Jeffrey R. Goit

The court considered a motion for summary judgment brought by Allstate Insurance Company of Canada to determine whether William Bezemer was at least 1% liable for a motor vehicle accident involving the plaintiff, Charmaine Farrugia.

The accident involved an unidentified third driver, John Doe.

The court found that a third vehicle was involved and that Mr. Bezemer was not negligent, applying the "agony of the moment" doctrine.

The action was dismissed as against Mr. Bezemer, and costs were awarded.

The applicant sought a declaration of insurance coverage and relief from forfeiture after the respondent insurer denied coverage due to the applicant's misrepresentation and civil fraud regarding a motor vehicle accident.

The court found the applicant breached her insurance contract and committed civil fraud by falsely representing herself as the driver and lying under oath.

Consequently, the court dismissed the application, denying relief from forfeiture due to the fraudulent conduct and the gravity of the breach.

The appellant (defendant at trial) appealed a judgment awarding damages for a respiratory injury allegedly caused by being sprayed with a fire extinguisher.

The appeal raised issues regarding the admission of participant expert evidence, the adequacy of the trial judge's reasons for not considering defence expert evidence on causation, and the quantum of non-pecuniary damages.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons insufficient for failing to analyze the appellant's expert evidence on the diagnosis of Reactive Airways Disorder Syndrome (RADS) and for relying on an unqualified expert's incorrect summary of other specialists' views.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a commercial bakery, appealed a summary judgment dismissal of its insurance claim against Intact Insurance Company for losses resulting from a power outage caused by an ice storm in December 2013.

The losses claimed included stock spoilage and business interruption.

The motion judge found that exclusionary clauses in the insurance policy precluded coverage because the loss or damage to electrical transmission lines or distribution lines was not located on the appellant's premises.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding no error in the motion judge's interpretation of the policy and rejecting the appellant's arguments regarding partial summary judgment principles and the need for expert evidence.

The plaintiff, a commercial bakery, sought damages for stock spoilage and business interruption following a power outage caused by an ice storm.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the policy's exclusions for loss or damage to electrical transmission or distribution lines not located on the premises applied.

The court found that the policy exclusions clearly precluded coverage for both stock spoilage and business interruption losses caused by damage to off-premises electrical transmission lines.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the action against the insurer.

The appellant, a plaintiff and defendant by counterclaim in a motor vehicle accident action, appealed a Master's order dismissing his motion to remove the plaintiffs' counsel of record due to an alleged conflict of interest.

The appellant argued that because he was counterclaimed against for contribution and indemnity regarding his co-plaintiff daughter's damages, their joint counsel was in a disqualifying conflict.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Master's conclusions that the risk of conflict was remote, that the clients had provided fully informed consent to waive any potential conflict, and that the risk of improper disclosure of confidential information was speculative.

The plaintiff, Parker Pad & Printing Ltd., sought partial summary judgment against its insurer, Gore Mutual Insurance Company, regarding coverage for water damage caused by significant rainfall.

The property insurance policy excluded "flood" (defined as the rising, breaking out, or overflow of any body of water) and seepage from natural sources through foundations.

The plaintiff also had a flood endorsement with an identical "flood" definition.

The court found that the pooling of rainwater did not constitute a "flood" as restrictively defined in the policy or endorsement, as it was not a pre-existing body of water.

Therefore, the damage was not covered by the flood endorsement and was excluded by the policy's seepage clause.

The motion for partial summary judgment was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment for a claim against their home insurance provider following extensive water damage to their property.

The insurer denied coverage, arguing the damage fell under policy exclusions.

The court reviewed expert reports which unanimously concluded the water entry was caused by continuous seepage through the foundation and wear and tear, rather than a sudden and accidental escape of water.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, held that the damage was excluded under the policy, and granted summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' action.