James M. Satin

The plaintiffs, who were unsuccessful debtors in a prior action brought by the Royal Bank of Canada, commenced a new action in Owen Sound against RBC and Joseph Doria (the Operations Manager of the Milton Court House).

The plaintiffs challenged RBC's use of the simplified procedure in the original action and raised various complaints regarding the bank's accounting practices and enforcement of the judgment.

The court found that the statement of claim did not reveal any viable cause of action against either defendant and dismissed the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The defendant Royal Bank of Canada filed a requisition under rule 2.1.01(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking dismissal of the action.

The court determined under rule 2.1.01(6) that it may be appropriate to make an order dismissing or staying the action, and directed the registrar to give notice to the parties in Form 2.1B.

The endorsement outlines the procedures and timelines for written submissions by the parties in response to the notice, as set out in rules 2.1.01(7) through (10).

The appellants sought to overturn a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent bank, which found no dispute regarding loan and credit card agreements and unpaid funds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, deferring to the motion judge's factual findings and finding no legal basis to interfere with the decision, including based on fresh evidence.

The plaintiff commenced an action against the corporate defendant and its director shortly after the director made an assignment in bankruptcy.

Years later, after the trustee was discharged but the director remained an undischarged bankrupt, the plaintiff obtained default judgment against the director without notice.

The court held that commencing the action during the bankruptcy stay was a curable irregularity, not a nullity, and the stay lifted when the trustee was discharged.

However, the court set aside the default judgment because the plaintiff failed to serve the motion materials on the director before she was noted in default, contrary to the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The director was ordered to attend an examination in aid of execution on behalf of the corporate defendant only.

The bankrupts moved for an order to schedule their discharge hearing, notwithstanding an ongoing fraudulent conveyance action by the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) against them.

The court dismissed the motion, exercising its discretion to adjourn the discharge hearing.

The court found that the outcome of the fraudulent conveyance action could bear on the discharge hearing, there was no evidence of delay by RBC, and the interests of all parties, including creditors and the integrity of the system, needed to be balanced.

The bankrupts were granted leave to reapply if delays or other factors changed the circumstances.

The plaintiff, Royal Bank of Canada, sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion for summary judgment against the defendant for unpaid credit debts.

The motion judge had dismissed summary judgment, finding genuine issues for trial regarding the defendant's unpleaded defences of non est factum and unconscionability.

The court, in this leave to appeal motion, found reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, particularly regarding the consideration of unpleaded defences.

However, leave to appeal was denied because the proposed appeal did not involve matters of such importance that transcended the immediate parties' interests or would enhance existing jurisprudence.

An execution creditor sought an order compelling a mortgagee bank to produce a mortgage statement to permit the sheriff to sell a debtor’s property to satisfy a judgment.

The mortgagee refused to disclose the statement on the basis that disclosure would violate the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA).

After the creditor examined a representative of the mortgagee under Rule 60.18 and the bank maintained its refusal, the creditor renewed the motion.

The court held that, in light of binding Court of Appeal authority interpreting PIPEDA, disclosure of the mortgage statement was prohibited.

The motion to compel production was therefore dismissed.