Nova Scotia, 2018 ONSC 7127 [19] Rebello v. Del Property Management, 2021 ONSC 7888 at paras 50-53 [20] See Leonard v Prior, 1994 CarswellOnt 578 (“Leonard”) at para 7; see also DeMarco v. Nicoletti Estate and Daboll, 2015 ONSC 8155 at pp 8-10 [21] Breatross Estate v. Woolfson, 2013 ONSC 6819 at para 9 [22] Leonard at para 22 [23] DeMarco at p 12 [24] Leonard at para 10 [25] Leonard, at para 11 [26] DeMarco at p 12 [27] Rebello v. Paragon Security et al., 2020 ONSC 2303 at para 21 [28] DeMarco at pp. 14-15 [29] Lindhorst v Stone & Co. Ltd., 2012 ONSC 3158 at para 17 [30] Rana v Unifund Assurance Company, 2016 ONSC 2502 (“Rana”) [31] Rana at para 50 [32] Bottan v Vroom, [2001] O.J. No. 2737 at para 26; see also Esposito v. City of Toronto, 2011 ONSC 5937 at para 39 [33] Heu v Forder Estate, 2004 CarswellOnt 729 at para 20 [34] Stacey v. Barrie Yacht Club, 2003 ONSC 44518 at para 9