Justin R. Winch

The plaintiff, Parker Pad & Printing Ltd., sought partial summary judgment against its insurer, Gore Mutual Insurance Company, regarding coverage for water damage caused by significant rainfall.

The property insurance policy excluded "flood" (defined as the rising, breaking out, or overflow of any body of water) and seepage from natural sources through foundations.

The plaintiff also had a flood endorsement with an identical "flood" definition.

The court found that the pooling of rainwater did not constitute a "flood" as restrictively defined in the policy or endorsement, as it was not a pre-existing body of water.

Therefore, the damage was not covered by the flood endorsement and was excluded by the policy's seepage clause.

The motion for partial summary judgment was dismissed.

The appellants sought a declaration that they owned part of an adjoining property through adverse possession.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding that the appellants failed to establish the three-part test for adverse possession: actual possession, intention to exclude the true owner, and effective exclusion.

The appellants' predecessors used the disputed lands only seasonally and intermittently, and failed to demonstrate inconsistent use with the true owner's intended use.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and legal conclusions.

The plaintiffs sought a declaration of ownership over a portion of the defendant's adjacent property through adverse possession.

The disputed lands were converted to Land Titles in 2001, requiring the plaintiffs to prove their predecessors in title established adverse possession for a continuous ten-year period prior to that date.

The court dismissed the claim, finding that the predecessors' use of the land was seasonal and intermittent, failing the requirement for constant and continuous actual possession.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the predecessors' use was inconsistent with the intended use of the true owner or that they had the intention to exclude the true owner.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granting the respondent bank amounts owing on a mortgage and line of credit, leave to issue a writ of possession, and dismissing their counterclaim.

The appellants admitted indebtedness but argued they had an arrangement with the respondent's employees to make mortgage payments using funds from a third-party loan.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial, as the appellants led no evidence to contradict the respondent's evidence of default, including property tax arrears.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant judgment creditor sought to enforce its judgment by having the sheriff sell the respondents' mortgaged property.

The sheriff required a mortgage discharge statement, which the mortgagee bank refused to provide without the respondents' consent, citing PIPEDA.

The respondents failed to attend examinations in aid of execution.

The appellant brought a motion to compel the mortgagee to produce the statement, which was dismissed based on binding precedent.

On appeal, a five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The majority held that the mortgage discharge statement was sensitive personal information under PIPEDA, and the respondents could not be deemed to have impliedly consented to its disclosure to a judgment creditor.

The majority affirmed that the proper procedure to obtain the statement without consent is to seek an order for the examination of the mortgagee under Rule 60.18(6)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which would satisfy the court order exemption in PIPEDA.

The appellant bank sought to appeal an order dismissing its motion to compel a third-party mortgagee to provide a mortgage discharge statement for property owned by judgment debtors.

The appellant argued that a previous binding decision was decided per incuriam.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding it lacked jurisdiction because the motion judge's order was interlocutory, as the appellant could still seek to examine a representative of the third party under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

An execution creditor sought an order compelling a mortgagee bank to provide a mortgage discharge statement to permit enforcement of a judgment through a sheriff’s sale of the debtor’s property.

The moving party argued that the Court of Appeal’s decision in Citi Cards Canada Inc. v. Pleasance should not apply because it was decided per incuriam or was distinguishable where the creditor had unsuccessfully attempted to examine the judgment debtors.

The court held it was bound by the Court of Appeal authority, which found that mortgage discharge statements constitute personal information protected by the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA).

Despite acknowledging significant practical difficulties for judgment creditors enforcing debts, the court concluded the precedent prevented ordering the disclosure.

The motion was therefore dismissed.