3 total
A new trial was ordered because the trial judge failed to analyze conflicting expert evidence.
The appellant (defendant at trial) appealed a judgment awarding damages for a respiratory injury allegedly caused by being sprayed with a fire extinguisher.
The appeal raised issues regarding the admission of participant expert evidence, the adequacy of the trial judge's reasons for not considering defence expert evidence on causation, and the quantum of non-pecuniary damages.
The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons insufficient for failing to analyze the appellant's expert evidence on the diagnosis of Reactive Airways Disorder Syndrome (RADS) and for relying on an unqualified expert's incorrect summary of other specialists' views.
The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.
Defendant found liable for plaintiff's severe respiratory injury caused by accidental fire extinguisher discharge.
The plaintiff was shopping at the defendant's store when an employee accidentally discharged a fire extinguisher in his face.
The defendant admitted liability but disputed causation and damages, arguing the plaintiff's subsequent severe respiratory issues were a natural progression of a pre-existing illness.
The court applied the 'but for' test and the thin skull doctrine, finding that the incident caused the plaintiff to develop Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome (RADS).
The court awarded the plaintiff $225,000 in non-pecuniary damages, along with significant awards for past and future income loss, and subrogated claims.
Applicant found to have sustained a catastrophic impairment exceeding the 55% whole person impairment threshold.
The applicant was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident in Georgia and sought a determination that he sustained a catastrophic impairment under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.
The parties' medical experts disagreed on the applicant's whole person impairment (WPI) rating, with the applicant's experts assessing it between 62% and 71%, and the insurer's experts assessing it between 48% and 51%.
The arbitrator preferred the evidence of the applicant's experts, finding that the applicant's physical and psychological impairments, when combined, exceeded the 55% threshold.
The arbitrator also found that the accident materially contributed to the applicant's impairments, including his atrial fibrillation and peripheral neuropathy, despite the insurer's arguments regarding pre-existing susceptibility.
The applicant was found to have sustained a catastrophic impairment.