James Patrick McReynolds

This costs endorsement arises from a failed real estate transaction that proceeded to a two-day summary trial under the simplified procedure.

The plaintiff, Anthony Gyimah, sought rescission and damages after the transaction with the Church failed to close due to a dispute over key delivery.

The Church counterclaimed for specific performance or damages.

The court found both parties partially successful but awarded the plaintiff the majority of his claim, with a small damages award to the Church.

The court considered the conduct of both parties in determining costs, ultimately awarding the plaintiff partial indemnity costs against the Church, and substantial indemnity costs to Mr. Lehoux, but in a reduced amount.

The court also addressed the appropriate rate and period for prejudgment interest.

The applicant, a commercial tenant, sought relief from forfeiture after its lease was terminated for nonpayment of rent.

The court found that the landlord did not waive its right to terminate the lease, as any waiver required written confirmation, which was absent.

The tenant was in substantial arrears and failed to pay rent for several months.

The court also found that the landlord did not breach the lease by failing to provide notice, as the lease allowed termination for nonpayment after 15 days without notice.

The application for relief from forfeiture was dismissed, as the tenant delayed bringing the application, the lease was about to expire, and a new tenant had already occupied the premises.

The decision concerns a failed real estate transaction in which the plaintiff, Anthony Gyimah, sought rescission and damages after refusing to close on a property purchase due to a dispute over the delivery of keys.

The court found that the plaintiff breached the agreement of purchase and sale (APS) by refusing to close, as the keys were made available for pickup in Cochrane and there was no contractual requirement for delivery to Toronto.

The court awarded the defendant Church damages of $219.61 and ordered repayment to the plaintiff of the balance of funds held in trust, with interest earned, totaling $70,142.23.

The case against the Church’s lawyer, Andre Lehoux, was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following the settlement of an application to assess a legal account.

The Applicant had made an Offer to Settle in February 2020, which the Respondent purported to accept in June 2024, after having already consented to the assessment in May 2024.

The court found that the Offer to Settle did not explicitly provide for the disposition of costs, thus entitling the Applicant to costs under Rule 49.07(5) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Despite the Applicant's claim for over $8,000, the court deemed this excessive and disproportionate, ultimately awarding the Applicant $4,000 in partial indemnity costs, to be set off against any amount the Applicant might owe the Respondent after the assessment.

The court criticized the Respondent's unreasonable delay in consenting to the assessment.

This decision concerns a motion for costs brought by the defendants, Alexander Gerstein and Ethan Gerstein (the "Moving Defendants"), after the plaintiffs discontinued their action and agreed to vacate a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) on the Moving Defendants' property.

The Moving Defendants sought full indemnity costs, alleging egregious conduct by the plaintiffs, including material misrepresentations and omissions when obtaining the ex parte CPL, unfounded fraud allegations, and uncooperative conduct during the motion.

The court found that the plaintiffs' numerous and significant failures to make full and fair disclosure, coupled with their belated and uncooperative conduct, amounted to a material misrepresentation.

The court awarded full indemnity costs of $115,000 to the Moving Defendants, finding the plaintiffs' conduct sufficiently egregious and reprehensible.

The plaintiffs brought a motion in the Superior Court for injunctive relief to restrain the defendants from dealing with a property, pending a motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The court declined jurisdiction, finding that the Court of Appeal, under section 134(2) of the Courts of Justice Act, was the proper forum to hear motions for interim relief pending an appeal or leave to appeal.

The Superior Court emphasized that the appellate court is in the best position to determine the merits of the underlying appeal, which is a key factor in granting interim relief.

The motion was therefore transferred to the Court of Appeal.

This decision provides supplementary reasons regarding a motion to discharge a certificate of pending litigation (CPL).

The applicants, 10381187 Canada Inc. and Elias Markos, leased a property from the respondent, Elena Cherny, for short-term rentals.

After the City of Toronto issued an Order to Comply due to illegal construction, Cherny prevented the applicants' access.

The applicants sought specific performance and damages, registering a CPL.

Cherny moved to discharge the CPL.

The court had previously ruled that specific performance was not an available remedy as damages were adequate.

In these supplementary reasons, the court declined to add a condition to the CPL discharge order to preserve the applicants' right of first refusal, reaffirming that specific performance was unavailable because the property was not unique and damages were an adequate remedy.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a motion brought by Metro Ontario Real Estate Limited ("Metro") to strike paragraphs from Hillmond Investments Ltd.'s ("HIL") Reply and Defence to Counterclaim.

The motion was settled on consent, with the issue of costs deferred.

Metro sought $10,944.63 on a partial indemnity scale, while HIL argued for no costs.

The Master found that HIL's refusal to engage in discussions regarding amendments until the day before the motion necessitated the motion and was the primary factor contributing to the costs incurred.

Considering the proportionality and the conduct of the parties, the Master awarded Metro fixed costs of $4,000.

The respondent, Elena Cherny, leased a house to the applicants, 10381187 Canada Inc. and Elias Markos, for a 10-year term, with the understanding that it would be renovated into six units for short-term rentals.

Cherny completed the renovations without proper planning permission or building permits.

After a City of Toronto Order to Comply, Cherny restored the house to a single-family dwelling and locked out the applicants.

The applicants sought specific performance of the lease and damages, registering a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) on the property.

Cherny brought a motion to discharge the CPL.

The court found that damages would be an adequate remedy for any breach of the lease, as the property was not unique in the commercial context of short-term rentals, and specific performance was not possible given the unlikelihood of obtaining the necessary zoning variances.

The CPL was discharged with conditions to protect the applicants' potential damages award, and a trial was ordered to determine the legality of the lease and whether Cherny breached it.

The appellants, former clients of a law firm, appealed an order dismissing their application to assess 33 legal accounts issued between November 2010 and July 2013.

The appellants sought assessment on grounds of dissatisfaction with services and alleged overcharging, claiming special circumstances warranted assessment despite the application being brought more than 12 months after the accounts were issued.

The appellants argued they had only received the accounts in 2016 as a package with a demand letter, and cited their unsophistication, the high amount in dispute, and growing dissatisfaction as additional special circumstances.

The application judge rejected these arguments, finding the appellants' claim of non-receipt lacked credibility and noting they were sophisticated individuals who had previously paid substantial amounts and had not expressed dissatisfaction when services were rendered.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal.

The applicant brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) to strike portions of the statement of claim or dismiss the action against them, arguing it failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiffs had invested in a syndicated mortgage and lost their investment, alleging breach of contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy against various defendants.

The court found the pleadings deficient for all claims against the moving party due to a lack of specific facts establishing proximity, duty of care, or particulars as required by Rule 25.06(8).

The claims against the moving party were struck, but leave was granted to the plaintiffs to amend their statement of claim within 30 days.

Costs were awarded to the moving party on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant appealed a Master's decision granting the respondent leave to amend its pleading to withdraw admissions.

The appellant argued the Master committed a palpable and overriding error by allowing amendments that were not based on newly discovered facts but rather on improving the respondent's litigation position, particularly in the context of a pending summary judgment motion.

The court found the Master misapprehended the evidence by confusing factual matters with advocacy positions and that there was no reasonable explanation for the late and strategic withdrawal of admissions.

The appeal was allowed, the Master's order set aside, and the respondent's motion to amend dismissed.

The Receiver sought a discharge order, addressing the enforceability of an indemnity agreement and entitlement to an HST refund.

The Indemnifying Parties argued the receivership proceeding was an improper venue for contract breach claims and raised misrepresentation defenses regarding the indemnity agreement, as well as a potential claim for the Receiver's alleged mismanagement of life insurance policies.

The court found the receivership proceeding an appropriate venue, granted summary judgment on the enforceability of the indemnity agreement, and denied a stay of enforcement.

The court also deferred the HST refund issue for further clarification.

The plaintiff insurers alleged a conspiracy to defraud by the defendants involving false medical assessment reports and invoices for statutory accident benefits claimants.

The moving defendants sought directions on producing medical documentation containing personal health information (PHI) of non-party claimants.

The court held that the claimants' consent in the Application for Accident Benefits (OCF-1) was broad enough to permit disclosure in civil litigation.

Furthermore, section 49(1) of the Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004 (PHIPA) independently permitted the plaintiffs, as recipients, to use and disclose PHI for the action's purposes.

To address privacy concerns, the court directed that PHI be filed separately in a sealed envelope with the presiding judicial officer, not in the public court file.

The defendants brought a motion under rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike portions of the statement of claim alleging conspiracy, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and unjust enrichment arising from allegedly false insurance assessment claims.

The court applied the “plain and obvious” test for striking pleadings and held that the conspiracy claim was redundant under the merger doctrine where the same damages were claimed for fraudulent misrepresentation.

Claims against the individual defendants were also struck due to insufficient pleaded facts establishing personal tortious conduct separate from the corporate defendants.

However, the court found the pleadings sufficiently disclosed causes of action for fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and unjust enrichment when read generously.

Leave was granted to amend the statement of claim.

The defendants appealed a master's order dismissing their motion to compel answers to a demand for particulars in an action alleging fraud and misrepresentation.

The motion had been dismissed because the defendants did not file an affidavit stating that the requested particulars were necessary to plead.

The court held that under Rule 25.06(8) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, full particulars are mandatory where fraud is alleged and affidavit evidence from the moving party is not required to obtain them.

The court further held that the plaintiffs’ affidavit of documents and production of extensive documentation did not sufficiently identify the specific fraudulent acts alleged.

The appeal was allowed and the plaintiffs were ordered to provide detailed particulars of each alleged fraud.

The applicant sought relief from forfeiture after its month‑to‑month commercial tenancy at the Ontario Food Terminal was terminated.

The tenant argued that the landlord lacked cause or a legitimate business reason for termination and that the notice failed to comply with the Commercial Tenancies Act.

The court held that the lease expressly permitted termination by either party on 30 days’ written notice and that the tenancy was properly terminated in accordance with both the agreement and the statute.

The court rejected the argument that the Ontario Food Terminal Board required cause or a legitimate business justification to exercise its contractual termination right.

Relief from forfeiture was therefore unavailable because the lease had been terminated pursuant to its terms rather than forfeited for breach.